The German Side of the Hill: Nazi Conquest and Exploitation of Italy, 1943-1945 by Saxon, Timothy D.
The German Side of the Hill: 
Nazi Conquest and Exploitation of Italy, 1943-45 
Timothy D. Saxon 
Ruckersville, VA 
B.A., Averett College, 1977 
M.Div., Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1980 
M.A., University of Virginia, 1987 
A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty 
of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Corcoran Department of History 
University of Virginia 
January 1999 
© Copyright by 
Timothy Dale Saxon 
All Rights Reserved 
January 1999 
ABSTRACT 
The view that German and Allied forces fought a senseless campaign for haly 
during the Second World War prevails in many histories of that conflict. They present 
the battle for Italy as a bitterly-contested. prolonged fight up the peninsula. wasting 
Allied men and resources. 
Evidence contradicting this judgment shows that Italy's political, economic, 
geographic, and military assets between the years 1943 and 1945 made it a prize worth 
winning. Allied leaders never grasped this fact nor made an effective effort to deny 
Germany this valuable asset. 
The German defense ofItaly secured the loyalty of Axis allies in Eastern Europe 
and permitted the establishment of a Fascist Italian puppet state under Benito Mussolini. 
11 
Moreover, Germany reaped an enormous harvest of agricultural and economic 
products in Italy. German estimates that Italy contributed between fifteen and twenty-
five percent of total output in late 1944 show that it was truly a prize worth winning. The 
Italian economy provided large quantities of consumer goods for Germany, freeing up 
industrial plants in the Reich for military production. In late 1944, Italian manufacturers 
shifted operations and directly supported German forces fighting in Italy. Italian skilled 
labor contributed substantially to the German 'economic miracle' of 1944. 
The battle for Italy further aided Germany in pressuring Switzerland to supply 
vital goods and keep open rail lines through the Swiss Alps without which German troops 
could not have survived in Italy. The Swiss, surrounded by German forces, used their 
isolation as a convenient reason to reject Allies entreaties that they reduce assistance to 
Hitler. 
Occupation of northern Italy also kept Allied air forces far from the Reich's 
southern boundaries and allowed the continued Gennan exploitation of the natural 
resources in the Balkans, a key asset that fed the Gennan war machine. 
lIa 
Finally, Germany enlisted substantial numbers of Italian laborers and troops who 
supported its fighting forces and served in antipartisan units. Italian workers kept vital 
rail lines repaired while Fascist Italian divisions supplemented defenses in coastal and 
Alpine sectors. Moreover, Italian military equipment captured in 1943 assisted in 
rebuilding German units crippled in the summer campaign of 1944. 
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CHAPTERl 
ITALY 1943: A PRIZE WORTH WINNING? 
Subjugating the e:ne:my's army without fighting is the: true pinnacle of c:xcc:lIencc:. 
Thus the highest realization of war1ilrc: is to attack the enemy's plans; 
next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; 
and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. 
Sun·tzu., T1r6 Art ofWazI 
INTRODUCTION 
Military historians have long contented themselves either with neglecting the 
grand strategic dimensions of the Italian campaign or railing against the ineptitude 
of a favorite villain. This distortion stems from the fragmentary state of the 
historiography of the Italian campaign. In particular, after the passage of a half 
century, we still lack a serious study of the German 'side of the hilL' This fissure 
running through previous accounts effectively and seriously distorts the historical 
record. 
This dissertation does not present a complete account of German military 
operations in Italy between 1943 and 1945.2 Instead, it examines German operations 
while asserting a strongly revisionist thesis that opposes the currently held 'gospel' 
1 Sun-tzU, The An o/War, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (New York: Barnes and 
Noble, 1994), 177. 
2See the forthcoming volume of Das Dritte Reich und tier Zweite Weltkrieg by 
Gerhard Schreiber containing the relevant chapters on Italy. 
1 
2 
concerning the Italian campaign. Given Italy's political, economic, geographic, and 
military assets between the years 1943 and 1945, Italy was a prize worth winning. Nazi 
Germany, in the person of a capable and persistent foe, Field Marshal Albert 
Kesselring, both thwarted Allied strategic goals in Italy and achieved its own. 
Archival records show that Italian resources materially assisted German 
prosecution of the war after 1943. The German takeover of Italy, fairly described as 
the Wehrmacht's last victory, ensured that the war wound down more slowly than it 
otherwise would have. If this argument can be proven, then it stands to reason that 
the Italian campaign was neither a necessary evil nor a misuse of Allied forces better 
employed elsewhere. In fact, the Allies employed too few troops in Italy. Defective 
strategic analysis before and during the long battles up the Italian peninsula caused 
them to miss a strategic prize of great value. 
RECENT mSTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 
The German conquest and occupation of Italy remained controversial long after 
the end of the Italian campaign. Many Germans seeking a historical account of their 
nation's occupation of Italy found it hard to establish the record. German historians 
and participants in the Italian occupation long cast Nazi actions in the mold of 
Italian treason and German response.3 They argued that German brutality could 
3For an example of German attitudes at the time of the Italian surrender see 
"Der Verrat Italiens," in: Luftflottenkommando 2/Fii Abt Ic BildiStabsbildabteilung, 
"Durchfiihrung von Landungsunternehmen - Die engl.-amerikanische 
Grosslandung im Raum Salerno am 9 Sept. 43," Frames 257-298, OKL/2600, Ro1189, 
T-311, RG 242. (College Park, Md.: National Archives II [Hereafter NAll]), 294-95. 
3 
only be understood in light of Italy's treacherous betrayal of the Axis alliance. 
Proponents of this view justified German behavior toward Italians by casting 
Germany as the trUe victim, meting out to Italians the harsh punishment that they 
deserved. 
No one seriously challenged this interpretation until the early 1980s. A new 
generation of critical German historians attacked the presumptions of Italian treason 
and cowardice. They argued that Italy had not treacherously abandoned its German 
ally simply to avoid the punishment that fell on Germany after the war. Research 
showed that Italian civilian and military leaders acted in keeping with Italian 
national interests. Italy's exhausted economy and its battered armed forces made 
further resistance hopeless. 
Benito Mussolini recognized this and sought modification of German strategic 
priorities. Given Italy's weakened state in 1942, he pressed Hider to transfer Axis 
forces fighting in Russia to the west. Mussolini correcdy judged that Italy could not 
defend itself unless the Axis strengthened its western defenses. When Mussolini fell 
from power, unlike the German populace, Italians chose not to follow Adolf Hitler 
and fight the war to its bitter end. A new generation of German historians have 
argued that Italians acted more rationally and sensibly than did Germans. Italy did 
not betray Germany. Italian officials acted in their nation's best interests after 
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's views are revealed by comments in Kesselring: A 
Soldiers Record (New York: Morrow, 1954),207-08,219. 
4 
having correctly estimated the hopelessness of the Axis position.4 
Recent historians of the Italian campaign have built upon this new approach to 
more accurately account for the German occupation of Italy. Richard Lamb's War in 
Italy 1943-1945: A Brutal Story uncovered evidence of widespread German atrocities. 
Using long-neglected Italian records, Lamb demolished postwar efforts seeking to 
rebuild the moral reputation of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. Lamb effectively 
refuted the assertions of Kesselring and his defenders that this great soldier was 
unaware of and unsullied by his troops' atrocities. 
Lamb had trained and served with Italian troops who fought as allies of the 
Anglo-American forces. He used that experience and Italian military records to 
counter German denigration of Italian military performance during the chaotic days 
following Italy's surrender in September 1943. Detailing the skillful Italian defense 
of Rome, he documented that surrender came only after Kesselring threatened the 
aerial destruction of that great city. Italian officers knew that Kesselring's aircraft 
had bombed the historic center of Rotterdam in 1940. They dared not risk Rome's 
ruination, given the failure of Allied forces to assist the city's defense. German 
troops marched into Rome only after Italian defenders capitulated rather than see its 
4For an excellent analysis of this historiographical change of course, see J ens 
Petersen's analysis, "Deutschland und Italien 1939 bis 1945," inDer Zweite Weltkrieg, 
ed. Wolfgang Michalka (Munich: Piper, 1989), 116. Petersen correctly credits Erich 
Kuby's seminal work for inspiring much of this movement away from blaming 
Italians for pursuing a rational course in their own best interest. Erich Kuby, Verrat 
aUf Deutsch: Wie das Dritte Reich Italien ruinierte (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 
1982). 
5 
inhabitants and monuments destroyed.s 
Jens Petersen, James Sacikovich, and Gerhard Schreiber have similarly aided in 
this reappraisal of the German campaign in Italy.6 Their work leaves most American 
accounts of the campaign in need of revision. The work of American military 
historian Carlo D'Este underscores the necessity of updating American accounts of 
the war in the Italian theater. Speaking to a recent conference on the role of Italian-
Americans in the Second World War, D'Este described this campaign as "bitter and 
indecisive." He portrayed it as having been fought without clear strategic goals. His 
views indict Allied leaders on a charge of squandering their soldiers' lives in a 
campaign unworthy of their sacrifice.7 While it may be true that generals on both 
sides wasted lives, those losses served a greater strategic purpose than is often 
recognized. German losses bought Hider time to delay the end of his 'Thousand-
Year Reich.' 
THE LINGERING WOUNDS OF WAR 
On March 23,1944, Gruppi de Azione Patriotica (Groups for Patriotic Action) 
SLamb, War in Italy. 
6Petersen, "Deutschland und Italien 1939 bis 1945"; James Sacikovich, 
"Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II," Journal of 
Contemporary K%Story 24 (1989); Gerhard Schreiber, Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen in 
Italien: Tater, Opfer, Strafoerfolgung (Munchen: C.H. Beck, 1996). 
7Carlo D'Este, "The War in the Mezzogiomo -- 1943-1944, A 50 Year Personal 
Perspective" (Hartford, Ct., April 21-23, 1995), Paper delivered at "Italy and America, 
1943-44: Italian, American and Italian-American Experiences of the Liberation of 
the Mezzogiomo," 2. 
6 
partisans struck a bold blow against the German garrison occupying Rome. Nazi 
officials had previously declared Rome an 'open city.' The illegal German 
occupation infuriated the men and women of GAP. Moreover, daily SS Police 
parades through city streets constantly reminded Italian partisans of the occupiers' 
brutality. GAP partisans took advantage of the German failure to vary march routes. 
After careful study, a GAP unit positioned explosives in a street sweeper's cart along 
the chosen thoroughfare. The ensuing explosion wreaked havoc among the men of a 
SS Police company, killing thirty-three. 
News of the attack outraged Adolf Hitler, who demanded swift retaliation. 
Herbert Kappler, head of SS forces in Rome, complied by hastily gathering and 
executing 335 Italian hostages. Kappler found 280 victims by emptying Rome's jails 
of political prisoners, many members of various partisan forces. Kappler's chosen 
scapegoats also included a substantial number of Jews. When Pietro Caruso, Rome's 
Fascist police chief, fell short of his quota, he made good the deficit by summarily 
arresting men and boys from the city's streets.8 
8Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's interrogation ofField Marshal Albert Kesselring 
on 13 March 1946 included Kappler's report of the categories of "offenses" present 
among victims of the massacre. 176 had "committed acts punishable by death." 
Twenty-two had had their cases marked closed, but were executed anyway. Four had 
been condemned to death. Four had been arrested near the scene of the crime. 
Kappler is said to have told Kesselring that he added 57 Jews to the final number of 
hostages. When asked to justify the ratio of Italian victims to German dead, 
Kesselring argued that the unsettled situation at the front required the exaction of 
such vengeance. See Kesselring's testimony in: Trial of the Major War Criminals 
Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, Germany, 1948) [Hereafter 
IMT], IX:232. 
7 
The condemned Italians traveled from Rome's Regina Coeli prison to the nearby 
Ardeatine caves on March 24. Executions of the bound hostages, marched to their 
death by fives, required four hours and lasted from 2:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. 
Kappler murdered an indeterminate number of hostages with his pistol. After the 
killings, Kappler's men drowned the memory of the massacre in brandy as German 
engineers tried to wipe out evidence of the atrocity. Their efforts to seal the caves 
failed. Italians quickly discovered the site and sought permission to bury dead 
family members. German authorities responded by sending troops to secure the 
location and to prevent exhumation of the dead for burial. 
In November 1946, a British military court convicted several high ranking 
German military officers for their role in this crime. In May 1948, the Rome 
Military Tribunal tried Kappler and five others, convicting Kappler and jailing him 
for life. The former SS officer served his sentence in an Italian prison until he 
escaped to Austria in 1977. Kappler died in 1979, still free and unrepentant.9 
The wounds of the Ardeatine caves' massacre lingered in Italy a half century 
later. Italian leaders marked the occasion annually with services of mourning at the 
site. Italian prosecutors persisted in their efforts to find and punish Nazis 
9 Maria de Blasio Wilhelm details the Ardeatine caves massacre from the 
Italian partisans' view point in The Other Italy: The Italian Resistance in World War II 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1988), 101-103. Richard Lamb's research 
implicates Field Marshal Albert Kesselring in the massacre. Lamb's exhaustive 
research of Italian records provides a guide through the tortuous legal aspects of the 
events and subsequent trials arising from the massacre. See War in Italy, 1943-1945: 
A Brutal Story (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993),56-64. 
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responsible for the killings long after World War Two ended. Pressured by angry 
Italians, prosecutors demanded and received the extradition of a principal 
participant in November 1995. Argentinian officials expelled to Italy an eighty-two-
year-old German, SS Captain Erich Priebke. The long-sought Priebke had 
previously avoided facing charges stemming from his role in the executions. 
Priebke had escaped from British custody in 1946 and joined other Nazi war 
criminals fleeing to South America. He evaded authorities searching for him and 
settled in Argentina. Priebke maintained his true identity while resident in 
Argentina, confident that he was beyond the re3ch of prosecutors. Investigators 
later discovered that Priebke made annual visits to the German Embassy in Buenos 
Aires to revalidate his German passport. He uSLd that passport twice to visit Rome. 
German diplomatic officials never disclosed his travels, nor did Argentinian 
authorities offer to extradite Priebke. In 1994, Priebke finally blundered when he 
admitted his role in the Ardeatine massacre to ABC News reporter Sam Donelson. 
Priebke's declaration caused a public outcry that forced the Argentinian government 
to expel him as a war criminal. 
Priebke insisted that he had merely 'followed orders' in conducting the 
massacre. His justification of the atrocity enraged Italians familiar with the events of 
March 1944. Nonetheless, the families of victims declared that they were not seeking 
vengeance by demanding that Priebke be tried fifty years after his crimes. Instead, 
they hoped for an accurate account of the Ardeatine killings. Priebke's advanced age 
and his extended period of freedom in Argentina ruled out the possibility of real 
9 
justice. Most Italians feared that Priebke, like Kappler, would ultimately escape 
punishment. 10 
The events of this trial, labeled as the last serious Nazi war crime trial likely to 
be conducted, show the lingering scars of the bitterly-fought war for Italy, now more 
than half a century distant. However, before we can understand the events that 
birthed this abiding anger, it is first necessary to understand the circumstances that 
existed in the central Mediterranean in late 1942 and early 1943. 
GRAND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 
Like its counterpart in Burma, the Italian theater remained an orphan theater in 
Allied strategic planning. The inadequate initial commitment of forces and frequent 
shifting of veteran troops to other battlefronts designated Italy as a backwater after 
late 1943. Nonetheless, a close examination of the strategic stakes in Italy reveals 
that it should not have become the 'Burma' of the European Theater. 
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Mussolini's Italy correctly occupied a prominent position in Allied grand 
strategy in early 1943. The defeat of Italy represented an opportunity to strike an 
important political blow against the Axis. Its swift conquest would remove 
Germany's only real 'parmer' from the war. As 1943 began, significant numbers 
10Reuter, "Argentina Extradites Ex-Nazi," Washington Post, November 21 
1995, A13; Daniel Williams, "Nazi Horror Still Haunts Eternal City," Washington 
Post, November 221995, A21, A23. 
10 
Italian troops still fought in Russia and North Africa Italian forces also occupied 
Greece, the Balkans, and southern France. German leaders would be hard-pressed to 
replace Italy's military forces in the event of a surrender. 
Allied leaders also hoped that Italian capitulation would undermine the loyalty 
and will to fight of Germany's allies and bolster Anglo-American international 
prestige. Italian surrender endangered Hungary and Romania by positioning Allied 
forces closer to them and by raising the threat of Turkish entry into the conflict as 
an Allied parmer. Moreover, if Turkey, Spain, and Switzerland adopted a stricter 
interpretation of their neutrality, the loss of exports from the three nations would 
constrict German war production. 
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
More lay at stake in Italy than dealing a body blow to the Nazi Reich. Historians 
frequendy note Italian economic weakness before the Second World War. Italy's 2.7 
percent of global industrial production compared poorly with either Britain's 9.2 
percent or Germany's 10.7 percent. ll Mussolini used Italian economic and military 
weakness to justify his abrogation of duties incurred under the 1939 Pact of Steel. 
Hider's sudden announcement of his intention to invade Poland angered Mussolini. 
TheDuce had not expected the next European war to begin before 1943. Surprised 
llSadkovich, "Understanding Defeat," 34; Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd 
Stegemann, and DedefVogel, Germany and the Second World War, trans. Dean S. 
McMurry, Ewald Osers, and Louise Willmon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
ill: 29. 
11 
and worried by his German counterpart's accelerated plan of action, Italy did not 
join Hitler's war against France, Great Britain, and Poland. Mussolini argued that 
Italy's poor economic and military condition precluded early intervention. Count 
Galeazzo Ciano backed up his leader's argument by presenting Hitler with a fantastic 
shopping list of raw materials and arms that Italy required as its price for supporting 
the German conquest of Poland. The Italian ploy discouraged Hitler from further 
pursuing Italian participation in the conflict.12 
A different picture of Italy'S economic status emerged after the German takeover 
of northern and central Italy in 1943. Despite an exhaustive survey of the Italian 
economy in May 1943, a positive picture of Italy's industrial capabilities emerged.13 
German officials quickly inspected the modem northern Italian industrial base 
occupied during the Italian surrender in September 1943. To their surprise, they 
discovered large, carefully-hoarded stockpiles of raw materials. 
12Hermann Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Germany and Its Allies in World War 
IL· A Record of Axis Collaboration Problems (Frederick, Md.: University Publications 
of America, 1980), 72-73; Gerhard L. Weinberg,A World at Arms: A Global History of 
World War II (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994),38; Peter 
Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the 
Second World War, 2nd edition (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 100; Ferdinand Siebert, 
"Der deutsch-italienische Stahlpakt: Entstehung und Bedeutung des Vertrages vom 
22. Mai 1939," Vzerteljahresheftfiir Zeitgeschichte 7, no. 4 (Okt. 1959):372-95. 
l3Oberkommando der Wehrmacht W Stb (Ausl), "Die Wehrwirtschaft 
Italiens," Document AL 2890 (OKW W Stb (Ausl) 2.1l a Az 3 i 10 Nr. 3901143 
g.Kdos.) (Imperial War Museum, London [Hereafter IWM]). 
12 
The extent of the stockpiling astonished all involved in the assessment.14 Field 
Marshal Albert Kesselring charged the Italians with pursuing "a deliberate policy of 
hoarding quite beyond my comprehension. The discovery, after the defection of the 
Italians in 1943, of vast stores of unused war material is alone sufficient proof of this 
cheese-paring."ls Major General Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand confirmed this after 
the war. He explained how Italian industrialists had built their stockpiles. 
Italy, for instance, would make counterrequests for large quantities of raw 
materials and coal. In this connection, moreover, as was discovered after the 
defection of Italy in September 1943 when the Italian armament industry was 
more strictly controlled by German agencies, the Italian government had never 
been in full control of its industries. Raw materials sent from Germany for 
armament purposes were found hoarded for post-war purposes.16 
Hans Henrici later told Allied officials [hat northern Italy possessed "a 
sufficient number of highly modem factories." Moreover, [hey had "the best and 
most modem machines of German, American and Swiss origin." Production in Italy 
had the further advantage oflessening demands on an already strained 
I4Hans Henrici, "The Use ofItalian Industry in [he Service of German 
Munitions Production," NARA Microfiche Publication MI035 Fiche 0009, Foreign 
Military Studies, D-Series (RG 338) D-0015 (1947), 1-2; Dr. Hans Leyers, "Italian 
War Production subsequent to 13 September 1943.," NARA Microfiche Publication 
M1035 Fiche 0003 Foreign Military Studies, D-Series (RG 338) 0-0003 
(Washington, D.C., 1947),3-4; Lutz Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bundnis und Besatzung: 
das nationalsozialistiche Deutschland und die Republik von Saw 1943-1945, Bibliothek 
des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom, vol. 75 (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 
1993),116. 
ISKesselring,A Soldier's Record, 119. 
I6Hermann Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Germany and Its Allies in World War 
II: A Record of Axis Collaboration Problems (Frederick, Md.: University Publications 
of America, 1980), 77. 
l3 
transportation net. Every item manufactured in Italy reduced shipping 
requirements by 700 to 1,200 kilometers. Henrici noted that Italy possessed large 
numbers of workers skilled in producing items vitai to the German war economy.17 
German officials, led by Albert Speer, quickly and energetically reorganized 
Italian farming and manufacturing. Production from the factories and fertile fields 
of northern Italy thereafter gready benefitted the German war economy, totaling 
fifteen-plus percent of total Gennan war production during 1944.18 Italian factories 
served the German war machine for many months after the Nazi takeover. They 
churned out highly specialized items that had long formed botdenecks in German 
war production. Italian manufacture of fuses, cartridge and shell casings, long-
barreled antitank and antiaircraft guns, and vehicles helped make up the German 
deficit of such items.19 More will be presented later detailing how Germany profited 
17Henrici, "The Use of Italian Industry in the Service of German Munitions 
Production, 1-2. 
18DeutschIands Riistung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert 
Speer 1942-1945, ed. Willi A. Boelcke (Frankfurt am Main: Akademische 
Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1969), 308. Gyorgy Ranki adds that: "Speer, in a 
speech given on July 11,1944, claimed that "25 to 30 percent of the German war 
production had been furnished by the occupied Western Territories and Italy." 
According to our data, in terms of armament-production [sic] this seems to be an 
overstatement. However, in the broader sense it was close to reality." Speer 
estimated that Italy contributed as much as one-half of all production from the 
occupied nations of western Europe if Italian production stood somewhere between 
13-15% of all German war production as late as July 1944. Gyorgy Ranki, The 
Economics of the Second World War, ed. Helmut Konrad, Bohlaus Zeitgeschichtliche 
Bibliothek, vol. 21 (Vienna; Bohlau Verlag, 1993),342. 
19Hans Henrici, "The Use of Italian Industry in the Service of German 
Munitions Production," 3; R L. DiNardo, MechanizedJuggernaut or Military 
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from stockpiles of rubber, finished steel, and war materials.20 The Germans either 
quickly returned critical materials to the Reich or used the stockpiles for Italian war 
production, outfitting German units fighting in Italy. 
The discovery of hoarded raw materials challenges interpretations of Italian 
economic weakness as emanating from a shortage of such goods. Italian arms 
producers could not match German output item for item. Nonetheless, Italian 
factories could have significantly increased armament production using the 
uncovered materials. Italy's defeat in the production war stemmed more from weak 
state control of the industrial sector than it did from a shortage of raw materials. 
The Italian cornucopia of hoarded raw materials assisted in the rapid expansion of 
German war production in late 1943 and early 1944.21 
Anachronism: Horses and the Germany Army of World War II, Contributions in 
Military Studies, vol. 113 (New York: Greenwood, 1991),75. 
20See David Fraser, Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1993),450. Rommel bemoaned the discovery of "immense 
quantities of Italian military equipment, all dating from the period when he had 
been assured by Comando Supremo that they had nothing with which to improve 
the material of their men in North Africa, that the cupboard was bare." For specific 
lists of arms seized from Italy see : Der Oberbefehlshaber Sud Fuhrungsabteilung 
Ie-EntwUrf, "Bericht uber das Ergebnis der Entwaffnungs-Aktion und die Haltung 
der Italiener im Bereich O.B. Sud," RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), Band 12, OB Sudwest 
18.Juni 1943 - 23.Februar 1944 Abt. Ie (Bundesarchiv\Militararchiv, Freiburg, 
Germany [hereafter BAMA]: Microfiche),204-05. For a comparison of the war 
booty seized in Italy with previous campaigns, see: Gerhard Schreiber, Die 
italienischen Militiirinternieten im deutschen Machtbereich 1943 bis 1945, Beitrage zur 
Militargeschichte, vol. 28 (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990),219. 
21Lucio Ceva and Giorgio Rochat, "Italy," trans. John Gooch, in The Oxford 
Companion to World War II, ed. I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D Foot (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995),585,586. 
IS 
The German war effort also benefitted from control of northern Italy's rich 
agricultural regions, especially the fertile Po Vaiiey.22 A steady stream of agricultural 
produce flowed from the provinces of upper Italy to Germany and to Wehrmacht 
forces fighting in occupied Italy. By December 1943, Italian sources had provided 
41,500 tons of rice to support the German war economy. In 1944, Italian fields, 
orchards, and vineyards supplied wheat, rice, com, oats, rye, potatoes, sugar, fruit, 
vegetables, meat, fat, fish, and wine for German consumption.23 
The German war economy similarly benefitted from the large pool of skilled 
Italian labor. Italians worked in the factories of northern Italy or as forced labor in 
Germany. Moreover, German authorities employed Italian military internees as 
slave labor. Estimates of their numbers have ranged from 600,000 to 1,000,000. 
Many Italian workers labored under horrible conditions, while interned members of 
the Italian armed forces suffered virtual enslavement. The difficulties under which 
internees labored contributed to an estimated 40,000 deaths among them. Nazi labor 
authorities shipped some skilled Italian laborers from the great industrial belt of 
northern Italy to Germany. The majority of skilled workers remained in Italian 
factories producing goods vital to the German war effort until Germany's war 
220berkommando der Wehrmacht W Stb (Aus!), "Die Wehrwirtschaft 
Italiens," Document AL 2890 (OKW W Stb (Ausl) 2./I a Az 3 i 10 Nr.3901l43 
g.Kdos.) (IWM), 7. 
23 Unknown, "Ernahrungswirtschafdiche Bilanzen Italiens. 1. Januar 1944 bis 
31. Juli 1944," Frames 1397414-461, Ro11103, RG T-84, (NAm, 1397414-461. 
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economy collapsed during the winter of 1944-1945.24 
This brief purview of the Italian economy shows that the conquest of Italy 
yielded Germany substantial gains. Stockpiles of raw materials, modem industrial 
plant, large pools of skilled labor, and agricultural production, all located close to the 
fighting front, substantially boosted the output of the German war economy. 
Although optimal performance was never achieved, the occupation and exploitation 
of Italy more than paid the victors' costs. 
GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
After the Second World War, Field Marshal Kesselring and Lieutenant General 
Siegfried Westphal, who served during 1943 and 1944 as Anny Group Cs Chief of the 
General Staff, characterized the Italian front as having played a secondary role in 
German strategic planning. Italy had received priority in shipments of men and 
materiel only during crises, such as the January 1944 Allied landing at Anzio-
Nettuno.2S Both Adolf Hider and American military leaders alike treated the 
Mediterranean conflict as a matter of secondary importance. Only the threat of 
2"The 600,000 figure represents a consensus of opinion among most 
researchers at this date. Henrici, "The Use of Italian Industry in the Service of 
German Munitions Production," 1; Ulrich Herbert, "Labour and Extermination: 
Economic Interest and the Primacy of Weltanschauung in National Socialism," Past 
and Present, no. 138 (February 1993):180-81; IMT, XVI:452; Petersen, "Deutschland 
und Italien 1939 bis 1945," 116-18; Gerhard Schreiber, Die italienischen 
Militiirintemieten, 230-31. 
2SEurope Foreign Military Studies Branch Historical Division Headquarters 
United States Army, "German Strategy During the Italian Campaign," Foreign 
Military Studies, Series B, B-270 (n.d.), 1-2. 
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defeat prevented them from completely neglecting its needs. 
By 1943, Adolf Hitler no longer nurtured his mistaken prewar notion of Italy as 
a world power awaiting its call to greamess. His Italian partner's bungled attempts to 
achieve the status of a world power encumbered Germany's war effort. Italian defeats 
in Greece and North Africa had consumed the country's military might. Italian 
dreams of glory had led Mussolini to spread the war into regions that Hitler 
preferred left undisturbed.26 
The vulnerability of the Balkans to Allied assault lay uppermost in Hitler's 
Mediterranean plans in 1943. The German war economy would have collapsed 
sooner than late 1944 had it been deprived of the flow of bauxite, chromium, and 
copper from the region's mines. Moreover, an Allied move into Yugoslavia 
threatened to sever lines of communication with Romania. Romanian fields and 
wells provided Hitler with essential supplies of wheat and oil. Those commodities 
traveled to Germany on Yugoslavian and Hungarian railroads. Trains bearing 
troops and supplies for German garrisons in Greece and Crete journeyed back down 
the twisting railways of the region. German forces there faced virtual extinction if 
the Allies moved boldly and cut off supply lines transiting the Balkans.27 Without 
26Petersen, "Deutschland und Italien 1939 bis 1945," 112. 
27Walter Baum and Eberhard Weichold, Der Krieg der "Achsenmiichte" im 
Mittelmeer-Raum: Die "Strategie" der Diktatoren, Studien und Dokumente zur 
Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, vol. 14 (Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1973),329; 
Frederick W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian 
Fascism (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 14. 
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exaggeration, Kesselring justified the German occupation of Italy in his memoirs 
with the statement that "[ w]hoever controlled the Brenner and the roads and 
railways running eastwards into Austria and the Balkans and westwards into France 
had a stranglehold on Germany."zs 
The Swiss role in the Italian campaign comprises a further crucial geographic 
consideration rarely emphasized by historians. Swiss acquiescence in Axis railroad 
transit traffic materially assisted the Axis cause during World War II. The terms of 
Switzerland's October 13, 1909 agreement with Italy and Germany required passage 
of nonmilitary rail traffic on Swiss railways.29 That traffic played a central role in the 
German exploitation of the Italian industrial base. As late as January 1945, Germany 
received shipments in excess of 7,000 tons of clothing, fabric, and foodstuffs from 
Italy over Swiss railways. Reverse shipments of German chemicals, iron ore, iron, 
and coal sustained Italy's output of finished goods. 
Protected passage of vital 'nonmilitary' goods along Switzerland's excellent 
28Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 208. 
29Under the terms of the convention between Germany, Italy, and Switzerland 
governing the use of the St. Gothard Railway of l3 October 1909, the Swiss agreed 
"Except for the case of circumstances beyond one's control, the Swiss guarantee use 
of the St. Gothard railway against any interruption. However, the Swiss reserve to 
themselves the right of taking measures necessary to the maintenance of their 
neutrality and for the defense of their nation." The Consolidated Treaty Series, ed. 
Clive Parry (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1980),373; Jerrold M. 
Packard, Neither friend nor foe: the European neutrals in World War II (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 14-15; Jonathan E. Helmreich, "The Diplomacy of 
Apology: U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War IT," Air University Review 
1977 (May-June 1977):29; Urs Schwarz, The Eye otthe Hurricane: Switzerland in 
World War Two (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1980),62-63. 
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railroads enabled German employment of the French Mont Cenis and Italian 
Brenner passes for the movement of essential military supplies and troops. The 
Brenner proved the only practical route for moving war materiel to and from Italy. 
Difficulty in transiting the Mont Cenis pass rendered shipment of most military 
goods across it impractica1.30 Nonetheless, German retention of northern Italy long 
depended on the efficient rail movement of goods across Switzerland. 
Germany encircled Switzerland after occupying Italy. This encirclement 
pressured Swiss government officials to continue rail transit traffic. The German 
presence on Swiss borders counteracted Allied demands that Switzerland halt Axis 
train movements. German threats to cutoff vital shipments of coal and other goods 
ensured that the Swiss continued exporting high-quality war materials to Germany 
and Italy. The German position remained a strong one until Allied forces arrived on 
the Franco-Swiss frontiers in late 1944 and eliminated the German threat to Bern's 
security. 
The turn of the tide against Germany in Russia and North Africa in late 1942 
and early 1943 increased Germany's need to control Swiss railroads. In March 1943, 
fear of German invasion rose to a fevered pitch among the Swiss as warning of an 
assault leaked to Swiss authorities. Disagreement still exists about the seriousness of 
German intentions to move against Switzerland. Nonetheless, Swiss mobilization 
and preparations to demolish strategic rail lines and tunnels highlighted German 
3OSchwarz, Eye of the Hurricane, 62-63. 
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vulnerability to Swiss defensive measures. German authorities may have settled for 
the uncertainty of Swiss control rather than kill the railway still transporting the 
golden eggs.31 
German control of northern Italy encouraged Swiss exports of scarce goods to 
the Reich throughout 1943 and 1944. Optical and watch-making parts, railroad 
switching engines (in great demand given Allied attacks on the German 
transportation network during late 1944 and early 1945), munitions, explosives, and 
high quality machine tools poured into the Reich. The Swiss government not only 
permitted the production of war materiel for the German Reich. Swiss credits up to 
1943 totaled 600 million marks and helped finance Swiss exports to the Reich.32 
Conversely, Allied pressure on Switzerland increased in effectiveness as German 
fortunes waned in late 1944. The Swiss government reacted by adopting a policy 
that assisted the Allies' gradual strangulation of German forces in Italy. Closure of 
the Simplon Tunnel to German transit traffic and cessation of raw material and 
munitions exports occurred in October 1944. Nonetheless, not until February 1945, 
did the Swiss, facing ever-increasing German indebtedness, cease all trade with Nazi 
Germany. Swiss officials conveniently blamed their termination of exports on the 
31JozefGarliriski, The Swiss Corridor: Espionage Networks in Switzerland in 
World War II (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1981), 111-112, 118; Packard, Neither 
friend nor foe, 14-15,315-316; Schwarz, Eye of the Hurricane, 60-61, 64, 88. 
32Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy: AlliedAir 
Power and the German National Railway (Chapel Hill: NC, 1988), 154; Helmreich, 
The Diplomacy of Apology, 26-28; Rinki, The Economics of the Second World War, 
342. 
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German failure to provide materials due to Switzerland as payment for past 
shipments.33 
By early 1945, the imminent economic and military collapse of the Third Reich 
freed Switzerland from the threat of German retaliation. The Swiss quickly adapted 
themselves to the rules of the "New World Order" of 1945. Nonetheless, Swiss goods 
flowed into Hitler's Germany from the summer of 1943 until the spring of 1945. 
This flow resulted in part from the presence of German forces on Swiss borders 
threatening the tiny republic's security. Any net assessment of the Italian campaign 
from a German perspective must add the economic benefits derived from 
Switzerland to the balance sheet. 
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Determining the Italian campaign's outcome requires an appraisal of the 
participants' goals before its initiation and during its course. This necessitates a 
comparison of stated Allied and German military goals if the outcome is to be 
accurately appraised. 
A 'Germany First' policy guided Anglo-American strategic thinking after 
America's December 1941 entry into the Second World War. Crises in the Pacific 
theater reduced the level of forces earmarked for the European theater throughout 
the war. Nonetheless, the goal of first defeating Germany and then dealing with 
33Helmreich, The Diplomacy of Apology, 27, 29; Ranki, The Economics of the 
Second World War, 342. 
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Japan remained paramount in Allied plans.34 
Implementation of the plan to defeat 'Germany Firsr proved that 'the devil is in 
the details.' American leaders grew more confident as their military resources 
expanded. They quickly extended the sinews of American military power around 
the globe. This newly confident American leadership sought a direct and immediate 
confrontation with the locus of German power in Europe. American military leaders 
believed that only a contest of strength with the German army in France would 
defeat the Third Reich. 
American military leaders feared British strategic designs. British strategic 
thinking represented a significant threat to American plans for an early landing in 
France. Winston Churchill argued that peripheral operations near to the European 
heartland offered great rewards. His American counterparts worried that launching 
a major campaign in the Mediterranean could tie down forces necessary for the 
invasion of France. American officials feared that a sizable commitment of forces to 
the Mediterranean would delay or force the cancellation of the main Allied assault 
against northwestern Europe.3s Americans took the British preference for 
Mediterranean operations as evidence of British timidity when faced with the need 
34 Albert N. Garland and Howard McGraw Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of 
Italy, United States Army In World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of 
Operations, vol. 11, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1986), 2; Michael Howard, 
Studies in War and Peace (New York: Viking, 1970), 128-31. 
3sForrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943-1945 (New 
York: Viking, 1973),246-48. 
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to close with and destroy the German armed forces. 
British civilian and military leaders viewed operations through a different 
prism. Their views reflected the accumulated experience of two world wars. A 
rapidly diminishing pool of manpower and materiel made the British hesitant to 
directly confront German forces occupying France. Winston Churchill's 
predilection for peripheral operations, dating back to his service as First Sea Lord 
during the First World War, shaped British strategy. Churchill had championed 
various schemes designed to win quick victory. His hare-brained plans ranged from 
the capture of the Dutch islands of Ameland, Borkum, or Sylt to one eventually 
accepted, the forcing of the Dardanelles by British battleships. All of Churchill's 
scenarios promised short cuts along the torturous road of war. But Churchill's 
daring schemes shared a common defect. Their author consistently miscalculated 
the true cost of his plans.36 
In 1942, Churchill again underestimated the difficulty of winning victory when 
he pressed for an assault upon the Axis's Mediterranean 'soft underbelly'. 
Experience established that it was a 'tough old gut'. Nonetheless, American 
commanders unfairly discounted the intertwined web of factors that drove the 
British to press for the continuation of Mediterranean operations. Britain's 
Mediterranean commitment dated back to the Seventeenth century. Mter centuries 
of effort, Britain possessed an extensive infrastructure constructed to defend its 
36John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1993),108. 
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Mediterranean interests.37 This enormous base, which supported British armies, 
fleets, and air forces, could not be moved as easily as the men, ships, and aircraft that 
it undergirded. 
The global structure of interests and possessions, crucial to the continuation of 
Britain's war effort, complicated British operations. By 1939, British power 
emanated from the flow of Middle Eastern oil and supplies of men and materiel 
provided by India, Southeast Asia, and the Anzac powers. Mediterranean transit 
routes linked these vital interests together. Control of the Mediterranean ensured 
that the stream of men and war materiel passing between the British Empire's many 
parts would continue. 
In June 1940 Italy threatened this route and compelled a British response. 
Britain would lose its grip on the Middle East if Italian warships closed the central 
and eastern Mediterranean. Britain would have lost its oil supply if it had lost the 
Middle East. The petroleum fueling the British war effort would have instead sated 
the voracious thirst of the Axis mechanized war machine for lubricating oil and 
gasoline. Moreover, closure of this artery would have forced the diversion of Allied 
shipping around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa. Lack of 
shipping limited the scope of Allied operations throughout the Second World War. 
An increased requirement for shipping in support of Middle and Far Eastern 
operations might well have been the straw that broke the British camel's back in 
37Howard, Studies in War and Peace, 122. 
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1940. 
Japan entered the war in December 1941 and rapidly defeated British forces in 
Malaysia. After that traumatic blow, British leaders redoubled their efforts to 
control the Mediterranean route to India. Defeat in the Mediterranean would not 
only herald the loss of the Middle East and its vital oil fields. Loss of the Middle 
East meant the meeting of Japanese and German forces in India. An Axis linkup 
there denoted loss of the war for the British and Soviets. German and Japanese 
forces could conduct joint operations against an encircled Soviet Union. The defeat 
of the Soviet Union would have opened the Eurasian heartland's vast treasure house 
of resources for Axis exploitation. This resource base in Russia and India would 
have tipped the scales toward the Axis in the war of production. From the British 
point of view, Mediterranean operations were anything but peripheral. Operations 
designed to ensure British control of the Mediterranean basin formed the foundation 
of British strategy. The closure of the Mediterranean in 1941 carried with it the 
certainty of British defeat.38 
The strategic divergence that developed between Great Britain and the United 
States concerning the Mediterranean's importance shaped Anglo-American 
operations in the theater. The 'tug of war' between British and Americans leaders 
inhibited planning, the deployment of forces, and the development of operations. 
Consequentially, the Allies missed chances to exploit Axis weakness. After the Axis 
38Howard, Studies in War and Peace, 124, 131. 
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defeat in Tunisia, the door to the Mediterranean stood unguarded. Allied planners 
failed to foresee this situation arising or to capitalize on this opportunity. Anglo-
American leaders acted timidly again after the conquest of Sicily. Hider planned to 
withdraw up the Italian peninsula and defend the line of the northern Apennines. 
Allied commanders knew of Hider's intentions from Ultra messages, deciphered 
radio intercepts of German communications encoded by the Enigma apparatus.39 
Moreover, information in Eisenhower's hands provided a clear picture of the pitiful 
state of German forces during the days before Italy's surrender. Inaction let swift 
victory slip from his grasp.40 
Success in North Africa, which released from batde the largest and most 
batdeworthy Allied army in existence, compelled the continuation of Mediterranean 
operations. Should not the Allies have struck a grievous blow against the Germans 
with this army? Circumstances in May 1943 dictated a swift invasion and conquest 
of Italy. Only this type assault would have removed Italy from the Axis alliance. 
Why did that not occur? The failure to conquer Italy resulted from defective 
strategic cooperation. The quarrelsome relationship between British and American 
leaders impeded bold action. Lack of strategic vision blinded the parmers to the 
opportunities awaiting them. German forces in Italy benefitted from the Anglo-
39Martin Blumenson, "Will 'Ultra' Rewrite History?" Army, August 1978, 
44-45. 
40Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy eN ew York: William 
Morrow and Co., 1989),221. 
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American conflict throughout the Italian campaign. 
ALLIED GOALS IN ITALY 
Allied leaders focused on several goals while planning operations in Sicily and 
Italy. First, they sought to tie down German forces in the theater that might have 
been employed against the Soviet Union. German troops fighting in Italy could have 
been used against Operation OVERLORD, the Allied plan to invade northwestern 
Europe. Moreover, employment of Allied troops in the Mediterranean would 
prepare them for future operations, as their combat experience in North Africa had 
done.41 
Defeating Italy stood high on the list of Allied military goals promising large 
returns. Italian divisions occupied large areas of southern France and the Balkans. 
Removing Italian occupation troops from the Axis order of batde would weaken the 
perimeter of , Fe stung Europa.' Soviet and Anglo-American forces had destroyed large 
numbers of Italian divisions in North Africa and Russia. Nonetheless, an extended 
pause in operations might have given Italy time to reconstitute its divisions for 
service at home and abroad. 
Italian surrender offered the additional dividend of neutralizing the Italian 
navy. Two problems confronted the Italian navy during the winter and spring of 
1943. The destruction of the Italian Air Force in the Mediterranean and the 
41Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 4; Dominick Graham 
and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War: The battle for Italy, 1943-1945 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1986),20. 
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inadequate German Lufrwaffo forces available for port defense exposed the remaining 
capital ships of the Italian navy at Taranto and La Spezia to Allied air strikes. A 
series of raids drove Italian naval forces out of Naples, Messina, Cagliari, and 
Navarino between December 1942 and the early months of 1943. Moreover, by early 
April 1943, the worsening oil situation had nearly immobilized the five battleships, 
eight cruisers, and thirty-seven escorts that constituted the remnants of the Italian 
navy.42 Despite the Regina Marina's weakened state, its elimination offered the Allies 
an opportunity to shift the balance of naval power in their favor. The surrender of 
the Italian navy would permit a global reshuffling of naval forces to other theaters 
and a potential savings of merchant shipping in excess of one million tons:B 
Finally, capture of part of Italy would permit the expansion of the Allied 
Combined Bombing Offensive against Germany. Plans made at the Casablanca 
conference in January 1943 envisioned the opening of a second air front in the 
Mediterranean. Capture of the Italian airfields on the plains bordering the southern 
Italian city of Foggia would allow the movement of Allied North African Air Force 
strategic bombardment wings to Italy. Mediterranean-based bombers, in concert 
42Stephen Harvey, "The Italian War Effort and the Strategic Bombing of 
Italy," History, no. 70 (February 1985):40; Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, "The 
Sicilian Campaign Part II," An Cosantoir 10, no. 7 Guly 1950):316; James J. 
Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II, Contributions in Military Studies, vol. 
149 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1994),328-29; James J. Sadkovich, "The 
Italian Navy in World War II: 1940-1943," in Reevaluating Major Combatants of World 
War II, ed. James J. Sadkovich, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 92 (Westport, 
Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1990), 147-48. 
43Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 8. 
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with the Royal Air Force and the 8th U. S. Army Air Force attacking from England, 
could then conduct an 'around the clock' bombardment of Italy and Germany. 
From Italian bases, Allied bombers could wage a more efficient air campaign 
against southern Germany than had been possible from airfields in North Africa. 
Many German factories had been built or had shifted operations to southern 
Germany hoping to escape Allied air raids. From new bases in Italy, Allied planes 
could strike these targets at only half the distance of raids staged from Benghazi and 
Alexandria. Airfields in southern Italy likewise increased the vulnerability of 
production centers in northern Italy, southern France, Romania, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria to the wide.-ranging Allied strategic bombers. Their new location meant 
that they could augment the bombing load carried to target. Fighters accompanying 
the vulnerable B-24 Liberators and B-17 Flying Fortresses from airfields in Italy 
also could dramatically extend their range. The decrease in warning time to Axis 
fighter units would further hinder German defenses against Allied air raids.44 
After the conquest of Sicily and southern Italy, Luftwaffe Field Marshal 
Erhard Milch lamented that the "south and south-east are now in the firing line as 
well ... Our "safe" has been blasted open. .. the distance from Foggia [0 Vienna is 
shorter than from London to Berlin.145 
44Asher Lee, The German Air Force (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), 
129; Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 23. 
45Quote from: David Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Lifo of 
Luftwaffe Marshal Erhard Milch (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973),237. See 
also: Albert Kesselring and et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign (n. p.: Fifth 
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GERMAN GOALS IN ITALY 
The defeat of Rommel's forces at the battle of Alam Halfa in Egypt (August 
30-September 7,1942) ended German offensive operations aimed at driving British 
forces out of North Africa Other than limited tactical offensives, such as that 
conducted against Allied forces at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia (February 14-24, 
1943), the Axis thereafter adopted a defensive operational posture in the 
Mediterranean theater. 
What strategic goals remained paramount in Adolf Hitler's mind from the 
battle of Alam Halfa until the Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943? Although defeat 
loomed on the horizon for Axis forces in North Africa, defense of the northern 
Mediterranean rim did not assume the highest priority in German strategic 
planning.46 Hitler's 'crusade' against Russia remained all-consuming, despite the 
United States Army Headquarters., 1945 [?]), 16; Karl-Heinrich Grafvon 
Klinkowstroem, "Italy's Break-away and the Fighting around Rome (September 
1943)," NARA Microfiche Publication MI03S, Fiche 0197, Foreign Military Studies, 
D-Series (RG 338), D-301 (Washington, D.C., 1947),4. Last few pages include 
comments on this account by Kesselring. Weinberg,A World at Arms, 599. 
46 As evidence of this see: Aufzeichnung aber die Unterredung zwischen 
Reichsmarschall GOring und dem Duce im Palazzo Venezia am 23. Oktober 1943. Goring 
notes Hitler's overriding concern with the battle for Stalingrad at that time. 
Germany. Auswartiges Amt, Akten ZUT Deutschen Auswiirtigen Politik 1918-1945. Aus 
demArchiv des Auswiirtigen Ames, Serie E (1941-1945), vol. IV. 1. Oktober bis 31. 
Dezember 1942 (Gottigen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975), 162-63. Matters had 
not changed as demonstrated by the Hitler-Jodi discussion concerning the need for 
more Italian troops in Russia and Tunisia, 12-1S(?) March 1943, and the 
Lagebesprechung bei C he flSkl. for 1 May 1943. Admiral Donirz, commander-in-chief 
of the German navy, days before the Axis surrender in North Africa, argued against 
Italian policy. He faulted the Italian plan that reserved naval forces to parry an 
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threat of an Allied landing on the Reich's southern flank during the spring of 1943. 
Polite refusals greeted Italian requests for German weapons in early March 1943. 
Tanks, heavy artillery, and antitank weapons went to rebuild German units 
decimated by the winter's fighting in Russia or to units deployed in the ever-
shrinking Tunisian bridgehead. Only after the fall of Tunisia in May 1943 did 
Hitler finally offer Mussolini six first-line German divisions for Italy's defense, an 
offer which Mussolini initially resisted for a variety of domestic reasons.47 
Hitler's view of the Mediterranean's secondary status emerges clearly from the 
Hitler-Mussolini talks of the period. Late in 1942, Mussolini had pressed Hider to 
shift the Axis's center of gravity from Russia to the Mediterranean theater. Having 
accurately predicted the impending Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa, 
Mussolini implored Hider through the German representative in Rome, Enno von 
Rintelen, either to break off fighting with the Russians to seek a negotiated peace or 
to withdraw to a shorter, well-fortified defensive line. Count Ciano's mission in 
December 1942 bore the same request. Unfortunately, Hitler's preoccupation with 
Allied move against Corsica and Sardinia. Donitz argued that the employment of 
every possible unit to assist holding Tunis remained the correct course: Hitlers 
Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokol/fragmente seiner militiinschen KonJerenzen 1942-1945, 
ed. Helmut Heiber. Quellen und Darsrellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 10 (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 184; "KTB der SKL," in Kriegsragebuch der 
Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945, ed. Werner Rahn, Gerhard Schreiber and Hansjoseph 
Maierhofer (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1994), 3. 
47Siegfried Westphal and Baron von Humboldt-Dachroeden, "The 
Reinforcement of the German Army and the development of the ground situation in 
Italy up to the latter's defection," Kesselring 9/24/117 (Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, London [Hereafter LHCMA], 1947),3-4. 
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the struggle for Stalingrad handicapped operations in the Mediterranean. As will be 
seen, Hitler rejected this and other appeals to strengthen Mediterranean defenses.48 
Mussolini, ever me pragmatist, wanted a revision of German strategy based 
upon a realistic analysis of the forces confronting the Axis. At Schl06 Klessheim in 
April 1943, Mussolini again beseeched Hitler to make peace with Russia and to 
employ the German forces released from mat theater to defend the West. Mussolini 
did not mince words, arguing that he now believed it impossible to conquer Russia. 
If so, then a compromise peace in the East might guarantee the defense of the West.49 
Mussolini's entreaties fell on deaf ears, not surprising given the Nazi 
dictator's fundamental understanding of the war as a racial crusade against 
Untermenschen. As Zeev Stemhell argues, Fascist and Nazi ideologies may have 
shared much in common, "but they differed on one fundamental point: the criterion 
of German national socialism was biological determinism. The basis of Nazism was 
racism in its most extreme sense, and the fight against the Jews, against 'inferior 
races,' played a more preponderant role in it than the struggle against 
communism."so Given Hitler's view of Russ!a as a Jewish-Slavic-Communist state, 
48Enno von Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse: Erinnerungen des deurschen 
Militiirattachis in Rom 1936-1943 (Tiibingen und Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich 
Verlag Hermann Leins, 1951), 180, 186. 
49Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklmationen 1932-1945 (Wiesbaden: R. 
Lowit, 1973), vol. 2, part 2, 2004; Melton S. Davis, Who Defends Rome? The Forty-
jive Days,july 25 - September 8, 1943 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972),28. 
sOZeev Stemhell, Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, The Birth of Fascist 
Ideology, trans. David Maisel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994),4-5. 
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he could not compromise. Peace with Russia meant the defeat of Nazism's bedrock 
belief in German racial superiority. 
Mussolini's appeals for peace with Russia and a strengthened defense against 
the Western powers also represented ideological defeat of Hider's ambitious design 
for gaining Lebensraum. Hider's biological determinism excluded assimilating 
'inferior races.' Preservation of pure Aryan bloodlines prevented the expansion of 
Germany by adding 'corrupt and inferior' Jews and Slavs to the Reich. Agreeing 
wholeheartedly with Bismarck, Hitler's nationalism cast about to solve the dilemma 
posed by the Nazi doctrine of 'grow or die.' Hitler found his solution in a grandiose 
plan to seize new territories. Expansion alone would permit the German people to 
grow and ultimately ensure their survival. Not by accident did the German conquest 
of Russia's vast hinterland result in genocidal behavior by German occupiers. Only a 
Social-Darwinist racial war employing extreme measures of 'enslavement and 
eventual annihilation' against Jews, Slavs, and Communists would gain the 
Lebensraum Hider required.51 
Hider's twin goals of racial purity and fulfillment of the 'Drang nach Osten,' 
excluded compromise with Stalin. After the expenditure of so much German blood, 
Hitler could not call off his crusade. Moreover, he always viewed the Mediterranean 
as a sideshow that diverted precious resources from the Russian front. This view 
effectively crippled the German defense of Italy by ensuring that operations had to 
SINorman Rich,HitleTs War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of 
Expansion (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., [1973] 1992), xlii. 
34 
be conducted with limited resources and often contradictory orders.52 Mussolini 
pled in vain with Hider to act upon strategic realities rather than racialist ideology. 
The two dictators held diametrically opposed world views that could not be 
reconciled. 
Nonetheless, Hider did not write off Italy or the Mediterranean basin during 
the time period between the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942 and 
the Sicilian landings in July 1943. Hider still hoped to retain his Italian ally. He 
understood Italy's important role in successfully defending the theater and Italian 
peninsula. Hider contemplated surrendering most of the Italian mainland to the 
Allies only after the July 1943 coup against Mussolini. This willingness to withdraw 
stemmed from his belief that Italy could not be defended without a stalwart Italian 
ally, not from a plan to wash his hands of the Mediterranean theater.53 
Other problematic policies complicated the strategic situation and made 
retention of Italian loyalties a difficult proposition by late 1942. Germany had 
established its position as leader of the Axis alliance. Losses incurred during the 
defeats in Egypt and Russia left Mussolini unable to reconstitute his lost divisions.54 
His report to the Fascist Chamber's Judiciary Committee in December 1942 
52Shelford Bidwell, "Kesselring," in Hitler's Generals, ed. Corelli Barnett eN ew 
York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989),274. 
53Blumenson, "Will 'Ultra' Rewrite History?", 45. 
S4Schreiber, Stegemann and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, 
III: 756. 
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highlighted the severity of Italian losses thus far in the conflict. He noted that 
230,738 Italians had been caprure9, 40,219 killed in action, 85,968 wounded, and 
37,713 reported missing in action.55 
Heavy losses of men and materiel had long since forced Mussolini to 
surrender his fantasy of conducting a 'parallel war' independent of German control. 
But German political and economic interference in the Balkans, an area that Italians 
had long considered their sphere of influence, increasingly turned Italian officials 
against maintaining the Axis alliance in its present form. Growing German 
influence in the Balkans indicated to Italians that living in a German-dominated 
Europe would at best be an unpleasant experience for their nation.56 
Fear of an Allied takeover of Italian naval and air facilities that could be used 
for operations against the German homeland heavily influenced Hitler's decision to 
defend the Mediterranean rim. Field Marshal Keitel told interrogators after the 
war's conclusion that the Germans conducted a forward defense in Italy because the 
''further you keep fighting away from the heart of the country the less danger to the 
heart." He emphasized that the German High Command worried that Allied air 
forces would exploit Italian airfields and interdict German supply lines. Allied 
planes based in Italy could have wreaked havoc on the Wehrmacht's already strained 
55 »Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg? tt Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939-1943, 
ed. Willi A. Boe1cke (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967),310. 
56Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, 7-8. 
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supply capabilities.s7 Field Marshal Kesselring, a highly competent commander of 
both air and land forces, echoed similar sentiments in comments that he later made 
to interrogators. He added that German strategy had to consider the pressure that 
an Allied push in the Mediterranean would exert on both Eastern and Western 
fronts. An Allied drive into Italy potentially opened the door to the Balkans, 
threatening the Reich's survival. S8 
Having seen that the combined strength of German and Italian forces had 
proven inadequate for defending the North African bridgehead, the Axis leadership 
confronted the daunting task of preparing defenses for numerous potential landing 
sites. This list included southern France, Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, the Italian 
mainland, Greece, Crete, and the Greek isles. 
German efforts to prepare an effective defense became the unwitting target of 
clever and successful Allied deception plans. These plans ultimately caused the 
redeployment of Axis forces into areas not targeted for invasion. Hitler, distracted 
by preparations for the critical summer offensive in Russia, at first relied on the 
analysis of the Operations staff of the armed forces (Wehrmacht Fuhrungsstab). 
General Walter Warlimont's officers correctly estimated that the Allies would move 
S7"CW/Oct/45 Notes on the Interrogation ofField-Marshal Keitel," Keitel 
9/24/116 (LHCMA), 1. 
S8Albert Kesselring, "Answers to Liddell Hart's Questions," 9/24/117 
(LHCMA),1. 
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next against Sicily.59 Despite this warning, Allied deception plans led a bewildered 
Hitler to change defensive plans for the Mediterranean. Relying on Allied 
'disinformation,' Hitler shifted German forces away from Sicilian beaches to 
Sardinia and the Balkans, his highest priority in southern Europe.6O 
Field Marshal Kesselring arrived at a different conclusion. Unlike Hitler, he 
thought an Allied invasion of Greece and the Balkans less probable than a move 
against Sicily or Italy. The deployment of Allied forces at the end of fighting in 
Tunisia indicated greater danger to targets directly opposite Tunisia. 61 Kesselring 
worried that an Allied move against Sardinia might lead to flanking operations 
against northern and central Italy as well as southern France, targets of great value to 
the Germans. Securing Sardinia would increase the safety of Allied convoys 
transiting the Mediterranean from German air attacks. Luftwaffe units would have 
to conduct future raids from northern Italy or southern France. The installation of 
S~alter Warlimont, 1m Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 39-45, 3rd ed. 
(Munchen: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1978),335. 
60 Allied deception efforts included the infamous "Operation Mincemeat" in 
which British intelligence duped Hitler by releasing a corpse of an apparent Royal 
Marine officer into the Mediterranean Sea off Spain bearing a copy of the plans for 
an invasion of Greece. Debate raged over the veracity of the plans recovered by the 
Spanish and passed on to the Germans but Hitler grudgingly accepted the 
documents as authentic and shifted his defensive plans accordingly. The classic 
account of "Operation Mincemeat" remains: Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never 
Was (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1954). 
61Westphal and Humboldt-Dachroeden, "The Reinforcement of the German 
Army and the development of the ground situation in Italy up to the latter's 
defection," 1-2. 
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Allied air forces on Sardinia also represented a serious threat to German and Italian 
lines of communication throughout the theater. Kesselring excluded an aggressive 
Allied move against northern Italian ports (Livorno, Genoa, or Venice), concluding 
that they were situated too far from Allied land-based air cover.62 
Since Hitler possessed at best a murky overall strategic conception to guide 
future operations, he kept his options open. One plan contemplated answering an 
Allied invasion of Italy with a rapid withdrawal to the Alps. This alternative 
abandoned Mussolini and his Fascists to the mercies of the advancing Anglo-
American armies. A variant of this plan foresaw fighting a delaying action while 
retreating up the peninsula, thereby buying time to shore up southern Germany's 
defenses. German forces could defend the peninsula as they were defending Russia. 
German divisions could establish linear defenses across the peninsula, surrendering 
ground only when necessary to preserve the irreplaceable fighting forces in Italy. 
But defending southern Italy left both Axis flanks hanging in the air. Allied air 
forces dominated the skies of southern Italy and provided cover for Allied ground 
forces. Allied leaders could be expected to exploit their domination of the 
Mediterranean and Adriatic seas by transporting troops around German flanks, 
thereby isolating and destroying Hitler's armies. 
Although confusion reigned in the highest German quarters about strategic 
goals and anticipated responses to Allied moves, painting a bleak picture of the 
62Kesselring et aI., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 3. 
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German strategic position during the first half of 1943 inaccurately represents the 
Reich's capability to prosecute the war. Despite crippling German losses in Russia 
and North Africa, the overall situation had improved. The maximum number of 
German men had been mobilized for service in the armed forces. They came from 
fine-tuned factories producing increasing numbers of weapons with fewer personnel. 
The mobilization of an army of prisoners-of-war and slave laborers released 
additional German manpower for military service during 1943.63 
The Wehrmacht immediately benefitted from this effort. 1943 proved to be 
thepeak year of German numerical strength during the Second World War. Army 
strength rose to 6.55 millions from the 1942 level of5.75 millions. The Wehrmacht's 
total manpower increased from 8.41 millions to 9.48 millions during 1943.64 As dire 
as the German position was at the beginning of 1943, the disintegration and rot in 
combat units that took place during 1944 and 1945 had not yet taken its toll. Well-
trained, veteran officers and noncommissioned officers led the now battle-hardened 
German Landser. Many new recruits had more than a decade of Nationalist Socialist 
military training that had prepared them for the call to colors. The Allied forces 
ranged against them, especially the hastily-formed American divisions, required a 
heavy expenditure of blood and trial by combat to compensate for the German lead 
63Weinberg,A World at Arms, 587. 
64Jiirgen Forster, Charles Messenger and Wolfgang Petter, "Germany," in The 
Oxford Companion to World War II, ed. 1. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995),469. 
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in combat experience and unit cohesion. 
1943 also provided a staggering reminder of the untapped potential of the 
German war economy when mobilized for total war. A stream of weapons and 
supplies flowed from the Reich's factories to German combat units. As Chart I-I 
demonstrates, Speer's version of a German 'economic miracle' occurred as factories 
drove production of tanks, aircraft, small arms, and munitions to un imagined 
levels.6S 
CHART 1-1 
Economic warfare, Table 2: 
Index of German armaments production 
Ganuary-February 1942 = 100) 
Year Total Weapons Tanks Aircraft Munitions 
prodn. 
1941 98 106 81 97 102 
1942 142 137 130 133 166 
1943 222 234 330 216 247 
1944 277 348 536 277 306 
Jan'45 227 284 557 231 226 
Saurce: Wagenfuhr, R,Die deuzsCM Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, pp. 178-81. [Taken from: 
Martin Fritz, "Economic Warfare," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, p. 321.] 
Not only more weapons, but better weapons poured from German factories. 
6SMartin Fritz, "Economic Warfare," in The Oxford Companion to World War 
II, ed.1. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
320-21. 
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New tanks with improved combat capabilities had been developed, replacing older 
models on which German Panzer units had relied since 1939. The Panther tank, 
sporting sloping armor plate and equipped with a high velocity 75mm cannon, 
proved capable of defeating all but the heaviest Allied armor. Tiger tanks with 
88mm guns struck fear into opponents wherever the lumbering vehicles appeared. 
As they materialized in combat units in 1943, the fighting power of German 
formations rose significandy. American commanders accepted the loss of five M-4 
Shermans, the workhorse of Allied armored formations, for every Panther 
destroyed. 66 Although serious 'teething' problems with the new Panzers lay ahead, 
the combat power of German Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions increased 
dramatically as the new weapons replaced ancient Pzkw IDs and IVs on the 
batdefield. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite German strategic confusion, Anglo-American forces in the 
Mediterranean confronted a potent German army throughout 1943. Allied planners 
could not take lighdy the riposte that German divisions would make against the 
66John Ellis, World War II: A Statistical Survey: The Essential Facts and Figures 
for all Combatants (New York: Facts on File, 1993), 277. As Ellis's Table 87 shows, 
German production of tanks and self-propelled guns rose from 6,180 in 1942 to 
12,063 in 1943. What may have proved more important for Allied forces was the 
even more dramatic increase in the numbers of German armored fighting vehicles 
now wielding a gun with a bore of75mm or larger. Production of such German . 
vehicles rose from 2,841 in 1942 to 11,349 in 1943. See also Max Hastings, Ooerlord: 
D-Day & the Battle for Normandy (New York: Touchstone, 1984), 193-94. 
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invading battle-weary British and inexperienced American divisions. They could do 
nothing about that contest. 
Allied leaders could have grasped the magnitude of the opportunity they 
faced. Italy, whole and aligned with the United Nations, would have provided an 
excellent base for prosecuting an air war against Germany_ Its men could have eased 
demands on a shrinking pool of Allied personnel. Italian factories and farms could 
have produced supplies that filled shipping needed to wage global war. No such 
vision filled the minds of Allied leaders and, because they saw no further than 
OVERLORD, Italy and its war potential fell firmly into the grasp of the German 
Reich. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GOTIERDMiMERUNG IN THE DESERT 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 11, 1943, Allied forces completed their reduction of the Axis North 
African bridgehead. The Italian San Marco marine regiment served as the rearguard 
for the remaining Axis forces. The marines provided time for Axis engineers to 
demolish port facilities and sink the shipping that choked the harbor of Tunis upon 
the Allied arrival.67 The withdrawal of the San Marco regiment, a unit destined to 
meet the Allies again at Anzio, heralded final victory for the Western Allies. Italian 
Field Marshal Rodolfo Graziani's inept and ill-fated invasion of Egypt in September 
1940 had marked the beginning of the North African campaign. That campaign 
ended thirty-three months later with the unconditional surrender of Italian and 
German troops, stranded on the North African shore by Adolf Hider's equally 
maladroit leadership. 
67James J. Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II, Contributions in 
Military Studies, 149 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1994),327. 
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A correct understanding of the Italian campaign requires an examination of 
the months immediately preceding the Axis surrender in Tunisia. Events during 
that period shaped the ensuing campaign in Italy. The British victory over Field 
Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika-Korps at EI Alamein unhinged the Axis North 
African front. Anglo-American landings in Morocco and Algeria threatened the 
Axis with catastrophe, creating a two-front war in North Africa. 
THE AXIS RESPONSE TO OPERATION TORCH 
Strategic miscalculation by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini precipitated a 
large-scale troop commitment [0 Tunisiafs defense in late 1942. The Axis dictators 
mistakenly believed that they could match Allied strength in Tunisia with like force. 
It proved ironic that only as defeat loomed in North Africa did Hitler finally commit 
massive, if still inadequate, forces to the Mediterranean. Too late did Hitler send 
German divisions to North Africa that might have swayed the course of battle just 
months earlier. Their commitment at this late date proved a colossal mistake. 
The battle for Tunisia became a quagmire, sucking German and Italian troops 
into a virtual prison camp. Hitler decided to commit German troops and prestige to 
a baule of aurition in Tunisia when he could least afford it. Hard-pressed by the 
Red Army at Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht found its military resources falling [0 
dangerously low levels as the North Mriean fighting rose [0 a fevered pitch.68 
68B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. 
Putnamfs Sons, 1970),433,435. 
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Hider now suffered the consequences of his most important strategic choice 
of the war: the decision to invade Russia in June 1941. Requirements for the 
imminent invasion of Russia had overridden all others in February 1941. The 
priority given Russian operations severely limited German assistance to Mussolini's 
routed forces in North Africa. Erwin Rommel's Afrika-Korps, ostensibly operating 
under Italian command, lacked the strength to drive British and Commonwealth 
troops out of Libya and Egypt. Operations against Russia hamstrUng Rommel's 
efforts to strike a decisive blow against the British 8th Army throughout the 
campaign. This strategic limitation effectively strangled efforts to seize Britain's 
vulnerable choke point at Suez. Rommel's attempts to convince the German dictator 
that North African operations should be accorded a higher priority in the division of 
men and materiel failed. Hider rejected every entreaty. Throughout 1941 and 1942, 
the German commitmen t of forces and logistics to North Africa remained static in 
numbers and insufficient for the conquest of Egypt.69 
The priority of the Russian front over Rommel's operations continued 
throughout 1941 and 1942 despite the serious threat that loss of control in the 
Mediterranean represented to German security. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, 
commander-in-chief of the German navy, had long sought priority for operations in 
the Mediterranean theater. Like Rommel, Raeder failed to gain Hider's agreement 
69Heinrich von Vietinghoff, "Brief Estimate of the Overall Situation in the 
Mediterranean up to the Landing on the Italian Mainland," OCMH MS # 0-116 
(1947),2-3. 
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in February 1942 to enlarge the Afrika-Korps and despatch it to conquer Egypt. 
Raeder believed that conditions in Egypt were ripe for the overthrow of British rule. 
He bolstered his case by claiming that the Axis conquest of Egypt would result in 
40,000 Egyptian troops joining the Axis cause. Hitler rejected the plan as too 
fantastic even for him.70 
Raeder appealed to Hitler anew in August 1942. The admiral warned that the 
weakness of German forces in the theater endangered Germany's entire strategic 
stance. He argued that Allied moves against North Mrica threatened to completely 
unhinge the German position in the region. Unless Germany took immediate 
measures to strengthen defenses, disaster lay ahead. Raeder believed that Germany 
must either make this effort now or risk future Allied moves against Italy or Greece 
from a secure North African base.71 
Hitler's focus remained fixed on Russia throughout the first two critical years 
of the North African campaign. The war in the desert seemed distant and 
disconnected from events in Europe. Did he not understand the changing balance of 
power in the region, which in late 1942 tilted in favor of the Allies? Field Marshal 
Kesselring stated in his memoirs that Hitler paid scant attention to this theater's 
requirements. The Fuhrer never grasped its importance nor the effect that a collapse 
7°Michael Salewski,Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945: Band IL· 
1942-1945 (Munchen: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fiir Wehrwesen, 1975),59. 
71F. H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1951),211-12. 
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would have on the general Axis position.72 
Ironically, while insisting on miracles from his meager forces in the region, 
Hitler halted the deployment of forces that might have tipped the balance in their 
favor. Why did Hitler hold this theater in such low regard? He mistrusted the 
Italian armed services. Hitler believed that Italy had sufficient forces to capture 
North Mrica. Only the muddle of Italian military administration and command, 
which resulted in passivity among Italian combat units, prevented victory.13 
Hitler's disdain for North Africa and distrust of his ally precluded the 
establishment of joint strategic planning by the Axis parmers. Italian and German 
commanders failed to coordinate their war efforts between 1939 and 1941.74 
Mussolini initially welcomed this free hand in the Mediterranean. Italian prospects 
seemed bright after entering the Second World War in June 1940. Disasters in 
Greece and North Africa quickly eliminated Italy's ability to conduct a 'parallel war' 
independent of Germany. Italy's dependence upon its German ally finally became 
apparent even to Italians. 
By 1942, Italian military weakness threatened the Fascist state with disaster. 
72Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 164, 177. 
13Shelford Bidwell, "Kesselring," in Hitlers Generals, ed. Corelli Barnett (New 
York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989),274. 
74Wemer Haupt, Kriegsschauplatz Italien 1943-1945 (Stuttgart: Motorbuch 
Verlag, 1977), 15; James J. Sadkovich, "The Italian Navy in World War II: 
1940-1943," in Reevaluating Major Combatants of Warld War II, ed. James J. 
Sadkovich, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 92 (Westport, Ct.: 
Greenwood Press, 1990), 134. 
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In October, Mussolini attempted to persuade Hitler of the grave situation developing 
in the Mediterranean theater. TheDuce warned his partner that the Allies would 
soon move against French North Africa. Hitler mistakenly believed that the next 
Allied stroke would fallon Rommel's exposed rear ar~ at either Tripoli or 
Benghazi. By landing in Libya, Anglo-American forces would isolate and eliminate 
Axis forces bogged down at EI Alamein. Mussolini disagreed with Hitler. He 
foresaw that the Allied conquest of French North Africa meant a future assault on 
the Italian peninsula. Events later proved Mussolini correct.7S 
Three factors converted Mussolini from a true believer in final Axis victory 
into a defeatist. Britain's decisive victory at EI Alamein in early November 1942 led 
to the near annihilation of Italy's North African army. The retreating German 
Afrika-Korps added to this blow by abandoning Italian foot soldiers. On November 
12, 1942, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law and Italian foreign minister, 
noted in his diary that: 
Rommel continues to withdraw from Libya at breakneck speed. 
There is a great deal of friction between Italian and German troops. At 
Halfaia they even fired on one another, because the Germans took all 
our trucks in order to withdraw more rapidly, leaving our divisions in 
the middle of the desert, where masses of men are literally dying of 
hunger and thirst.76 
7SEnno von Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse: Erinnerungen des deutschen 
MiZitiirattachis in Rom 1936-1943 (Tiibingen und Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich 
Verlag Hermann Leins, 1951), 180. 
76The Giano Diaries 1939-1943, ed. Hugh Gibson (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden 
City Publishing Co., 1947),543. 
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German mistreatment of Italian soldiers worsened relations between the two allies, 
already strained by Italian doubts concerning Hitler's 'strategic genius.,77 
In November 1942, Allied air forces initiated a bombing campaign against 
Italy. Combined with Britain's victory at EI Alamein, this aerial assault shattered 
Mussolini's belief that the Axis would win the war.78 His support for the war 
wavered just as a serious physical illness weakened the dictator's control of the 
Italian government.79 Fearing the next Allied blow, Mussolini formulated a set of 
strategic priorities separate from those voiced by Hitler. 
Italian commitments abroad had denuded Italy of defenders. As 1942 ended, 
troop deployments to Russia, North Africa, the Balkans, and southern France tied 
down most Italian divisions. The few soldiers left to man Italy's defenses clearly 
could not repel an Allied invasion. Italian weakness led the normally reticent King 
Victor Emmanuel to express concern to Count Ciano. He begged that troops be 
returned to defend Italy. The king noted that even the Grenadiers of the royal guard 
had been pressed into duty elsewhere.80 Mussolini and other members of the Fascist 
government saw that only a compromise peace with the Soviet Union offered the 
77David Fraser, Knight's Cross: A Lift of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1993),384. 
78JosefSchroder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943, Srudien und Dokumentezur 
Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, 10 (Gottingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1969), 
42. 
79Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 42. 
8OCiano Diaries, 545-46. 
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hope of returning Italian forces back to defend Italy. 
The rapidly changing balance of power altered Italian attitudes toward the 
Axis alliance. Many Italians worried that a victorious Germany dominant on the 
European landmass might prove as grave a threat to Italian security as an Allied 
invasion. Hostility toward Italy's alliance with the Third Reich mounted as 
Germany coopted the Balkans into its sphere of influence.81 Italians had retained 
their traditional view of the Balkans as a region reserved for Italian aggrandizement. 
As Germany's raw-material requirements swelled, its war economy drew heavily 
upon the region's resources to feed the German populace and sustain production in 
its factories. The simultaneous German failure to deliver promised raw materials to 
Italy and the harsh conduct of German officials toward Italian guest workers 
lengthened the list of problems developing between the two nations.82 
Relations sank further as the year wore on to an exhausting end. An exchange 
of representatives between the two powers failed to bridge the rift growing between 
them. Aldo Vidussoni, Secretary of the Fascist Party, visited Hider and Goring on 
October 7, 1942. He found the duo focused on Russia even as the situation worsened 
in North Africa. Vidussoni, recendy returned from visiting Italian troops on the 
8lJames J. Sadkovich, "German Military Incompetence Through Italian Eyes," 
War in History 1, no. 1 (March 1994):60-61. Mussolini and Ciano "sought to secure as 
much for Italy as possible so that in a postwar Europe dominated by Germany they 
would not become their ally's 'servants.'" 
82Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 27-28; Sadkovich, "German Military 
Incompetence," 60-61; Weinberg,A World at Arms, 588. 
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Russian front, warned Hider that all was not well in Italy. The harsh conditions of 
the last winter portended a disastrous Italian harvest in the new year. Hider 
commiserated with Vidussoni and expressed the hope that after three difficult 
winters the coming season would prove milder. Later at tea, Hider told Vidussoni to 
report to Mussolini that as Germany's leader he remained absolutely optimistic 
about the war's favorable outcome for the Axis powers. 83 
Both Reichsfiihrer SS Heinrich Himmler and Goring visited Rome later that 
month. They offered further platitudes about eventual German victory in Russia 
that failed to quiet Italian concerns.84 Fiirst Otto von Bismarck, Minister of the 
German Embassy in Rome, reported that October 23 to the German Foreign 
Ministry that Italian fears concerning Allied moves against North Africa were on the 
rise. Bismarck noted that the Allies obviously intended to conquer North Africa. 
The next logical step would be the defeat of Italy, the weaker of the two Axis 
partners.85 
Operation Torch, the Allied landing in North Africa, further exacerbated 
Italo-German relations. On November 28, Rommel flew unannounced to Hider's 
headquarters at Rastenburg, East Prussia. Rommel requested the immediate 
83Germany, Auswartiges Amt, Akten zur Deurschen Auswiirtigen Politik 
1918-1945. Aus demArchiv des AuswiirtigenAmrs, Serie E (1941-1945) (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975),40-44. 
84Peter Padfield, Himmler Reichsfiihrer-SS (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 
1990),404; Schroder, [taliens Kriegsaustritt, 40-41. 
ssKlinkhammer, Zwischen Bundnis und Besatzung, 28. 
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evacuation of Germany's North African forces to Italy. Given that Axis shipping 
could not supply forces already there, withdrawal from North Africa was urgent. 
Supported by Goring, Hitler sharply rebuked the exhausted Field Marshal. Blind to 
conditions in North Africa, Hitler upbraided Rommel as a defeatist. "I no longer 
want to hear such rubbish from your lips," he declared. "North Africa will be 
defended as Stalingrad will. Eisenhower's invading army must be defeated at the 
Italian front door and not in the Sicilian parlour.,,86 
Goring blithely promised that his air forces, already stretched to the limit 
airlifting supplies into besieged Stalingrad, would also supply Tunis. Hitler 
indulged Goring's fantasy that North Africa could be supplied by air. Hitler 
proclaimed that the Reichsmarshal had assured him the air trip to Tunis was merely 'a 
short hop' for his flyers. The Fuhrer rejected outright Rommel's entreaties to 
withdraw German forces. 'ir7 
Hitler ordered the departing Rommel to accompany Goring to Rome. The 
86Paul Carell, The Foxes of the Desert (N ew York: Bantam, 1960), 305-06; The 
Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart, trans. Paul Findlay (N ew York: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., 1953), 364-66. 
'ir7Fraser, Knight's Cross, 392-94; Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 
1939-45 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),307-08. Field Marshal Kesselring 
claimed to support Rommel's analysis of the simation and his plan to withdraw from 
EI Alamein. Although delayed by a balky engine at Crete, he sent a telegram to 
Hider backing Rommel. "Smiling Albert" Kesselring, as always, maintained an 
overly optimistic view of the simation in North Africa throughout this period. He 
opposed Rommel's plan to pull his forces back from EI Agheila to Gabes in Tunisia. 
It would take further experience with the Allies growing might to temper and 
improve Kesselring's judgment of the capabilities of Axis forces. Kesselring, A 
Soldier's Record, 177. 
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duo was to reassure Mussolini's worried government of German support. Rommel, 
however, left Hitler's headquarters a changed man. The Desert Fox departed 
Rastenburg enraged at his leader's incompetence and unwilling ever again to trust 
Hitler's 'strategic genius.'ss The ensuing visit to Rome only further unsettled Italian 
officials. Goring blamed the 'inadequate Italian organization' for the defeats in 
North Africa, which did little to reassure Italian leaders. As the Italians feared, 
promises of air support for Mediterranean operations proved illusory. The looming 
catastrophe at Stalingrad again deprived the Mediterranean theater of forces critical 
to its support.89 
A decisive moment had thus passed in the drama of the battle for the 
Mediterranean. Hitler's irrational strategic decision to mount a defense of North 
Africa with inadequate force weakened the Axis hold on the Mediterranean.90 His 
hastily-made decision ensured that the Axis forces necessary to repel a future Allied 
landing in Europe would instead suffer ignominious defeat and captivity. 
THE SLIDE TO SURRENDER: ITALIAN STRATEGIC WEAKNESS 
Italy's position throughout this period justified Mussolini's increasing 
concern for his nation's declining war potential. Threats to the survival of his 
88Carell, Foxes of the Desert, 307. 
89David Irving, GOring (London: Macmillan, 1989),371. 
9ORintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, 183; Warlimont, Inside Hitler's 
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54 
regime loomed ever larger as the specter of defeat jeopardized what little support 
remained for Fascist rule in Italy. The royal family's December 1942 bid to negotiate 
peace with Britain demonstrated the decline in support for Mussolini. British 
officials rejected the private offer. They stated that negotiations were impossible 
until Italians first removed Mussolini as head of the Italian govemment.91 
Mussolini sought by all means possible ro prevent this situation from ever 
arising. He communicated to Hider a second time that Italy desired a separate peace 
with Russia. This message, conveyed to Hider through Goring in early December, 
did not move the Fuhrer to alter his Russian policy.92 Mussolini also dispatched 
Count Ciano to exchange views with Hitler later that month. Mussolini instructed 
Ciano to press Hitler to make peace with Russia. Failing this, Ciano should seek the 
Axis forces' withdrawal to a strong defensive line. Moreover, Mussolini wanted the 
Fuhrer to know that Italy lacked the forces necessary to repel an Allied invasion. 
Ciano's goal, Mussolini demanded, must be the immediate transfer of Axis divisions 
from Russia to Africa, the Balkans, and the western theater.93 
Ciano and Marshal Ugo Cavallero, head of the Italian Supreme Command, 
attended the resultant conference at Hitler's headquarters in Germany. Hitler 
opened the December 18 meeting with a lengthy statement. He laid out his views 
91Weinberg, A World at Arms, 588. 
92Irving, Goring, 373. 
93Ciano Diaries, 555-56. 
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concerning the development of Axis operations in 1943. Hitler's remarks showed 
that he remained focused upon operations in Russia and the Near East. Only near 
the end of his monologue, did Hitler finally address Tunisia's defense. He viewed 
the occupation of Tunis as a great advantage to the Axis cause. Possession of the 
French ports of Tunis and Bizerta permitted the movement of supplies between Italy 
and Tunisia. Hitler later qualified his remarks by stating that this advantage could 
be lost unless the Axis grasped the key to the entire campaign. They must work to 
establish secure lines of communications between Europe and Tunisia. 
Ciano responded with a direct and succinct reiteration of Mussolini's 
instructions to him. Mussolini foresaw Anglo-American forces conducting 
operations dangerous to Italy during 1943. Given this threat, a compromise peace 
with Russia should be explored. Peace with Russia, even a harsh one along the 
model of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk treaty, would end the two-front war that threatened 
eventual Axis defeat. If a separate peace with Russia proved impossible to conclude, 
Mussolini suggested the occupation of a strong defensive line on the Eastern front. 
TheDuce offered this proposal to permit the rapid transfer westward of Italian and 
German forces. Only in this way would the Axis possess strength sufficient to 
defend North Africa and Italy in 1943. Ciano concluded with Mussolini's 
recommendation that Japan be used as intermediary in the peace talks. TheDuce 
counseled buying Russian acquiescence to his proposal by offering them a free hand 
in Central Asia. 
That Mussolini's appeal had only the slightest chance of German approval can 
56 
be seen from Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels's diary entry of December 20, 
1942. Goebbels reported Hitler's willing acquiescence to Italian demands for 
concessions in France. However, Goebbels emphasized Hitler's firm demand that 
the Italian fleet secure the sea lanes between Italy and North Africa. Italian hopes 
for peace with Russia received scant notice. The Nazi Propaganda Minister correctly 
reported the conference's outcome as Hitler rejected Mussolini's diplomatic 
initiative. 94 
THE ITALIAN DILEMMA 
Why had Mussolini proposed this dramatic break with Hitler's stated aim of 
defeating Bolshevik Russia? The steadily deteriorating situation in Italy forced 
Mussolini to grasp for alternatives short of outright defeat. He ventured a 
diplomatic solution to the Russian war because Italian forces were unable to defend 
their homeland. The campaigns in Russia and North Africa had decimated the 
Italian military. Allied bombing raids that autumn produced a steady stream of 
casualties in Italian cities. On October 24, a daylight raid on Turin by eighty-eight 
94For a complete account of the Hitler-Ciano exchange, see: Nr.303 
(F20/580-627 & F7/243-235), "Aufzeichnung iiber die Unterredung zwischen dem 
Fiihrer und dem Grafen Ciano in Anwesenheit des Reichmarschalls, des RAM, des 
Feldmarschalls Keitel, des Generals J ad! und des Marschalls Cavallero im 
Fiihrerhauptquartier am 18. Dezember 1942" in Akten ZUT deutschen Auswartigen 
Politik 1918-1945. Serie E: 1941-1945. Band IV: 1. Oktober his 31. Dezember 1942. 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975),538-55. For Goebbels's views see: The 
Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943, ed. & trans. Louis P. Lochner (New York: Doubleday & 
Co., 1948), 253. See also Rintelen's report of this exchange in Rintelen, Mussolini als 
Bundesgenosse, 186. 
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Royal Air Force Lancaster bombers killed 171 civilians. Fires burned throughout 
the city for days after the raid's end. Allied warplanes again struck hard at Turin and 
Naples as the year ended. The situation worsened in early 1943 as raids launched 
from England killed thousands in the period preceding the Allied invasion of Sicily. 
Although Rome remained untouched until July 19, the Allied air forces' destructive 
power brought the war home to Italians. The raids made the populace restive and 
less supportive of the Fascist regime's stated policy of continuing the war.9S 
More than just Allied bombers cast a dark shadow over the Italian landscape. 
Looming famine darkened Italy's future. Instead of the glory and conquest promised 
by Mussolini, Italian citizens found themselves near starvation. Food rationing did 
not alleviate shortages. High prices and diminished harvests sharply reduced Italian 
fare in comparison to its German counterpart. (See Chart II-I) Unless relief came 
quickly, many Italians faced starvation during 1943.96 
CHART 11-1 
Weekly German Weekly Italian Adult Weekly Italian 
Adult Ration Ration Worker Ration 
Bread 2412 grams 1050 grams 1750 grams 
Meat 437 grams 100-150 grams 100-150 grams 
9SStephen Harvey, "The Italian War Effort and the Strategic Bombing of 
Italy," History, no. 70 (February 1985):40. 
96Kevin Allen and Andrew Stevenson, An Introduction to the Italian Economy 
(London: Martin Robertson, 1974),7; Sadkovich, "Understanding Defeat," 35. 
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Fats 1215 grams I 94 grams /94grams 
Figures are for German adults are for May 1943, Italian statistics are for April 1943. Records show 
that meat ration not issued in June and had not been restored thereafter. 
Sources: Richard Overy, "Germany," Oxford Companion to World War II, Table 7, p. 461; 
"Untersuchung tiber die ernahrungswirtschaftliche Leistungsfiihigkeit Norditaliens. Anlage l. 
ltalienische Rationssatze 1942 .. " 2.September43. Frame 1755572., Roll 576. T-77. 
Oberkommando derWehnnacht, Part V. (microfilm). National Archives II. College Park, Md. 
Italy's faltering economy pressured Mussolini to end the war before both Italy 
and his regime collapsed. If Italy were to defend itself in 1943, it had to reconstitute 
the forces lost along the Don River and at EI Alamein. But Italy had not yet 
mobilized its economy for total war. It could not replace losses of materiel as quickly 
as Germany could in the coming year. The destruction of ten additional Italian 
divisions in early 1943 merely escalated the deficit in combat-ready divisions that 
Italy had to make good.97 
Italian dependence on German weapons to replace lost equipment that the 
Italian economy could not produce intensified after November 1942. Hider 
authorized the shipment to North Africa of 560 88-mm anti-aircraft guns crewed by 
German soldiers. The guns strengthened the defense of Tunis and Bizerta but hurt 
Italian pride. This deployment represented a stark admission that Italy could no 
longer provide rear-area defenses capable of coping with the Allied air forces. 
German anti-aircraft guns later defended Italian cities until Italian crews had hastily 
97Sadkovich, "Understanding Defeat," 49-50. 
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trained in German schools.98 German officials promised additional support for the 
rebuilding of Italian divisions from French military stockpiles. They stipulated, 
however, that the Italians must find and collect the weapons from France, adding to 
Italy's burden in reconstituting its divisions.99 
Mussolini's lack of control over Italy's war industries lay at the root of this 
crisis. One scholar describes the Italian effort at mobilizing national resources 
during the Second World War as 'trifling' when compared with that of the First 
World War. An examination of economic figures bears out this assertion.100 
Moreover, as recent research affirms, no shortage of raw materials precipitated Italys 
poor production record and eventual defeat. What explains Fascist Italy's poor 
performance? Mussolini's government failed to impose a striCt regime demanding 
98Ciano Diaries, 546; Georg Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und 
Riistungswirtschaft (1918-1943/45) (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1966), 
377-78. 
99Angela Raspin, The Italian War Economy 1940-1943 (New York: Garland, 
1986),362-63. 
100 Harvey, "Italian War Effort," 34-35. Harvey notes that "certain 
non-strategic industries were virtually unaffected by the war: private expenditure on 
furniture for example was 5,837,000,000 lire (1939 values) in 1939 and had dropped 
only slighdy to 5,282,000,000 lire in 1942. It is illuminating to compare national 
economic investment in the First World War with that in the Second World War. 
Statistics for the ratio between consumption and investment show that mobilization 
of national resources 1939-45 was trifling compared to 1915-18: 
1915 -7.8 
1916 -21.9 
1917 -30.2 
1918 -30.9 
1940 +5.7 
1941 +6.8 
1942 +2.9 
1943 -1.2" 
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maximum production. This failure, not a dire shonage of raw materials, constitutes 
the primary economic factor contributing to Italian defeat in the Second World 
Italian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Marshal U go Cavallero proved one of the 
few Italian leaders to take the 'war of production' seriously. In 1942, he authorized 
the German Waffenamt's use of idle Italian factories for military production. 
Cavallero also wanted German arms produced in Italian factories. German armor 
had established a clear superiority over its Italian counterparts. Cavallero advocated 
using Italy'S industrial base to manufacture German weapons. This approach offered 
the best route for rapidly increasing the fighting power of Italy's remaining forces. 
Cavallero later discovered that his cooperative ventures with the Germans had 
undermined his position within the Italian hierarchy.102 
Cavallero and German officers coordinating anempts to increase Italian war 
production found themselves quietly thwarted by the resistance growing within the 
Italian government. General Ernst Riner von Horstig, the German officer assigned 
to coordinate production with Italy, reported on conditions there to his superior, 
101Lucio Ceva and Giorgio Rochat, "Italy," trans. John Gooch, in The Oxford 
Companion to World War II, ed. LC.B. Dear and M.R.D Foot (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 585, 586. 
102 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, 190-91. The Germans often 
prevented the coordination of production with the Italians by obstinately demanding 
a large portion of weapons produced under German license in Italian factories. For 
an example of the German attitude, see the inability of Italy to obtain production 
rights to German pzkw III and IV tanks from 1941 until 1942 as recounted in: 
Sadkovich, "German Military Incompetence," 61. 
General Georg Thomas, in early 1943. He accused the Italian armed forces' 
leadership and civilian officials of actively sabotaging attempts at economic 
cooperation.103 
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Italian actions had already caused Thomas to hesitate before providing 
German assistance in augmenting Italian war production. The notion that Italy 
might be hoarding large quantities of German-supplied war materials for peacetime 
production had worried Thomas at the end of 1942. His November meeting in Rome 
with Cavallero simply gave the Italians an opportunity to complain that Germany 
had failed to ship finished goods and raw materials in promised quantities and on 
schedule. 
Shipments to Italy of steel and raw materials for making steel were the most 
critical items on the agenda. Germany produced 28.7 million metric tons of steel in 
1942. Italian industry managed an anemic figure of only 1.7 million tons. 104 
Cavallero sought a significant increase in German shipments. Thomas urged him to 
achieve greater efficiency in Italy's steel usage. Cavallero argued that Italy could not 
maintain current production levels, much less rebuild Italy's decimated tank force, 
given current allotments of German coal and steel. The Germans continued to ship 
low-quality steel to Italy. Coal deliveries had dropped to critical levels, and Italian 
steel production had fallen sharply. Under these conditions, rearmament to replace 
lO~homas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und RilstungswirtschaJt, 377-78. 
lO4Ellis, World War II: A Statistical Survey, 276. 
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Italian losses exceeded the capacity of Italian industry. Thomas refused the Italian 
request, suggesting that they ask again later for an increased allocation of German 
steel. lOS 
The assay of Italian raw material stocks made after the German occupation of 
Italy confirmed Thomas's suspicions. At the very time when Cavallero pressed 
Thomas for a larger allotment of German steel, Italian steel producers possessed 
large quantities of raw materials and finished steel in their warehouses. After 
OPERATION ACHSE in September 1943, German o£Pcers discovered stores of 
steel equivalent to three times Italy's entire supply in 1940.106 
Despite this hidden wealth of materials, Italian officials requested increased 
raw-material shipments up to the Italian surrender in September 1943. Given this 
situation, it can be argued that the Italian collapse rendered a significant service to 
the German war effort. Germany gained control over Italian production and raw 
material caches after the Italian surrender. German control of Italian production 
facilities permitted the determination of the Italian war industry's true raw material 
requirements and led to the transfer of raw materials back to Germany.I07 
IOSRaspin, Italian War Economy, 359-61. 
I06Ceva and Rochat, "Italy," 585,586. 
I07For an example of continuing Italo-German negotiations concerning 
shipments of raw materials to Italy see: "Auszugsweise Abschrift der Abschrift von 
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deutsch-italienischen Besprechungen iiber der Aussatzung Siidfrankreichs fUr die 
deutsche und italienische Kriegswirtschaft," Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Reichswirt-
schaftsministerium, R7055, 133-134. 
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In late 1942, German military officers in Italy also made a concerted effort to 
determine the strength and disposition of Italy's army. The German High 
Command required this information to ascertain how far Germany should assist 
Italian rearmament efforts in 1943. A survey conducted in November 1942 revealed 
seven Italian army commands. They directed twenty-eight army corps disposing of 
ninety divisions. Comando Supremo had assigned twenty-three Italian divisions to 
coastal defense and occupation duties. Eight Italian divisions had been lost in the 
battle for North Mrica. Another division in the theater had suffered significant 
losses. An amazing fifty-two of the fifty-eight remaining Italian divisions served 
outside of Italy, leaving only six combat-ready and mobile units for Italy's defense. 
This German observer warned that "[a]ll of these divisions -- even the best outfitted 
ones -- have only the combat strength of a brigade." 
The report's author attributed the weakness ofItalys fighting forces to the 
inability to replace either personnel or materiel losses. Losses dating back to the 
1941 Yugoslavian campaign still had not been made good for Italian occupation 
divisions in Slovenia and Dalmatia. Additional troop casualties in Africa and Russia 
made reinforcement of existing Italian units unlikely. Divisions serving in North 
Africa and Russia, virtually annihilated before the Sicilian invasion in July 1943, 
represented the most capable forces remaining to the Italian army in November 
1942. The report concluded with an ominous warning that a "lack of reserves 
capable of counter-attacking on the Italian mainland is, given the present situation, a 
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considerable weak point.',108 
The Italian navy appeared stronger than its brother service. The majority of 
its capital ships remained intact in late 1942. Supermarina disposed of a variety of 
cruisers and destroyers representing a credible threat to the conduct of future Allied 
operations. Despite its apparent power, the Italian navy did not loom large in 
German calculations. Surface warships consumed vast quantities of fuel when 
conducting operations. Hider's obsession with capturing the Russian Caucasus 
during 1942 arose from Germany's deteriorating fuel situation. The demands of 
operations in Russia and the need to reserve fuel for German warships held at the 
ready to defend Norway against an Allied invasion remained the top German 
priorities. Litde fuel could be spared for Italian naval operations. 
Discussions of the fuel situation had hindered planning for the 
Mediterranean as far back as January 1942, when the Axis powers' naval staffs had 
gathered for discussions at Garmisch, Germany. With German reserves nearly 
l0811Bericht tiber Zustand des ital. Heeres. Stand 20.11.1942," Anlage zu der 
Deutsche General beim Hauptquartier der Ital. Wehrmacht. Ib Nr. 5239/42 
gKdos.Chefs., RH2 Oberkommando des Heeres/Generalstab der Heeres, Band 470 
Verschiedenes v. 9.11.40- 2.7.44 - Chefs (BAMA: Microfiche),62-64. Sadkovich 
estimates Italian battle losses at "over 80,000 dead and missing in Russia; 75,000 in 
Italy; 49,900 in the Balkans; and 22,000 in Africa. Sadkovich,"Understanding 
Defeat," 35. This estimate of 227,000+ dead and missing from a pre-war population 
of 43,800,000 (1 in every 192 Italians) far exceeds American dead of 405,000 from a 
population of 129,200,000 (1 in 319 Americans). German losses were 3,250,000 
combat deaths from a popUlation of78,000,000 in 1938 (1 in 24 Germans). Ellis, 
World War II: A Statistical Survey, 253-54. Although Italian losses did not exceed 
German, they exhibit a ratio that refutes the prevailing view of Italian units breaking 
and running in combat. Sadkovich in particular has shown the value of Italian 
armored units, which saved Rommel's vauntedAfrika-Korps on several occasions. 
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exhausted, the Italian fleet's immobilization would soon follow. Remaining fuel 
reserves could be expended only for the most important operations.109 
The Italian navy used its mighty battleships after June 1942 as little more 
than fuel barges for merchant shipping and escorts. This employment richly 
illustrates the paralysis that gripped the Italian fleet during the second half of 
1942.110 The situation improved somewhat after the surrender of Tunisia in May 
1943. German supplies of fuel to the Italian navy increased as the fear of invasion 
rose.1ll The dearth of fuel for Italian naval operations must be weighed against 
Hitler's complaints of its inactivity. Immobilized by empty fuel bunkers, the Italian 
navy remained a tethered guard dog during Allied naval operations in the 
Mediterranean throughout late 1942 and early 1943. 
Additional weaknesses weighed heavily in German calculations of the Italian 
navy during late 1942 and early 1943. Naval operations supporting the Axis North 
African bridgehead claimed an alarming number of Italian escort vessels. Having 
lost thirty-six destroyers from all causes by June 1943, the Italian navy lacked 
escorts. The remaining destroyers were clearly insufficient to shield its capital ships 
against Allied submarines and destroyer flotillas during future operations. Of 
twenty destroyers still carried on the rolls, approximately half were laid up for 
lO9Salewski, Seekriegsleirung, 57-58. 
1l0Sacikovich, "The Italian Navy in World War II: 1940-1943," 147. 
lllMarc'Antonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval ~stitute Press, 1957),258-59. 
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repairs in Italian ports. Moreover, the cruiser force also had suffered serious losses. 
With thirteen cruisers sunk, just ten remained afloat. Of that pitiful number, four 
cruisers required repairs that immobilized them in Italian shipyards. 
Of the five Italian battleships, only two would be fully capable of operations 
when the Allies moved against Sicily. Littorio and Roma, each armed with nine 15-
inch guns, sat at the ready in La Spezia A sister ship, the Vittorio, had yet to 
complete repairs to damage incurred during an Allied air raid in June 1943. The 
Gaia Duilia and Andrea Doria, at 24,000 tons smaller sisters to their 35,000 ton 
counterparts at La Spezia and Genoa, faced two additional months of repairs before 
their 12.6-inch guns could be brought to bear against an Allied invasion fleet. l12 
German worries about the strength and condition of the Italian navy are 
better appreciated when compared with the Allied armada arrayed against it. Allied 
naval forces in the Mediterranean, increasing steadily despite the demands of the 
naval war in the Pacific, consisted of six battleships, seven carriers, twenty cruisers, 
and one hundred destroyers. Nonetheless, knowledge of Allied worries concerning 
the Italian 'tleet-in-being' would have comforted the Germans. ll3 The presence of a 
fleet capable of making a one-way sortie against the new and unseasoned Anglo-
American amphibious forces preparing for the invasion of Sicily weighed against a 
bold Allied invasion of Sardinia, Corsica, or northern Italy. By preventing such 
l12Bragadin, Italian Na'DY, 259-60; David C. Isby, "Dreadnought: The 
Battleship Era, 1905-1971," Strategy & Tactics, MaylJune 1975, 32-33. 
113Bragadin, Italian Na'DY, 260. 
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moves, the Italian 'fleet-in-being' contributed significandy to defending the 
Mediterranean throughout this period. 
The Italian air force chief related the Regia Aeronautica's predicament to 
Count Ciano in December 1942. General Rino Corso Fougier described his service 
as unable to conduct "any kind of serious military operation.,,114 His squadrons were 
outfitted with obsolescent equipment in numbers insufficient to contest Allied air 
supremacy over either Tunisia or Italy. 
The Italian air force no longer possessed either the will or means to tum the 
tide of bat de to Italy's advantage. German complaints that Italian flyers remained 
inactive throughout February 1943 revealed the Italian air force's near-collapse. 
Italian fighters refused to escort German aircraft on mine detonation missions. 
Kesselring took this complaint and one concerning Comando Supremo's failure to 
reinforce Italian units in Tunisia directly to its new commander, General Vittorio 
Ambrosio. Ambrosio's reply hinted of the Italian air forces's declining morale when 
he instructed it to make sure that all combat capable aircraft flew missions several 
times daily. I IS 
Consideration must be given to Italian aircraft losses before judging 
performance. Italian losses between November 2,1942 and June 30,1943 wrecked 
114Ciano Diaries, 559. 
llSU. S. Army Air Force, ULTRA and the History of the United States Strategic 
Air Force in Europe vs. the GemzanAir Force (Frederick, Md.: University Publications 
of America, 1980),23-24. 
68 
the Regia Aeronautica. 2,190 aircraft, including 1,600 bombers of all types, had been 
destroyed. Damage sent another 1,790 aircraft to repair shops. Few emerged for 
further service. Many of the aircraft carried as on active duty were likewise unready 
for combat. 1 16 
Operational strength slowly increased until it totaled an estimated 1,695 
aircraft one week prior to the invasion of Sicily. But a substantial portion of this 
meager force could not be counted as combat-ready for operations against the 
overwhelming array of Allied air power used against Sicily. The Italian air force 
carried 220 planes stationed in Italy as incapable of operations. Another 335 aircraft 
operated from airfields in Albania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rhodes, and the Aegean 
islands. 1,140 Italian air force planes remained available to Comando Supremo in 
Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Italy when the blow fell at last in July 1943.117 
116Karl Gundelach,Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940-1945, 
Europrusche Hochschulschriften, Reihe ill, Geschichte und ihre 
Hilfswissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Peter D. Lang, 1981),599. 
I17Sadkovich estimates Regia Aeronautica strength at 1,360 front-line aircraft 
in late 1942 and 620 planes as of July 1943. The contradictory estimate in this 
dissertation derives from a SUNSET or ULTRA summary dated 2 July 1943. 
Although the Italian air force did not use ULTRA, Allied intelligence apparendy 
benefitted from German reports of Italian air force strength throughout the period 
covered in this chapter. Information accompanying the SUNSETS, a weekly 
summary of vital information gleaned from ULTRA, notes only that they passed 
across the desk of key figures at the highest levels. These summaries remain the 
only ULTRA items containing information pertaining to the war in the 
Mediterranean currently available to scholars in the United States. Unfortunately, 
large gaps in SUNSET coverage occur during the period of operations covered in 
this chapter. Still restricted British copies of ULTRA intercepts giving complete 
coverage of the ground war in Europe resist all attempts at opening them for scholars 
wishing to offer a view other than that of Hinsley or Bennett. "Sunset No. 72. 2nd 
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THE GERMAN SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Events on the Russian front again occupied Hider's attention as 1942 
concluded. Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist's Army Group A hastened its escape from 
an exposed position in the Caucasus, pursued by Soviet forces threatening to cutoff 
and annihilate it. Massive batdes raged from November 1942 through March 1943 
as Russian assaults drove German back. Soviet attacks regained Rostov and 
Kharkov. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein saved his forces on the southern wing 
of the Russian front only by defying a Fuhrer directive. His jealously hoarded 
Panzer forces at last stabilized the front when they first cut off and then destroyed a 
Russian tank army between Izyum and Dnepropetrovsk. Manstein followed up this 
victory by retaking Kharkov on March 15, 1943. 
Winter's end found the German front line reestablished not far from the 
positions used to launch the ill-fated assaults on Stalingrad and the Caucasus the 
preceding year. The enormous bulge in German lines at the important rail center of 
Kursk dominated the dormant front. Until late summer 1943, Hider's desire to 
amputate this protrusion played an important role in reducing forces sent to defend 
the West. 
The German situation in the Mediterranean steadily deteriorated during the 
early months of 1943 despite earlier Allied reverses. Eisenhower's forces bogged 
July 1943," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, Part 1, (1 of2). RG 457, 
Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, (NAil), 96. 
Sadkovich, "Understanding Defeat," 48. 
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down as the Tunisian winter arrived. Icy rains, muddy conditions, and the lack of 
rail and road transport wreaked havoc on the poor overland lines of 
communication.118 As winter weather caused a lull in North African operations, 
American and British leaders met at Casablanca Ganuary 14-24, 1943). Churchill, 
Roosevelt, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and their Mediterranean commanders, 
Alexander and Eisenhower, made important modifications to Allied grand strategy. 
They agreed to continue the American daylight strategic bombardment of occupied 
Europe in concert with Royal Air Force night attacks. Allied leaders also mediated a 
political reconciliation between Charles de Gaulle and Henri-Honore Giraud, leaders 
of French factions competing for control of the French government in exile. 
One particular decision produced a measurable effect on the course of the 
Italian campaign. The conferees agreed that the policy of 'unconditional surrender' 
would form the basis for terminating hostilities with the three Axis powers. An 
argument can be made that this policy hardened German attitudes, causing many to 
fight the war to its bitter end.1l9 The Allied decision at Casablanca [0 continue 
Mediterranean operations after the Tunisian campaign ensured that the Allies would 
soon confront this sentiment among German forces in Sicily. 
Substantial changes in Italian direction of the war also took place at this time. 
118J ames Kennedy Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American 
Logistics in WWII (Dekalb, n.: Northern illinois University "Press, 1994), 192. 
119Harry Hoppe, Die 278. Infanterie-Division in Italien 1944/45 (Bad N auheim: 
Verlag Hans-Henning Podzun, 1953),7. 
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Aware of his government's increasing unpopularity, Mussolini reorganized it. His 
critics particularly sought removal of the pro-German Marshal Cavallero. In 
January, Mussolini replaced the detested head of the Comando Supremo with General 
Vittorio Ambrosio. TheDuce followed up the change in military leadership with a 
wholesale cabinet purge on February 9. Sacking nine cabinet ministers, Mussolini 
installed replacements he judged more loyal to his regime. His own son-in-law, 
Count Ciano, fell victim to the second purge. Mussolini correctly suspected the 
foreign ministry of disloyalty. But Mussolini's efforts at reform proved vain. The 
shuffling of cabinet chairs provided no substitute for the change most Italians 
wanted. Mussolini himself represented his regime's major problem. Only his 
removal would satisfy the majority of Italians.120 
Hitler likewise reorganized the German command structure in January 1943. 
On January 30, raging against the poor performance of German surface units off 
Norway, he sacked Grand Admiral Raeder. Karl Donirz added overall responsibility 
for the Marine, while continuing to direct the submarine war against Allied shipping. 
A restructuring of the German command structure in the Mediterranean also 
occurred that month. Field Marshal Kesselring had long labored under a command 
arrangement subordinating him to Italian commanders. Initiated upon Kesselring's 
November 1941 arrival in Italy, it placed him under the direction of the Italian king 
120Rintelen, Mussolini als Buntiesgenosse, 187-88. For a complete listing of 
Mussolini's cabinet shifts see, "Appendix: The 'Changing of the Guard' on February 
5, 1943," in Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 154-55. 
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and Mussolini.121 Hitler broadened Kesselring's command responsibilities on 
January 5,1943. He assigned Kesselring command ofLuftJlotte 2, German liaison 
officers to the Italian armed forces, all naval forces in Italy, the German forces in 
Tunisia, and miscellaneous forces throughout the Mediterranean. Given a 
Wehrmacht staff to assist in his new responsibilities, Kesselring took command, 
assisted by a Chief of the General Staff and his Supreme Command South 
(Oberbefehlshaber SUd, hereafter OBS) staff for the three German armed services. 
OKWalso assigned transport and quartermaster staff to Kesselring's headquarters. III 
Although he still operated under Italian oversight, Hitler had erected the foundation 
for German continuation of the war after the Italian surrender. 
Kesselring's expanded command responsibilities proved beneficial during the 
German campaign in Italy. When first implemented, his new role seriously hindered 
the Axis fight for North Africa. Kesselring's unbounded optimism caused him to 
mistakenly report the Tunisian situation to Hitler. Kesselring made a positive 
report on Tunisia to Hider on January 12, 1943 and again in February. Kesselring's 
opinions overrode Rommel's more pessimistic estimates throughout this period. By 
the time that Rommel's forces fell back to Tunisia's borders, Hider had filled his 
thoughts with fantastic schemes for resuming the offensive. General Walter 
121 Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 116-17. 
122Walther Hubatsch, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 
(WehrmachtfUhrungsstab) 1940-45. Band III: 1. Januar 1943 - 31. Dezember 1943. 
Zweiter Halbband, ed. Helmuth Greiner and Percy Ernst Schramm (Frankfurt am 
Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1963), 1408-10. 
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Warlimont's early February report on conditions, issued after an extensive journey 
throughout the region, failed to halt Hider's offensive plans. Kesselring's 
unexpected appearance at the conference during which Warlimont, Deputy Chief of 
the OKW Operations Staff, was to report, prevented any assessment other than 
Kesselring's optimistic appraisal from being heard. l23 
In late February, General Vittorio Ambrosio, the new head of Comando 
Supremo, sent the Italian estimate of equipment requirements to General Warlimont. 
He sought 750 tanks, 1,322 artillery pieces and antitank guns, 7,400 trucks, 500 
fighter and bomber aircraft, and fuel for their operation.124 This request from the 
new Italian military commander, who was sharply anti-German in his views, got a 
hostile reception. 
That reception would have worsened considerably had the Germans seen 
Ambrosio's estimates of the war situation on 17 and 21 February 1943. Accurately 
appraising the likely course of operations for 1943, Ambrosio foresaw a complete loss 
of Axis initiative unless the Germans abandoned their dream of conquering Russia. 
Only a period of defensive inactivity in Russia, permitting increased Axis efforts in 
the Mediterranean, could redeem the situation. Ambrosio candidly warned 
Mussolini that "the Germans must change their operational objectives and must 
come to our aid, otherwise we shall not be obliged to follow them in their erroneous 
123Warlimonr, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 308-10. 
124Raspin, Italian War Economy, 369-70. 
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conduct of the war.',l2S 
As Axis troops deployed to Tunisia, conditions worsened for Italy. In early 
March, workers of the Fiat Mirafiori plant at Turin went out on strike. Their 
example ignited a wave of strikes across the north Italian industrial belt. Industrial 
laborers, suffering from inflation and the unremitting pressures of wartime 
production demands, united around their calls for peace. In scenes reminiscent of 
the Fascist rise to power, squadrons of Blackshirt thugs attempted to beat workers 
back to work. Mussolini's regime learned that unwilling workers did not make the 
best industrial base for war production. Production levels in key war industries fell 
radically after the strikes ended. Italy's armed forces, rebuilding already depleted 
stocks of materiel, fell further behind in their defensive preparations for the 
impending Allied landing. 126 
The strikes infuriated Hider, who discussed them with his staff in mid-
March. He bemoaned Mussolini's failure to use sufficient force in suppressing the 
strikes. Had not the Germans supplied Italian divisions with the weapons for this 
task, he wondered? The Italian failure to provide additional divisions for service on 
the Russian front also vexed the Fuhrer. Hider left unmentioned the destruction of 
Italian divisions, poorly-equipped and unsupported by German mobile forces, 
12SQuoted in Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 166. 
126Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes 
and Courses of the Second World War, 2d ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1989),389; 
Harvey, "Italian War Effort," 44. 
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during the preceding months. In a repetition of events in North Africa after the 
German defeat at El Alamein, German forces in Russia either abandoned their 
Italian counterparts or escaped in Italian vehicles seized at gunpoint. The German 
disdain for Italian forces assisted many Italian officers in making the psychological 
break necessary for their coming 'betrayal' of their German ally.127 
Mussolini continued to pepper Hitler with pleas that the Fuhrer make peace 
with Russia. Mussolini's letter of March 9 appealed for Hitler to limit the stakes 
being wagered in the bloody Russian campaign. Mussolini reminded Hitler of the 
growing strength of the Western allies. TheDuce asked for the construction of an 
'Ostwall' that would serve as a bulwark against the Red Army and buy time to 
negotiate with the Angio-Saxons.128 
As the Allied offensive pushed deeply into Axis lines in Tunisia during late 
March, Mussolini made his plea once more. He warned Hitler that events in Russia 
had shown the difficulty of mastering Stalin's empire with its limitless territory and 
inexhaustible manpower. Unleashing the full weight of argument, Mussolini boldly 
asserted that not even an attack on Russia's rear by the Japanese would turn the tide 
127Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 205-06; Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die 
Protokollfragmente seiner miZitiirischen Kon/erenzen 1942-1945, ed. Helmut Heiber, 
Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1962), 184-86. 
128See Mussolini's comments in: "Mussolini an Hitler," No. 192, FIO/233-4, 9. 
Miirz 1943, Germany. Auswartiges Arnt, Akten zur Deutschen Auswiirtigen PoZitik 
1918-1945. AusdemArchiv des Auswiirtigen Amts, Serie E (1941-1945) (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975), V:376-80. 
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in the favor of the Axis. The laborious summer advances and winter retreats could 
not be repeated endlessly. Some understanding with Russia had to be reached if the 
Axis were to amass forces sufficient to reclaim the initiative both on land and in the 
air. Mussolini appealed for a daring strategy designed to crush Allied forces in 
Tunisia before their victory there gave the Allied cause a tremendous psychological 
boost. He called for !talo-German resistance against the Allies in Tunisia while 
moving against them in Spain and Spanish Morocco. Such a stroke would reverse 
the Allied strategy of autumn 1942 by falling on the Allied rear. CUt off at Gibraltar, 
Allied forces would face annihilation by Axis forces transferred from the east.129 
Hider paid scant attention to Mussolini's appeals. The Fuhrer later justified 
the commitment of substantial, if still inadequate, forces for the defense of Tunisia. 
The Tunisian campaign, he argued, had served the strategic purpose of winning time 
to prepare the defenses of the Mediterranean's northern shore. The actual conduct 
of the campaign and the severe losses inflicted on Axis forces puts the lie to this 
grand delusion. 
Axis land, air, and naval forces finished the Tunisian campaign in worse 
condition than they had begun it. Hider substantially weakened German land 
strength by committing most of the Mediterranean theater's mobile forces to 
Tunisia. Rommel opposed the deployments even after his November 1942 
confrontation with the Fuhrer. Rommel knew that this commitment endangered 
129See "Mussolini an Hider," No. 252,69/50 147-54,26. Man 1943, Germany. 
Auswartiges Amr, ADAP, E-V, 1. Januar - 30. April 1943, V:481-84. 
77 
German prestige and weakened Italy's defense. He wrote on March 10, 1943 that he 
had 
emphasised as strongly as I could that the 'African' troops must be re-equipped 
in Italy to enable them to defend our southern European flank. I even went so 
far as to give him [Hider] a guarantee - something which I am normally very 
reluctant to do - that with these troops, I would beat off any Allied invasion in 
southern Europe. But it was all hopeless. l30 
The insane strategy of defending the Tunisian bridgehead continued to the end of 
the campaign. Instead of preparing a strong defense of Italy and the Balkans, Axis 
reinforcements practically deployed into captivity. 
By March 1943, the hopelessness of the German position in North Africa had 
become clear to members of Hider's entourage. Joseph Goebbels recorded the views 
of the formerly optimistic Reichsmarshal Goring on March 2. 
Goering says we must either try to achieve a decisive success in 
Tunisia or else swallow the bitter pill of giving up North Africa. 
He believes we'll lose Africa to the Americans anyway. Should 
we succeed, however, in breaking through in the East, our loss of 
Africa would not be irreparable. Goering certainly thinks very 
highly of the military power and war potential of the 
Anglo-Saxons. He has no illusions about those.l3l 
Hider, however, took little strategic advice, even from members of his inner circle. 
OKW reconstituted divisions lost in Tunisia in name only from the remnants 
of forces held up by transportation difficulties encountered in Italy. The new 
divisions proved poor substitutes for veteran, well-equipped units lost in North 
130Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 419. 
l3lGoebbels Diaries, 263. 
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Africa. German Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge later estimated that between two and 
four divisions could have been saved from among those sent to Tunisia. Such troops 
would have made any future Allied invasion in the Mediterranean a risky 
proposition. The loss of both Afrika-Korps veterans and the best Italian troops 
remaining after the winter's debacle on the Don Front in Russia weakened the ability 
of the German and Italian high commands to defend anywhere in the 
Mediterranean. Hider, by not reinforcing or withdrawing from North Africa at 
appropriate moments, had left Italy and the surrounding islands open to a swift 
Allied descent.132 
German land forces in North Africa suffered losses rivaling Stalingrad when 
the Allies conquered Tunisia. 238,000 Axis troops surrendered to Allied forces in 
May 1943: 101,000 Germans, 90,000 Italians and 47,000 of indeterminate 
nationality.133 The German 1 rf', 1 Sn, 2P', and Hermann Goring panzer divisions plus 
the 1640 and 99Cfh light divisions comprised the bulk of German losses. Hider could 
not replace the armored and motorized formations before the Allied invaded Sicily. 
An inestimable measure of combat experience vanished from the Mediterranean 
132Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 435; Alfred One, The HG 
Panzer Division (West Chester, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing, 1989), 86; Friedrich von 
Ruge, "Translation of Report on the Evacuation of Sicily (August 1943) with 
Enclosures (Register No. 59)," MS X-HI, Record Group 338, (NAil, n.d.),3-5; 
Gundelach, Die deutsche Lufiwaffi im Mittelrneer 1940-1945,585. 
1331 S. Playfair, 0., C. J. Molony, c., F. C. Flynn and T. P. Gleave, The 
Destruction of Axis Forces in Africa, vol. IV of The Mediterranean and Middle East, ed. 
Sir James Buder, History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military 
Series (London: H.M.S.O., 1966),460. 
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theater upon their surrender. The deficit of combat veterans and first-rate materiel 
proved cosdy. The inept counterattacks of ad-hoc German units against Allied 
landings on Sicilian beaches in July 1943 disclosed the price of Hider's folly in 
Tunisia. Although bearing the proud designations of the 1 Sill Panzergrenadier and 
Hermann GOring divisions, those units were but shadows of the veteran units lost in 
Tunisia. 134 
Germany lost more divisions at Stalingrad than it did in Tunisia. But the 
losses in Tunisia can be said to have played a greater role in defeating Germany than 
those at Stalingrad. The losses in North Africa, especially of mobile forces, 
represented the forces that could have driven an Allied landing in Sicily back into 
the sea. The result would have been no second front of any kind until much later 
than 1944. Russia would have found itself threatened by an even greater deployment 
of German forces thereafter. Tunisia may not have been the absolute equal of 
Stalingrad, but the result stands as a true catastrophe for Germany's overall strategic 
position. 
134J ohn Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second W arid War 
eN ew York: Viking, 1990), 306. John Ellis notes that more Axis troopS were 
captured in Tunisia than at Stalingrad. He adds that n[a] more meaningful 
comparison, however, is that between the numbers of German divisions destroyed in 
each batde. The records show that in North Africa the Germans lost 3113 panzer 
divisions, 3 light divisions, 1 infantry division and some paratroopers. In the 
Stalingrad pocket were lost 3 panzer divisions, 3 motorised divisions, 1 jager and 
thirteen infantry." Ellis's argument seems to contradict the main point of his book. If 
Germany's effort in Russia all but overwhelmed in scale efforts in the west, then 
would not significant losses in Tunisia playa much greater role in defeating 
Germany than like ones in Russia? 
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Luftwaffi losses in the Mediterranean between 1 November 1942 and 1 May 
1943 included the 1Cf" and 20'" Flak divisions plus 2,421 aircraft, exclusive of air 
transport losses. The loss of aircraft equaled the authorized strength of twenty wings 
(Kampfgruppen ). 
Those losses represented a significant drain on German air resources. 
Between November 1942 and April 1943 the German aircraft industry produced 
1,604 Ju-88 medium bombers. Approximately one of two aircraft constructed (723 or 
45% of production), went to Luftflotte 2 in the Mediterranean. Of 3,194 Me-l09s 
built, 1,226 (38%) served in the Mediterranean theater. Given the demands of the 
Russian front and the increasing intensity of the air war over Germany, it is hard not 
to agree with Karl Gundelach. He concludes that given the "complete picture of the 
strategic situation in the air, the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean was of 
decisive significance - if not completely irreparable - for the further conduct of the 
air war.,,13S 
In response to the dire situation confronting them, Hitler and Mussolini 
acted before the final surrender in Tunisia and reorganized the Mediterranean 
command structure. Keitel's directive on 8 May 1943 instructed all three German 
services that Hitler and Mussolini had agreed to continue resistance in Tunisia for 
the maximum possible period, Mussolini's agreement coming despite his otherwise 
expressed wishes. Nonetheless, unmistakable Allied preparations for an invasion 
135Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffi im Mittelmeer 1940-1945,584. Also see 
Baum and Weichold,Kriegder "Achsenmiicme," 332. 
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operation elsewhere in the Mediterranean compelled the strengthening of German 
units on the Italian islands and mainland. Keitel directed Kesselring to prepare the 
region's defenses. Kesselring, facing catastrophe in North Africa, could do little 
more than withdraw staffs from Tunisia made superfluous by the contracting front 
without approval by the OKWs Fuhmngstab, a clear indication that difficulties lay 
ahead for him in preparing an effective defense of Italy. 136 
Defenses in Italy were either in poor condition or did not exist. Sicily, slated 
for extensive fortification, remained naked of the pillboxes and strongpoints that 
later characterized Hitler's vaunted Atlantic Wall. Despite the presence of a large 
Italian work force on the island, little had been done thus far to construct defensive 
works on Sicilian beaches.137 
CONCLUSION 
Responsibility for the calamitous Axis defeat registered in Tunisia must be 
laid at Adolf Hitler's doorstep. Hitler's preoccupation with Russia and mistrust of 
his Italian ally prevented him from deploying forces sufficient to conquer Egypt 
before 1942. After Operation Torch, Hitler dispatched forces wholly inadequate for 
defending Tunisia against the growing might of Allied forces. He sacrificed the best 
German armored and mobile forces in a campaign doomed from its onset. 
Hitler's responsibility for this disaster grows when viewed in light of 
136Hubatsch, Ktb OKW 111(2), 1428. 
137Ruge, "Report on the Evacuation of Sicily," 3-5. 
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Mussolini's and Rommel's separate appeals. They both sought measures appropriate 
to the strategic situation. Hitler recklessly rejected appeals to establish a defensible 
line or to negotiate a (temporary) peace with Russia. Rommel's March appeal to 
rescue battleworthy troops while still possible led to his dismissal as the Afrika-
Korps's commander. Hider also refused to undertake a large-scale reequipping of 
Italian forces after the debacles at EI Alamein and the Russian Don. German 
parsimony and blame heaped upon Italian forces for these disasters combined with 
an inept execution of strategy at Stalingrad and Tunisia to poison !talo-German 
relations. The record demonstrates that the lion's share of responsibility for the 
debacle in North Africa lay squarely with Adolf Hitler. The Allies exacted payment 
for Hitler's irresponsibility when they stormed Sicily's beaches in July 1943. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEFEAT AND RETRENCHMENT: MEDITERRANEAN DEFENSES 
INTRODUCTION 
A series of crises struck the Axis between A<larch and July 1943. Hider could 
not ignore the fighting on the Mediterranean front. Despite his attempts to defer 
action in the region, strategic considerations could not be swept aside. March saw a 
'mini-crisis' develop as security for railways linking Germany and Italy became a 
bone of contention between the Reich and Switzerland. Relations with Italy 
deteriorated, although Hitler held off a break with his ally by haranguing Mussolini 
and convincing theDuce to hold fast to policies that ultimately proved fatal to his 
regime. 
When the Axis North African armies capitulated in May, Hitler could no 
longer postpone deliberation of the region's strategic requirements. Deficits in men, 
material, fortifications, and plans could not be corrected without a substantial 
commitment of German men and resources. A lengthy and significant deployment 
of German strength to the theater began, but too litde time remained before the 
Allied invasion of Sicily to correct the flawed disposition of Axis forces serving there. 
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Surrender in North Africa led to a period of retrenchment and set the stage for 
another defeat in Sicily, all of which Mussolini had foreseen with great trepidation. 
THE MARCH ALARM: GERMAN INVASION PLANS FOR 
SWITZERLAND 
The crumbling Axis front in Tunisia increased the value of Swiss rail links 
joining Germany and Italy. Since August 1940, nearly 1800 rail cars had crossed 
Switzerland each day on their way to Italy. German rail shipments to Italy increased 
in volume as OKW moved men and materiel into Italy and North Africa. To 
accomplish this, Germany and Italy shipped coal and other 'civilian' cargo using 
Swiss lines. The passage of Axis freight through Switzerland significantly reduced 
pressures on other routes carrying military shipments directly between the two Axis 
states. 138 
Lack of access to Swiss railroads would have restricted the German buildup to 
using lines running into Italy from France, German Austria, and Yugoslavia. The 
Brenner line, serving traffic from Innsbruck to Verona, was the most important 
route exclusively in Axis hands. Lines served the rest of Italy from the northern 
Italian hub at Verona. The Brenner-Verona route's short length and difficult terrain 
made it easier to defend from air attack and repair than the other routes joining 
Germany and Italy. Moreover, being fully double-tracked and electrified, its trains 
138Schreiber, Stegemann and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, 
m:32; Jerrold M. Packard, Neither friend nor foe: the Eurppean neutrals in World War 
II eN ew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 14-15. 
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did not consume coal that Italian factories needed for production. Other lines 
connecting France and Yugoslavia with Italy fell far below the Brenner route's cargo 
capacity. 139 
Securing access to Swiss railways greatly concerned Hitler and his 
commanders as the Italian buildup began. They lacked alternatives to Swiss routes if 
Allied action closed the Brenner line. In 1942, anxious communications between 
Berlin and the German ambassador in Bern led to German demands that the Swiss 
improve their security measures along the routes. Swiss leaders also suffered 
anxious moments when contemplating possible German seizure of the rail links. 
Their commander-in-chief, General Henri Guisan, expected German concern for the 
rail lines to heighten as the Allied invasion of Italy neared. Guisan also knew of 
German worries that Switzerland might allow Allied armies to pass through the 
republic's cantons and attack Germany.140 
A January 1943 report from Walter Schellenberg, head oftheSS Foreign 
Intelligence Service (Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)), contained 
information from Swiss sources that focused German attention on the rail routes' 
vulnerability. Informants warned that the Royal Air Force intended to bomb the 
Brenner line. This action would sever the flow of German reinforcements to Italy. 
139Transportation Division The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Rail 
Operations Over the Brenner Pass (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1947),3. 
l~iirg Fink, Die Schweiz aus der Sicht des Dritten Reiches 1933-1945 (Ziirich: 
Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1985), 153,160. 
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Swiss forces were described as preparing a defense against possible Allied attack. 
The information, regardless of its reliability, highlighted the insecurity facing 
German forces in Italy. The defense of Swiss railroads remained in Swiss hands. 
Hitler could not discount the possibility of Bern suddenly halting traffic and 
isolating his forces in Italy.141 
On January 30,1943, Swiss intelligence operatives in Germany informed their 
controllers of a conference held at Fuhrer Headquarters. They reported that Goring, 
Goebbels, Himmler, and Alfred Rosenberg, Nazism's ideological philosopher, had 
joined Hider in planningAKTION SCHWEIZ, the invasion of Switzerland. The 
account stated that Major General Eduard Dietl, conqueror ofNarvik, had been 
given command of German forces slated to invade Switzerland. This information 
lent considerable weight to the report's credibility.142 
An expert in mountain warfare, Died was the type of officer Hitler would 
assign to execute a surprise attack against Switzerland. The plan, said to have been 
oudined by Died, consisted of three phases. First, air landing troops would seal 
entrances to the Swiss National Redoubt and prevent Swiss forces from taking up 
defensive positions there. Second, motorized and armored units would link up with 
the air landing troops. FinallY, German Alpine divisions would conquer the 
141 J 6zef Garlinski, The Swiss Corridor: Espionage Networks in Switzerland in 
World War II (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1981), 111-12. 
142Hans Rudolf Kurz, Hundert Jahre Schweizer Armee (Thun: Ott Verlag, 
1978), 192-93. 
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Redoubt. 143 
Swiss officials knew of an earlier German plan to seize Switzerland. The 
Wehrmacht's Operational staff had rejected OPERATION TANNENBAU}I!, a 
scenario envisioning the lightning conquest of Switzerland in October 1940. Little 
evidence exists that German leaders seriously contemplated anacking Switzerland at 
that time. German leaders, as they would for the remainder of the war, decided that 
the Swiss Stackelschwein (porcupine) served German interests far better as an 
independent nation. Nonetheless, knowledge of OPERATION TANNENBAUM 
added weight to Swiss worries in March 1943 that the Germans intended to invade 
their mountain republic. l44 
On March 18, 1943, Swiss apprehension intensified when the Swiss 'Wiking 
Line' confirmed reports of an impending invasion. Well-placed sources in 
Stockholm, Sweden, corroborated the information already in Berne's hands. Swiss 
officials believed that Italy would quit the war when the Allies invaded. Given the 
large number of German units deploying to Italy, Guisan feared that Germany would 
seize Swiss railways to secure its lines of communication. 
143Hans Senn, "Militarische Bedrohung," in Sollen WiT die Armee abschaffen? 
Blick aUfeine bedTohliche Zeit, ed. Walter Schaufelberger (Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 
1988),47. 
144Fink, Schweiz aus tier Sicht des Dritten Reiches, 1-2; Werner Roesch, 
"Deutsche Angriffsplannungen gegen die Schweiz vom SommerIHerbst 1940 
(,<Operation Tannenbaum»)," in Sollen WiT die Armee abschaffen? Blick aUf eine 
bedrohliche Zeit, ed. Walter Schaufelberger (Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 1988),51-62; 
Schwarz,Eye oftke Hurricane, 61-62. 
88 
Swiss planners weighed other factors while planning their response. The 
timing of the crisis did not surprise Guisan and Switzerland's civilian leadership. 
Swiss and German trade officials were locked in contentious trade negotiations. 
Swiss representatives were working to limit exports and loans extended to Germany. 
They did not discount the possibility that Germany had leaked invasion plans to 
improve its bargaining position. A further report from Munich that German 
mountain divisions under Dietl's command had deployed along the Bavarian-Swiss 
border brought the crisis to a boil. The German units were described as ready to 
move upon six hours notice.14S 
Two factors defused the impending confrontation. On March 18, after 
receiving additional information concerning German invasion plans, Guisan placed 
Swiss forces on the alert. His firm response provided Hitler with indisputable 
evidence that the republic would defend its territory. Information already in 
German hands further reinforced the belief that the Swiss would oppose a German 
invasion. Otto Kocher, German ambassador to Switzerland, reiterated previous 
warnings that the Republic would demolish its rail lines if the Germans invaded. l46 
Swiss engineers had readied tracks, bridges, tunnels, viaducts, and electrical supply 
14SHans Rudolf Kurz, "Problemes Militaires: L'entre-deux-guerres," Revue 
d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale 31, no. 121 Ganvier 1981):28-29; Hans Rudolf 
Kurz, Geschichte tier Schweizer Armee (Verlag Huber Frauenfeld, 1985), 169-70; 
Packard, Neither Friend nor Foe, 315-16; Schwarz, Eye of the Hurricane, 61-62; Senn, 
"Militarische Bedrohung," 47. 
146Garlinski, Swiss Corridor, 5-6, 111-112. 
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lines for demolition. Forcing a way through the Swiss national redoubt's defenses 
would be cosdy and time consuming. Faint hope existed that the prized rail lines 
would be seized intact.147 
Guisan reinforced this information during secret meetings with Walter 
Schellenberg, head of the German Security Service's (Sicherheitsdienst) Foreign 
Intelligence department. While meeting with Schellenberg on March 3, 1943, 
Guisan delivered notice that his nation would oppose a German invasion. In a later 
controversial handwritten note, the Swiss general pledged that Switzerland would 
resist invasion from any quarter, Allied or German.148 
Scholars still debate the earnestness of the March 1943 German invasion 
plan. German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels' diary entry of 17 March 1943 
reveals that Major General Eduard Died was not in Bavaria, but at his post in 
N orway.149 Moreover, German forces, spread dangerously thin in many theaters, no 
147Schwarz, Eye of the Hunicane, 64; Packard, Neither Friend nor Foe, 157. 
148Fink, Sehweiz aus tier Siehl des Dritten Reiehes, 153; Schwarz, Eye of the 
Hurricane, 64-65. 
149Die TagebUchervonJoseph Goebbels, Bd. 7: Teil2, Diktate 1941-1945. 
Januar - Miirz 1943., ed. Elke Frolich (Miinchen: K. G. Saur, 1993),572. Goebbels' 
diary entry of 17 Mar 43 includes the report of a telephone conversation with Josef 
Terboven, Reich Commissioner for Norway. 
"T erboven ruft mich abends spat von Oslo an. Er hat einen Besuch an der 
N ordfront gemacht und dort die besten Eindriicke gesammelt. Er freut sich sehr 
iiber den tiefen Eindruck, den meine Sportpalastrede bei Deiti, seinen Offizieren 
und auch den Mannschaften gemacht hat." 
Dietl was nowhere near German-Swiss border in command of mountain 
troops assigned to invasion of Switzerland, even at the height of the supposed crisis. 
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longer possessed strength sufficient to swiftly defeat the formidable Swiss defenses. 
Italian forces, decimated in battle, likewise lacked the brawn necessary to penetrate 
the Swiss National Redoubt, even in conjunction with a German attack. Given the 
sorry Italian performance in 1940 against similar mountainous French and Greek 
border defenses, it would have been the height of folly to expect more than a 
repetition of past debacles. What is clear is that 'these cursed Swiss runnels,' Hitler's 
livid response to the quandary in which he found himself, remained both worrisome 
to German officials and vital for Italy's defense.Iso 
DIVERGENT COURSES 
More than the Miirzalarm occupied German and Italian attention in March 
and April 1943. The two Axis allies had embarked upon divergent courses. Hitler's 
pre- and early war successes had endowed him with near-absolute power in 
Germany. The Italian siruation had evolved in a diametrically opposed direction. 
Burdened by illness, a weakening political base, and an unbroken string of defeats, 
Mussolini found his freedom of action increasingly limited by dissent within his 
government and by popular unrest among Italians. As the events of the April 1943 
SchloB Klessheim conference demonstrated, the two dictators now occupied 
strikingly different personal positions within their governments. 
CONFERENCE AT KLESSHEIM: lITTLER AND MUSSOLINI MEET (8-10 
ISOKu~ Hundertyahre Schweizer Armee, 192-93; Ku~ Geschichte tier Schweizer 
Armee, 165; Schw~ Eye o/the Hurricane, 62. 
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APRIL 1943) 
After several failed attempts at conferring, Mussolini and Hitler met again at 
Salzburg's baroque Schl06 Klessheim. The worsening Axis position topped their 
agenda. The Stalingrad disaster and annihilation of the Italian 8th Army on the Don 
river line had placed German and Italian forces in a precarious position. Encircled 
Axis forces in North Africa faced imminent defeat at 'Tunisgrad.' Not as adept at 
self-deception as his German counterpart, Mussolini, worried by inflated estimates 
of Allied strength, guessed that Allied armies would set their sights next on Italy.ISI 
Conference participants later remarked on more than just the deteriorating 
strategic situation. Hitler's haggard appearance shocked the Italian delegation. The 
Fuhrer's practice of remaining awake each evening until Allied aircraft had departed 
German airspace had sapped his physical vitality. Mussolini's health had similarly 
fallen prey to the ravages of war. He spent most of the rail journey to Klessheim 
battling a stomach ailment that had reduced him to a shadow of his former self. ISZ 
Unlike Hitler, Mussolini arrived bearing a bold proposal meant to alter Axis 
conduct of the war. The Duce believed that the Allies had forced the Axis onto the 
diplomatic defensive with the Atlantic Charter and recent statements upholding the 
Charter's principles at Casablanca. The Axis powers needed to regain the diplomatic 
ISIDavis, Who Defends Rome?, 28. 
IszDeakin, Brutal Friendship, 260-61; David Irving,Hitler's War (New York: 
Viking, 1977), 505-06; Jonathan Steinberg, All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust 
1941-1943 (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 135. 
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initiative. The Italian foreign minister, Giuseppe Bastianini, had given Mussolini a 
plan to reorganize Europe. Mussolini approved the plan and agreed to place it before 
Hider at Klessheim. 
Bastianini's plan envisioned the creation of an European community in which 
the two Axis powers would guarantee the rights of the lesser states and nationalities. 
The proposal would improve the Axis position by strengthening support from their 
allies and neutrals. By guaranteeing the smaller states' position in postwar Europe, it 
would ameliorate fears of a German-dominated continent. Adoption of this proposal, 
designed to buy Italy time to rebuild its defenses, required that the war's focal point 
be shifted from Russia to the Mediterranean. 
Ribbentrop offered Bastianini faint hope that Hitler would adopt this 
ambitious design during the two foreign ministers' preliminary meetings. The 
incongruous stance taken by Hider's entourage revealed the Fuhrer's advisors' 
desperate desire to alter his disastrous policies. They spoke frankly of their hope 
that Mussolini would shift Hider's focus from Russia, something they had failed to 
dO. IS3 Hider's associates clung to their hopes in vain. The German overlord repeated 
the mantra of his strategic thinking throughout the conference: Tunisia, like the 
Russian front, must be defended at all costs. 
By early April 1943, few other options remained open to the Axis. Italian 
supply convoys running the gauntlet to North Africa provided defenseless prey for 
IS3Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 261-63, 266. 
93 
Allied submarine 'wolfpacks' and their sky-borne companions, guided by the expen 
hand of Ultra. The decimated Italian merchant fleet could not have staged an Axis 
'Dunkirk' from North African beaches even if Hitler had ordered it. Conferees spent 
little time debating the issue, given the impossibility of escape. lS4 Hitler also stressed 
that peace could not be made with Russia. The Axis must hold on and win. 
The Duce, however, had more on his mind than the defeats in North Africa 
and Russia. The 'March Strikes' in northern Italy had demonstrated the regime's 
growing vulnerability at home. The German defeat at Stalingrad and subsequent 
destruction of Italian divisions had emboldened Communists and labor unionists 
into open resistance. The symbolism of the strike's birth at the Fiat Mirafiori plant, 
Italy's largest and most modern factory, did not escape Mussolini's attention. lSS 
Conflicting accounts exist of the two dictators' private discussions. Perhaps 
unsettled by the unrest at home, Mussolini remained strangely passive throughout 
his conversations with Hitler. Mussolini claimed that he made a forceful 
presentation of the Italian program and received Hitler's agreement to make peace 
with Russia. The Duce's description of initial discussions with Hitler encouraged 
Marshal Ambrosio, although the incredulous Comando Supremo head requested that 
lS4"W. W arlimont January 1952. Foundations and Objectives of the 
German-Italian Campaign in Tunisia 1942-1943," Warlimont 9/24/148 (LHCMA), 
23-26. 
lSSTim Mason, "The Turin Strikes of March 1943," in Nazism, Fascism and the 
Working Class, ed. Jane Caplan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),283, 
287. 
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Mussolini repeat his fantastic news.1S6 Given the results and Hider's domination of 
the conference's public sessions, it seems more likely that Hitler rode roughshod 
over Mussolini's efforts to redirect errant Axis policy while meeting in private.1S7 
The limited defensive aid promised Italy further highlighted the precarious 
German situation. Shrinking weapon stockpiles could not supply the 750 tanks, 
1,322 artillery pieces and antitank guns, 7,400 trucks, 500 fighters and bombers, and 
fuel that Ambrosio had requested on February 27. Germany offered only sixty tanks 
IS7he account of the German translator at Klessheim supports the assertion 
that Mussolini fought for the adoption of the European community plan and peace 
with Russia. See "Walter Warlimont to Enno von Rintelen, 9 February 1950," Folio 
7, N 433, NachlaB Rintelen (BAMA), 15-18. 
Ambrosio described Mussolini as convinced that peace would be reached with 
Russia. Only later did he learn from Ribbentrop that Hitler had meant that Russia 
was tottering on the edge of collapse and that peace would be possible after Russia's 
defeat. Vittorio Ambrosio and G. A. Infante, "Events in Italy, 1 February - 8 
September 1943," NARA Microfiche Publication M1035, Fiche 0179, Foreign 
Military Studies, P-Series (RG338), P-058. (1950), 3-4; Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 
264-65. 
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Press, 1971), 1-11. Hider followed Mussolini's difficulties in ending the strikes with 
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supplemented by an air 'armada' of 120 aircraft and 200 spare engines, increased 
supplies of aviation fuel, and additional assistance to Italian forces occupying the 
Balkans.lss Hitler also pressed Mussolini to form a 'Praetorian Guard' to ensure his 
regime's survival. Rimmler and Hitler promised German equipment and military 
advisors to train and equip a Militia armored division, formed from Fascist 
stalwarts. IS9 
Hitler's impassioned soliloquies left Mussolini temporarily reenergized at the 
conference's conclusion. Nonetheless, Mussolini's short-lived revival of spirits could 
not compensate for the conference's true outcome. Hitler would pursue his 'Russia 
First' policy, even at the cost of Italy's collapse.l60 
FINALE IN NORTH AFRICA: FOOLS FOR THE FiJHRER 
The waste of Axis troops defending Tunisia evidenced Hitler's determination 
to act as he promised at Klessheim. This final 'forlorn hope' included men of the 
German 15th klotorized Battalion. They were meant to seal the breech created by 
advancing Allied divisions threatening to annihilate the Italo-German North African 
lS8"Protokoll iiber Besprechung in Schloss Klessheim," OKW/WFSr/Op'/ 
Dt.Gen.Rom Nr. 66782/43 g.K.Chefs. vom 8.4.43, MA 60 (WFSt) Akz. Nr. 1882/56 
(Microfilm) (Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte, Miinchen [Hereafter IFZ], 9 April, 1943), 
72-73; Raspin, Italian War Economy, 369-70. 
IS9Plehwe, End of an Alliance, 9. 
160Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 259-60; Goebbels Diaries, 352; Playfair, Molony, 
Flynn and Gleave, The Destruction of Axis Forces in Africa, 409; Plehwe, End of an 
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bridgehead. This crack battalion's fate, however, illustrated the consequences of 
Hitler's disregard for strategic principle. The Fuhrer dismissed as irrelevant the 
limited capabilities such small driblets of men possessed and ordered that they 
perform impossible tasks. Rather than conserving veteran troops to defend Italy and 
the Balkans, Hitler insisted that they be flown to North Africa's battlefields, now 
dominated by the overwhelming power of American, British, Commonwealth, and 
Free French divisions. 
Italian transport planes airlifting soldiers to North Africa flew into skies filled 
with antiaircraft fire that punctured both the unarmored sheet-metal skins of the 
lumbering Italian aircraft and the fragile bodies of German LAndser. Many of the 
ponderous planes succumbed to the barrage that greeted their arrival. A fortunate 
few survived the ordeal in the air and subsequent crash landings. Nonetheless, 
survival did not betoken success. The shattered remnants of this proud battalion 
emerged from wrecked planes and marched straight into captiviry.161 
Thus did the Axis defense of North Africa collapse. Adolf Hitler, seeking to 
stave off defeat, insisted upon shipping troops into the doomed North African 
bridgehead, even as Allied forces broke through the final Axis defensive positions. 
Hitler's foolish obstinacy condemned to death or captiviry the veteran soldiers of the 
15th Panzer and the Hermann GOring divisions at the precise moment he needed them 
to shore up his southern European defenses. 
161Carell, Foxes of the Desert, 351. 
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THE AXIS STRATEGIC SITUATION AFTER TUNISIA 
Mter the Axis capitulation in May 1943, Hitler faced a strategic nightmare in 
the Mediterranean theater. Long obsessed with the Eastern front, he had doled out 
troops with an eyedropper to this theater. Too late in 1942 did he commit an army 
group to Tunisia. For this strategic folly, Hider finally paid the full price as the 
summer of 1943 approached. The men and materiel lost in Tunisia forced the Axis 
onto the strategic defensive in the West. Allied offensives would henceforth 
determine Axis responses. Strategic initiative, the ability to call the tune for the war, 
now passed wholly from the Axis to the western Allies.162 
THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION 
The Italian army confronted the changed strategic situation after the 
Tunisian surrender with a bare cupboard. Although demanding command of all 
forces in Italy, Comando Supremo no longer mustered a handful of combat-effective 
divisions. Mter the destruction of the Italian r Army in Tunisia, the remaining 
Italian armies were scattered about Yugoslavia, Greece, the Aegean, and the French 
Riviera. Comando Supremo earmarked eleven divisions of the 5th Army to defend 
central Italy, Sardinia, and Corsica. The 7th Army deployed seven divisions within 
southern Italy. An additional eight divisions of the Italian 6th Army defended Sicily. 
With a million and a half men under arms, the Italian army still possessed on 
162Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 4; Warlimont, Im 
Hauptquartier tier deutschen Wehrmacht, 334-35; D'Este, Bitter Victory, 18. 
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paper a substantial force with which to counter the forthcoming Allied invasion. 
However, only a handful of the remaining divisions retained [he mobility necessary 
to defeat an amphibious invasion. Of the Italian 6th Army's eight formations, only 
two, LiVOTnO and Napoli, were effective fighting formations. These 'combat-ready' 
divisions each possessed a single company of obsolete French R-35 tanks. The 
remaining divisions and brigades, designated 'coastal defense' units, were allocated 
low priority for equipment and personnel. The elderly men of these poorly-
equipped units, commanded by unseasoned reserve officers, fled before the well-
equipped and fully-manned Allied divisions. The only surprise is that they should 
have been expected to do otherwise.163 
Coastal defenses did not exist in Italian-held areas. As June began, the 
German military attache, General Enno von Rintelen, appealed for energetic German 
efforts to improve this situation. He believed that proper fortifications could only be 
constructed under German direction. Moreover, German engineers would have to 
provide materials for the construction work. Building supplies still had not been 
shipped to threatened sectors.l64 
163Magna Bauer, "Drafts: Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily July August 1943. 
Part I. Chapter I. Background," MS # R-114, U. S. Army Military Historical 
Institute (Carlisle, Pa., n.d.), 24; Haup~ Kriegsschauplatz Italien, 19-20; Hubatsch, Ktb 
OKW Ill(2) , 1526-27; Rintelen, Mussolini als Buntiesgenosse, 197. 
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THE ITALIAN DOMESTIC SITUATION 
Mussolini's continuing illness further paralyzed preparations for a vigorous 
defense of Italy. The Duce's weak stomach left him in constant pain and reduced 
him to a bland diet of milk and rice. Although all hope for an improvement in the 
dictator's health had not been given up, hopes for Mussolini emerging from his 
isolation did not appear good.16S 
Mussolini's declining health and influence alarmed Hitler. Rumors flying 
about Rome of Mussolini's imminent overthrow exacerbated the Fuhrers anxieties 
concerning the survival of his alliance with Italy. Indications of disloyalty to the 
Axis alliance among Italian leaders multiplied. German officials working in Rome 
reported these shifting sentiments, strengthening Hitler's belief that the alliance 
would last only as long as Mussolini held power.l66 
The internal situation in Italy gave Hitler good reason for anxiety. Blame for 
the loss of North Mrica and the colonies had fallen squarely upon Mussolini's 
government. The losses had severely demoralized Italian public opinion. The 
surrender of Italian colonial possessions after decades of effort stripped Italians of 
the illusion that the colonies ensured a brighter future. Italians knew that they 
would not recover the lost territories. With invasion and defeat facing the country, 
16SCiano Diaries, 553. 
I66Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bundnis und Besatzung, 28-29. 
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Italians simply hoped that their occupiers would proved humane.167 
Horrific troop losses in Russia worsened the situation. The casualty reports, 
Allied air attacks throughout Italy, and the poor effort at defending Italian cities, 
mrned war weariness into hatred of the Fascists. Reports from Italy stated that 
Italian middle- and working-class support for the conflict had vanished. Italy was 
ready for peace. 168 
In early March 1943, strikes by Italian workers sharply reduced war 
production. Work actions at Turin's Fiat Mirafiori factory spread across northern 
Italy, quickly reaching Milan. Laborers, suffering the effects of inflation, demanded 
higher wages. The threat represented by the striking workers to Mussolini's rule was 
clear. Without the support of workers in key industries, the Fascist regime 
possessed but dwindling hopes of survival. 169 
Mter the strikes ceased, production in armaments factories declined sharply. 
Fascist police could not compel disaffected workers to enthusiastic toil. 
Prosecutions of political crimes rose steadily, but the regime did not use terror 
effectively enough to coerce workers into raising output. The ineffectiveness of 
167Haupr, Kriegsschauplatz Italien, 14- 15; Rinrelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, 
196; Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, 
Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn: Athenaum-Verlag, 1950),214. 
168Enno von Rintelen, "Der Feldzug in Italien," Band 3, N433 - Nachlafi 
Rintelen (BAMA, 2 Dezember, 1947), 1-2. 
169Mason, liThe Turin Strikes of March 1943," 275-76; Raspin, Italian War 
Economy, 370-71. 
punitive action further established the rot eating away at Italy.170 
"DIE WEHRWIRTSCHAFI'S ITALIEN": ITALY'S ECONOMIC 
POTENTIAL 
Rintelen warned Berlin in May 1943 that the lack ofleadership had 
compromised Italian combat-readiness. Although Cavallero, former head of 
Comando Supremo, attempted to improve war production before his dismissal, the 
dismal output of Italy's industrial base had not improved. OKWlearned from 
Rintelen that the reverse was true. Production had fallen to new lows. Rintelen 
partially blamed the lack of improvement on Ambrosio's inherent lethargy, which 
kept the new Comando Supremo chief from urgent action during the crisis. Other 
Italian leaders likewise remained passive, accepting German advice but doing 
nothing. 171 
Shortfalls in German deliveries to Italy undermined the reconstitution of 
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combat-effective Italian divisions. Coal deliveries, vital for power generation and the 
production of steel, fell seven percent below agreed upon levels.172 Allied air raids on 
the Italian rail net added to the shortfall. The disrupted rail net also caused the 
breakdown of food distribution. In April 1943, vast numbers of rail cars sat 
immobilized in north Italy, unable to reach locations where the population was 
170Harvey, "Italian War Effort," 44. 
l71Rintelen, "Beurteilung der derzeitige Kampfuaft der italienischen 
Wehrmacht," 52-53. 
172Raspin, Italian War Economy, 371. 
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suffering from hunger. Shortages of food and materials reduced industrial 
producti<ln and hurt the popularity of the Fascist regime, which the populace saw as 
incapable of effectively managing the economy.173 
German army reports mentioned dwindling Italian civilian support for 
further fighting. German troops found the populace openly antagonistic to them in 
potential combat zones. Allied propaganda had effectively blamed the Germans for 
the air attacks on Sicily. While hoping that Sardinians might help defend their 
island home, OBS officers worried that the inability to supply civilian needs once 
the battle had begun would turn Italian civilians against the Germans.174 
A May 1943 survey by the OKW Foreign Economics Staff detailed the Italian 
war economy's assets and situation. Staff officers scrutinized every aspect of Italian 
consumption and production. They took particular interest in breaking down the 
Italian war economy and its potential by region. 
A careful reading reveals the north Italian industrial center's importance to 
the Italian economy. This small region contained 50 percent of steel production, 9S 
percent of aluminum manufacturing, and 100 percent of the truck, automobile, and 
armored vehicle industries. Two-thirds of artillery producers, 88 percent of 
munitions production, 98 percent of aircraft frame and 66 percent of aircraft engine 
173Harvey, "Italian War Effort," 43. 
174Der Oberbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung, " Beurteilung der Lage auf 
den Inseln Sizilien, Sardinien und Korsika," Ia - Nr. 203/43 gKdos. H.Qu., den 
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production were concentrated in northern Italian factories. German researchers 
noted that 97 percent of GERMAN orders let with Italian factories had been placed 
with this region's industrial concerns. These orders amounted to 874 million 
Reichsmarks through May 1943.175 
Comparisons of German and Italian war production frequently draw similar 
conclusions: Italian production paled in comparison with German output. Some 
economic historians therefore dismiss the scale of Axis war production as so inferior 
to their opponents' output as to preclude any chance of Axis victory, given the 
explosive growth of the American and Soviet war economies. While the validity of 
the overall contribution of the Allied war economies should not be belittled, such 
analyses rarely note the useful assistance wrested from Italy after the German 
takeover. 
The factory-by-factory OKW study ofItalian armament production reveals 
that Italian producers possessed valuable capacity that could be enlisted in the 
Reich's war effort. While Italy's 2.7% of world production did not suffice to win 
Mussolini the victories of which he dreamed, it represented a substantial asset if 
effectively combined with German production. Italian factories could have boosted 
German output by 2S percent in 1943, ifunder German control. 
Conclusive evidence of German interest in Italy's economic assets as a factor 
1750berkommando der Wehrmacht W Stb (AusI), "Die Wehrwirtschaft 
Italiens," Document AL 2890 (OKW W Stb (AusI) 2./1 a Az 3 i 10 Nr.3901l43 
g.Kdos.) (IWM), S. 
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driving the seizure of the Italian peninsula in September 1943 is lacking. 
Nonetheless, this survey shows that, unlike their opponents, who dismissed the 
Italian industrial base as a non-factor in strategic planning, the Germans recognized 
Italy's economic value. Subsequent German efforts to integrate Italian production 
into the German war effort demonstrate that retaining the north Italian industrial 
base materially assisted the Nazi regime's struggle to prolong the war. 
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE STRATEGY: AXIS PREPARATIONS FOR 
THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE 
The collapse in Tunisia forced the Axis to define a common strategy designed 
to counter future Allied operations. The Mediterranean theater offered the Allies 
wide latitude in choosing their next move. British and American forces, released by 
the Axis surrender, could conduct landings in the Mediterranean or shift to Great 
Britain and operate against northwestern Europe. Axis planners could only guess 
what the Allies would do. Would they invade the Balkans via Greece or would they 
descend on Sicily, Sardinia, or Corsica as a first step toward the conquest of Italy? 
ULTRA 
Allied penetration of Axis intelligence gathering and communications 
seriously compromised German efforts to divine their opponents' intentions and 
prepare a decisive repulse of the next Allied move. Moreover, British 
counterintelligence officers controlled Abwehr agents in Great Britain reporting back 
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to Germany.176 Allied counterintelligence had likewise ferreted out many Axis 
intelligence operatives in North Africa, although some transmitted accurate 
information to Berlin.177 Most damaging of all, Allied codebreakers had cracked 
codes guarding Wehrmacht communications. Transmissions encoded by the German 
Enigma code-typewriter had been broken by dint of often tedious, if nonetheless 
quite brilliant, work by Allied codebreakers. The decoded and translated messages, 
assigned the codename IDtra, revealed German fears and plans in detail. l7& 
Allied deception plans before the Sicilian invasion fully exploited the 
advantages gained from IDtra. British and American planners employed an panoply 
of deception schemes that weakened the Axis defense of Sicily. Operation Barclay 
created the illusion of an Allied move against either southern France or the Balkans. 
Other deception plans manufactUred uncertainty by causing Axis officials to believe 
176J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972). 
InMichael Howard, Strategic Deception, British Intelligence in the Second 
World War, (London: HM.S.O, 1990),5:84. 
178Useful books abound exploring the breaking of the German Enigma codes. 
Jozef Garlinski's The Enigma War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, [1979] 1981) 
remains an excellent introduction to the topic. The Polish contribution to this effort 
is detailed in Richard A. Woytak's, "The Origins of the Ultra-Secret Code in Poland, 
1937-1938,Polish Review (1978: XXIII) and Wladyslaw Kozaczuk's Enigma: How 
the German Machine Cipher was Broken, and How it was Read by the Allies in World War 
Two (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1984). The dimensions 
of this accomplishment and the toll it took on the men and women who cracked this 
"unbreakable machine code" are detailed in F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp's recent 
volume, Code Breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchiey Park (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
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that Crete or Turkey might be the target of Anglo-American forces. 179 
The Allied ruses shrewdly reinforced Hider's prejudices, which Ultra often 
revealed. Hider, fearing an Italian surrender, reluctandy deployed German troops to 
southern Italy and Sicily. Allied planners cleverly exploited this and focused his 
attention on peripheral areas such as Greece. In the end, Hider refused to send more 
than two divisions to Sicily. This resulted from his fear of an Italian surrender and 
Allied dis-information. While it cannot be said which played the larger role, skillful 
Allied deception plans reinforced the fears and prejudices of top German officials. ISO 
In 1942, Ultra intelligence had played a direct role in defeating Rommel's 
Afrika-Korps. Allied leaders hoped that Ultra would reprise its vital contribution in 
Sicily. Eisenhower and his commanders foresaw a similar flow of helpful 
intelligence during the Sicilian campaign. However, the campaign's short duration 
and the irregular flow of intelligence to the batdefield prevented Ultra's full 
exploitation during the ground campaign. The complex tasks of breaking the 
Enigma machine's daily code wheel settings, deciphering messages, and difficulties 
translating and communicating the intelligence to field commanders, kept Ultra 
from regularly playing a direct role in Sicily.181 
179Howard, Strategic Deception, 85. 
lsoIbid.,92. 
181David Kahn's description of the intricacies of solving an Enigma message 
bear repeating for readers not fully versed on the difficulties of providing timely 
information to Allied commanders. "Now a basic point in understanding the 
operation of Ultra is to recognize that solution does not come permanendy in one 
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The transfer of fighting from North Africa to Europe further limited Ultra's 
contribution. F. W. Winterbotham served as security chief for the Special Liaison 
Units (SLUs) delivering Ultra intercepts to Allied commanders. He assured General 
Alexander that the distance between Rome and Berlin would ensure a steady stream 
of intercepts. In practice, telex posts, using secure ground cables, often substituted 
for radio transmissions of orders and reports. German commanders, especially 
Kesselring, occasionally used Enigma for quick communication with Berlin. The 
poor state of Italian communication links also forced reliance on Enigma. 
Nonetheless, Ultra's value diminished as the frequency of intercepts, an important 
factor in finding the daily solution to Enigma, declined.I82 
Ultra occasionally provided Allied commanders with valuable tactical 
intelligence during the Sicilian campaign. Kesselring handed his opponents a 
single blow. Reading a message today does not mean that you can thereafter 
instantly read every message as soon as you have intercepted it. Rather there are 
levels of analysis. To read a message, for example, you had to do three things -- and 
even here I am simplifying. (1) Reconstruct the wiring in all of the rotors. (2) 
Know which three rotors out of the set of five were used that day. (3) Know the 
position the rotors were in for the start of that message. You can know one or even 
two of these factors and still not be able to read a single word of the original message. 
You must know all three. And this takes time. So you can intercept a message today, 
but not solve it for three weeks, by which time the message is valueless. On the other 
hand, sometimes things are going well and solutions are prompt." David Kahn, "The 
Significance of Code breaking and Intelligence in Allied Strategy and Tactics," 
Cryptologia, July 1977:214-15. 
I82Albert Kesselring, "Italy as a Military Ally," NARA Microfiche Publication 
MI035, Fiche 0015, Foreign Military Studies, C-Series (RG 338) C-015 
(Washington, D.C., 1948),2; Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants 
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priceless advantage when he transmitted a complete order of battle to OKW shortly 
before the invasion. As later proved true in Normandy, Ultra also provided detailed 
information on the arrival of German reinforcements. Allied officers praised Ultra 
for revealing on July 14 that the Germans would contract their defensive perimeter 
and pull back from the western half of the island. Moreover, Ultra revealed after 
July 16 that Allied air raids had forced Luftwaffe planes to beat a steady retreat from 
the island. Nonetheless, the swift and undetected escape of German forces from 
Sicily, hidden from Ultra until August 10, revealed the limitations of even the most 
reliable intelligence source. Given this mixed bag of contributions, Ultra did not 
decisively affect the campaign's outcome. Although defeated, German forces escaped 
their Allied pursuers.IS3 
AXIS DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS (APRIL - JULY 1943) 
TAKING THE ENEMY'S MEASURE 
OKWand Kesselring understood that Tunisia's loss had both opened the 
Mediterranean and released Allied shipping for amphibious operations. Allied naval 
forces quickly exploited the shorter Mediterranean passage to the east. The first 
Allied convoy dispatched on the Gibraltar to Suez route sailed May 17-26, 1943. 
I83Ralph Bennett, Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany, 
1939-45 (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994),205; Adolph G. Rosengarten Gr.), 
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Luftwaffe units, seriously weakened by losses in North Mrica, failed to hinder the 
convoy's passage.l84 
Victory in Tunisia shortened the 13,000 mile voyage from Great Britain to 
Suez via the Cape of Good Hope to less than 3,000 miles. OKW staff estimated that 
convoy routes unlocked by the loss of North Africa would release two million tons of 
Allied shipping. General Brehon B. Somervell, the autocratic and efficient head of 
U.S. army logistics, calculated that the Allies would gain only 1,825,000 tons during 
the first five months' free passage of the Mediterranean. The actual benefit to Allied 
naval forces proved much less. Poor British shipping controls reduced the 
anticipated benefits of the newly opened route. The OKW staff could not foresee 
this and miscalculated Allied naval capabilities for the upcoming invasion. ISS 
The OKW Operational staff warned that increased Allied naval resources 
represented a direct threat to the survival of the Axis alliance. An invasion of Italy 
could drive it from the war. Planners therefore had to prepare the defense of Italy 
while anticipating Italian defection. All this remained secondary to the Operational 
staffs warning that weak coastal defenses, a growing partisan movement in the 
Balkans, and the opportunity to cut Germany off from vital Balkans resources, made 
184Baum and Weichold, Krieg der "Achsenmiichte," 328. 
185 Albert N. Garland and Howard McGraw Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of 
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an assault on southwestern Europe the most likely long range Allied goal. l86 
Allied deception plans magnified the apparent threat to the German position, 
creating an illusion of Allied strength greater than that arrayed against the Axis. 
Misleading estimates of Allied military strength tempered German hopes that they 
would gain a prolonged period of recovery after the Tunisian debacle. On June 27, 
1943, two weeks before the Allied invasion of Sicily, the OBS Operational staff 
calculated that the Allies had readied six armored divisions, five armored brigades, 
eighteen to twenty infantry divisions, two air landing divisions, eighteen to twenty 
parachute battalions, and a number of Commando units to invade Sicily, Sardinia, 
and Corsica. Kesselring's staff warned that the Allies could simultaneously land 
nine to ten American or seven to eight British divisions. Strong forces of paratroops 
and Commandos would accompany the conventional units. l87 
While not inconsiderable, actual Allied strength stood far below German 
estimates. Anglo-American invasion forces numbered roughly fourteen and two-
thirds divisions instead of the thirty-two and one-half divisions that German 
l~arlimont, 1m Hauptquartier tier deutschen Wehrmacht, 334-35. 
187Der Oberbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung, "Beurteilung der Lage auf 
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calculations attributed to them. The ten and a third infantry divisions, two and one-
third armored divisions, two parachute divisions, and assortment of American 
Ranger and British Commando units poised to descend upon Sicily represented a 
force weaker by half than the force levels OKWestimates credited Allied armies. l88 
DEBATING ALLIED INTENTIONS 
Speaking to Allied intentions in late spring 1943, Winston Churchill declared 
that "anybody but a bloody fool would know that it was Sicily." Unfortunately for 
the Axis, a vast range of possible invasion targets, including Sicily, required 
defending. 189 
From the beginning of May, Hitler's attention focused on a possible Allied 
move against the Balkans. Shipments of bauxite, chromium, copper, and oil 
sustained the German war machine. Germany could not replace these essential war 
materials from any other source. Hitler thus decided that he would defend his 
southern flank with six mobile divisions transferred from Russia. Groups of mobile 
forces would be sited in threatened areas, especially Greece, to counter the expected 
Allied invasion. Italian hesitation and German combat requirements in Russia 
188Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr. and Friedrich von Stauffenberg, Battle of Sicily 
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defeated this plan.l90 
In contrast, Mussolini and the Italian military commanders held 
unswervingly to the belief that Sicily was the next Allied target. Comando Supremo 
believed that Sicily's conquest would gain the Allies command of the sole remaining 
threat to their shipping and wrest a springboard from the Axis, useful for an attack 
on Sardinia or the Italian peninsula To prepare an effective defense, the Italian high 
command wanted its forces transferred back to Italy from the Balkans and southern 
France. 191 
While visiting Italy in May 1943, Admiral Donitz encountered similar views 
among the Italian naval staff. While they thought Sardinia a strong candidate for 
invasion, they expected a move against Sicily to quickly follow. Donitz pressed his 
Italian counterparts to make a maximum effort to ensure that sea lines of 
communication remained open to all threatened sectors.192 He also found Mussolini 
hesitant to accept German divisions offered by Hitler. General Mario Roatta, head of 
the Italian army, had approved the deployment of six German mobile divisions. 
Mussolini, fearful of growing German strength in It21y, wished to remain master of 
190Baum and Weichold, Krieg der "Achsenmiichte," 329,330-31; Haupt, 
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his house and demanded a reduction in the number of divisions. 193 
OKW views of potential invasion sites varied widely over the passage of time. 
In late February 1943 it had warned of a possible invasion of Sicily, Crete, Sardinia, 
or Corsica.l94 While rating Sicily highest on its list of possible targets, this estimate 
later changed. Operation Mincemeat worked its magic on German planners, the 
fabricated information convincing some in Berlin that Greece lay in greater danger 
than Italy or the surrounding isles. Hitler, influenced by the misinformation, moved 
the well-armed 1st Panzer Division with its 18,000 men and 83 tanks to Greece. 
Although this experienced division's men would be sorely missed in Sicily, Greece, 
entry way to the Balkans as it had been during the First World War, had to be 
defended. l9S 
By late spring 1943, German officers in the Mediterranean theater expected 
bold Allied moves against possible invasion targets given the correlation of forces 
favoring the Anglo-American alliance. Kesselring believed that the Allies would 
seize total control of the Mediterranean Sea. Any plan adopted would also have to 
provide significant assistance to their embattled Russian ally, while not hindering 
preparations for the invasion of western Europe. Kesselring saw advantages in 
Allied moves against Sicily and Sardinia. Bases there would threaten northern Italy 
193"Walter Warlimont to Enno von Rintelen, 9 February 1950," (BAMA), 14; 
Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, 216, 218. 
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and southern France. He later expressed his surprise over the timid invasion plan 
adopted for Sicily. In his view, the "Allied rejection of such a solution ... made the 
conduct of further hostilities easier for the German Supreme Command." 
Kesselring also correcdy estimated that direcdy assaulting the Italian 
mainland would prove less advantageous than seizing the islands. A bold leap to the 
European mainland did threaten the continuation of the Axis alliance, the collapse of 
which would have opened eastern Mediterranean shipping routes. Kesselring 
chided postwar interrogators that "[t]he decisive disadvantage of this solution 
[moving into Sicily] consisted in the necessity which is involved of fighting ... on 
the entire length of the boot of Italy with its terrain which was unfavorable for the 
attacker and extremely favorable for the defense." 
Reflecting upon the campaign after the war, Kesselring believed that the 
Allies must have taken this course hoping that an Italian surrender would pay 
significant dividends. The successful German defense of Italy demonstrated 
the disadvantages of the second solution very clearly. Viewing retrospectively 
the Italian campaign which began at Salerno it therefore seems that the 
advantages of the "safe" solution did, of course, lead to eventual success, but 
that due to [sic] the length of the campaign total losses were doubdess higher 
than they would probably have been in case of the bold first solution. l96 
General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, later 1 (f' Army commander and 
Kesselring's successor in Italy, worried that Sicily would not be the Allies' sole 
objective. He feared simultaneous Allied assaults against Sicily and Calabria, the toe 
196Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 22-23. 
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of the Italian boot and sine qua non of Sicily's defense. Dual landings would trap 
German forces much as they had been cornered in Tunisia. Vietinghoffbelieved 
that the Allies would assault the Italian mainland after landings on Sicily and 
Corsica. Allied forces could use their new island bases as a springboard from which 
to bound into northern Italy. From this new position, Allied forces could outflank 
German troops, sever their supply line to the Reich, and quickly defeat them. 
Nonetheless, Vietinghoffwanted German divisions concentrated on Sicily, 
leaving Italian forces to defend Sardinia and Corsica. Although this meant 
surrendering Sardinia and Corsica to the Allies, Vietinghoff judged that the forces 
available could not defend the many potential targets. He sharply criticized Field 
Marshal Kesselring's decision to divide German forces between the islands.I97 His 
judgement proved correct as support arrived too late to help the two German 
divisions positioned in Sicily repulse the Allied invasion. 
SITUATION IN THE AIR: LUFTWAFFE PLANS AND OPERATIONS 
By June, Kesselring's operational staff came to the same conclusion that 
Vietinghoffhad. Staff officers noted that the Lufrwaffe no longer controlled the skies 
over Sicily and Sardinia. On May 11, the day after the surrender in North Africa, II. 
Fliegerkorps reported its strength at 374 combat-ready aircraft. Only 166 of these 
were fighters and another ninety-one bombers. Given Italian naval losses and the 
absence of German capital ships, the Allies could now move at will in the 
197Vietinghoff, "Brief Estimate of the Overall Situation," 5-7. 
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Mediterranean and land where they chose.l98 
TheLufiwaffe High Command (Oberkommando tier Lufiwaffi or OKL) divided 
Luftflotte 2 command responsibilities after the Tunisian defeat. A new formation, 
Lufiwaffenkommando SUdost, took charge of operations in the Balkans, Greece, and 
Crete, while Luftflotte 2 retained control of formations in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and 
Corsica. A new leader assumed command of Lufiwaffi forces in the wes tern 
Mediterranean. On June 12, Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen departed the 
Russian-based Luftflotte 4 and took up his new post. Other commanders followed 
him from Russia to new assignments as fighter and bomber leaders. Hitler sent the 
German ace and Inspector of Fighters, Adolf Galland, to personally direct Sicily's air 
defense. The new command structure freed Kesselring from responsibility for 
directing Luftwaffe operations and allowed him more time [0 map out plans to 
defend the Mediterranean.l99 
Lufiwaffi units arriving in Sicily from Tunisia had suffered heavy losses 
fighting in North Africa. Losses from November 1942 to May 1943 totaled 2,422 
aircraft, 40.5 percent of all Lufiwaffi aircraft on the books that November. Average 
unit casualties amounted to twice their official strength, an incredible toll of combat-
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199Matthew Cooper, The German Air Force 1933-1945 (London: Jane's, 1981), 
287-89; Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Lufiwaffi, 1939-1945 (Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1983), 164; Herhudt von Rohden, 
"The German Air Force in the Mediterranean 1941-1945," Akz. Nr. 1843/56, (IFZ, 
1946),73-74. 
111 
experienced pilots and planes. Galland personally wimessed the dire condition of 
the remaining Lufiwaffo units in Tunisia when he paid them a visit shortly before the 
surrender. Transport crews made a supreme effort bringing in troops up to the 
surrender and suffered accordingly. In April, seventy-six Ju-52 and fourteen 
enormous Me-323 transports fell to Allied guns. The few escaping planes, despite 
carrying irreplaceable ground crews, could not redress the lack of repair facilities and 
equipment in Sicily.zoo 
OKL substantially reinforced its squadrons defending Sicily. Aircraft 
deliveries to the Mediterranean took precedence over units preparing for battle at 
Kursk and defending German skies. Lufiwaffo commanders transferred fighter and 
fighter-bomber units to the island. Unit strengths rose to 450 planes before the 
invasion, notwithstanding heavy combat casualties. A force of 1,280 aircraft awaited 
Allied moves in Italy and the Balkans. Luftflotte 2 attained a strength of 380 Me-109s 
and FW-190s, the newest and best fighter in Luftwaffo inventories. Despite receiving 
40 percent all new fighters built from early May until mid-July, as well as two new 
combat wings, the out-gunned Lufiwaffo could not seize air supremacy.20l 
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The decimated survivors of Tunisia operated under depressingly familiar 
conditions. 4,800 Allied planes, guided by Ultra reports, rained down a torrent of 
destruction on Axis airfields. Ultra provided daily updates from German sources 
highlighting the raids' effectiveness. Allied commanders used the information and 
rapidly shifted their attacks to hit crowded undamaged airfields.202 Guided by this 
intelligence, B-17 Flying Fortress bombers with fighter escorts hit Luftwaffe bases at 
Marsala and Trapani during May and June. Carpet-bombing raids caught German 
fighters on the ground at Grottaglia and Vibo-Valencia. Fragmentation bombs 
wreaked havoc on German fighters parked at cramped Sicilian bases. Air damage 
surveyors later provided evidence of the campaign's effectiveness. They found 
almost 1,000 destroyed Axis aircraft on the island's airbases. 
American and British fighter squadrons ranged across the island, downing 
survivors as they rose to defend their bases. The daily situation rapidly deteriorated 
into an enormous mismatch as Galland's squadrons struggled to PUt 120 fighters 
into the skies. Allied air forces routinely countered the oumumbered Germans, 
sending 300-500 fighters to meet them. During Galland's six week sojourn in Sicily, 
his pilots suffered 60010 losses.203 On May 25, American P-38s dispatched eleven 
German fighters in a single dogfight over Capo San Vito. Sardinia, Corsica, and 
20ZR H. Humphreys, "Reports Received by the U. S. War Department on the 
use of ULTRA in the European Theater, World War II: The Use of"U' in the 
Mediterranean and Northwest African Theaters of War," SRH-037, (NAn, 1945),31; 
Sadkovich, "Understanding Defeat," 48. 
203Rohden, "German Air Force in the Mediterranean," 76. 
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Pantelleria also received attention from Allied air formations. Harbor facilities, rail 
yards, supply depots, and factories suffered great destruction. The May raids 
eventually forced the evacuation of Luftwaffe bombers to safer fields in Italy. 
Luftwaffe units made feeble attempts to reply in kind, attacking 
concentrations of Allied shipping and aircraft. The raids petered out as German 
fighters focused on surviving the swarms of attacking Allied fighters rather than 
protecting their assigned charges. Allied deception plans substantially reduced 
German air strength on Sicily. German uncertainty as to where the blow would fall 
caused significant numbers of aircraft to be held in reserve in Italy and to be spread 
across airfields throughout the theater. By early July, Allied air raids had rendered 
the point moot. Not only had the reinforcements been eliminated from the Luftwaffe 
order of battle, most of the fighters and bombers fell back to bases near Naples. 
Allied flyers had rendered their ground troops invaluable assistance. They had won 
air superiority over Sicily and would keep it for the remainder of the Italian 
campaign.204 
204 A detailed account of Allied air operations for May-July 1943 may be found 
in: Eric Hammel, Air War Europa: America's Air War Against Germany in Europe and 
North Africa 1942-1945 (Pacifica, Ca.: Pacifica Press, 1994), 130-151. Conditions 
encountered by Luftwaffe units based on Sicily are discussed by: Cooper, German Air 
Force, 287-89; Galland, The First and the Last, 146; Karl-Heinrich Graf von 
Klinkowstroem, ttItaly's Break-away and the Fighting around Rome (September 
1943),tt NARA Microfiche Publication MI035, Fiche 0197, Foreign Military Studies, 
D-Series (RG 338), 0-301 (Washington, D.C., 1947), 1; Hubatsch, Ktb OKW 111(2), 
1607; Lee, German Air Force, 139-40; Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and 
the Land Battle in Three American Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force 
History, 1994),56-57; Murray, Strategy for Defeat, 165. 
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GERMAN LOGISTICS 
Knowing that the Allies controlled the skies and seas, OKWacted to ensure 
that combat units would find adequate supplies on Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica The 
German High Command wanted between two and five units (an amount sufficient 
for a day of combat) of ammo, twenty units of fuel, and a ninety-day supply of rations 
positioned on the islands. Allied attacks on Italian railroads and harbors in the 
months prior to the invasion of Sicily made the difficult task even more laborious. 
Raids on Sardinian ports destroyed harbor facilities, exacerbating a shortage of 
merchant shipping in the theater.2OS Targeting key points in the Italian rail net, 
Allied pilots created chaos throughout the system. Trains bearing essential war 
materials suffered delays in transit from the Brenner pass near the German border of 
Italy down to the southern province of Calabria. 
German commanders surmounted the looming crisis with stopgap measures. 
Italian civilian traffic was shut out of the rail system as German trains rushing south 
took priority. The vital rail ferry at the Strait of Messina remained open and helped 
supply Sicily, averaging 400 wagons a day on the crossing. Although serious losses 
in German locomotives slowed operations, operations continued. Not even the 
intermittent efforts of Allied submarines to interdict rail traffic by shelling coastal 
2°SHarvey, "Italian War Effort," 42. 
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railways succeeded in shutting down me effort to supply Sicily.206 
Ever enterprising, the German High Command employed the Gotha 242 
gliders of the 1st (Gotha) Verbindungskommando (Segler) to augment its efforts to build 
stocks of supplies on Sardinia. The bulky gliders made 178 journeys to Sardinia 
between March and May 1943, transporting 241.8 tons of materie1.207 This early 
version of an airborne 'rapid deployment force' played a key role in the German 
takeover of Italy in September 1943. For now, its unique vehicles assisted in 
maintaining the flow of supplies to German units deploying to Sardinia. 
By early July, despite the best efforts of Allied airmen and sailors, stocks 
sufficient for extended combat operations were in place on Sicily. Although Sardinia 
and Corsica had received lesser amounts in comparison with Sicily, stockpiles of 
ammunition, fuel, and rations on the islands met the basic requirements set by 
OKW.208 
TROOP DEPLOYMENTS 
The ever-optimistic Field Marshal Kesselring might have lost his perennial 
smile had he known that his opponents possessed detailed knowledge of Sicily's 
206Conrad Seibt, "Stockpiling Supplies for Sardinia and Sicily (May-Iun 
1943)," NARA Microfiche Publication M1035 Fiche 0065, Foreign Military Studies, 
D-Series (RG 338) D-0090. (1947), 2-3. 
207Georg Schlaug, Die deutschen Lastensegler-Verbiinde 1937-1945 (Stuttgart: 
Motorbuch Verlag, 1985), 170. 
208Der Oberbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung, "Beurteilung der Lage auf 
den Inseln Sizilien, Sardinien und Korsika," 49. 
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defenseless state in early March 1943. Bereft of combat troops and coastal defenses, 
Sicily was ripe for the plucking. Kesselring later wrote of his certainty that a swift 
Allied invasion of Sicily would have proven a 'decisive succesS.,209 
For this respite between campaigns, Kesselring could thank Eisenhower's 
lack of strategic flexibility. The vigorous Axis defense of Tunisia until May 1943 
tied down Allied divisions designated for the landing far longer than planners had 
expected. Moreover, North Africa proved a logistical nightmare for British and 
American quartermasters. Having failed to quickly conquer Tunisia in November 
1942, Allied forces thereafter floundered in a sea of mud. Aiaintaining operations 
and preparing for the spring offensive in Tunisia placed demands on American naval 
forces that they could not meet. 
The shipping shortage placed an insurmountable obstacle in the way of an 
early invasion. Supply deliveries to Allied forces fighting in Tunisia arrived late. 
Grand Admiral Donitz's submarine 'wolfpacks' deserve partial credit for delaying a 
possible early invasion of Sicily. In March 1943, their successes against Allied 
convoys made the British Admiralty fear that the convoy system itself had finally 
collapsed under the weight of submarine assault. U-boats sent 627,000 tons of Allied 
shipping to the bottom, the second highest monthly total of the war. Losses 
dropped off sharply in April as bad weather hid Allied convoys from German eyes. 
The sudden tum of the tide against German submariners the next month could not 
209Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 221; Albert Kesselring, "Answers 
to Liddell Hart's Questions," 9/24/117 (LHCMA), 3. 
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have been foreseen. Allied naval commanders had to operate cautiously throughout 
March and April. Nothing extra remained for bold strokes against Sicily, a fact that 
frustrated General Eisenhower.2Io 
Inadequate transportation and crowded port facilities also delayed supply 
deliveries to Allied combat units. The rail and road net of French Northwest Africa 
required improvement as the existing layout barely met the needs of front line 
forces. Civilian requirements in liberated regions and the incessant demands of 
French commander Henri-Honore Giraud for equipment to rearm his French 
divisions fighting alongside the Allies further complicated Allied preparations. 
After the Axis surrender in May 1943, Allied forces assumed responsibility for a 
quarter-million German and Italian prisoners. POW movements clogged railroads, 
delaying Allied operations. The resulting pause in activity bought Kesselring time 
to organize Sicily's defense.211 
Kesselring required every moment that the enforced Allied inaction 
provided. German forces assigned to Italy remained weak as Hider kept Russia the 
main theater of operations. The melange of German supply, antiaircraft, 
communications, and military police units were no substitute for seasoned combat 
2I'TIan Van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 
322,327,331; Harry C. Butcher,My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1946),303-304. 
2llBennett, Behind the Battle, 118-19; Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 
310; Ohl, Supplying the Troops, 192, 194-96; Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood o/War: 
Logistics in Anned Conflict (London: Brassey's (UK), 1991),68-69. 
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troops. The Plenipotentiary General of the German Armed Forces in Italy 
[Bevollmiichtiger General der deutschen Wehrmacht in [talien], General Enno von 
Rintelen, organized his forces into ad hoc 'alarm units' that possessed minimal 
combat capability. 
The insistence of Comando Supremo that it command all Axis forces within 
Italian borders complicated the situation. Although Italy remained unprepared for 
its defense, Italian leaders limited the influx of German troops. In March, OKW 
reinforced Sardinia with the newly-formed SS Sturmbrigade XI. It later provided the 
foundation of the 90th Panzer grenadier Division. Eight German fortress battalions 
covered key points on Sardinia, strengthening its coastal defenses and releasing 
mobile forces for counter-invasion operations. 
That month OKW hastily despatched a term of German coastal defense 
experts to review fortifications on Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. It later arranged for 
a tour of German coastal defenses by Italian officers assigned the same work.212 Only 
a thin crust of defenses covered Sicily at the beginning of May. Kesselring later 
pinpointed the days following the surrender of Tunis as that island's period of 
greatest vulnerability. He claimed that "[an] attack immediately following the 
capitulation of TUNIS against Sicily had to have had a quick and decisive 
212Siegfried Westphal and Baron von Humboldt-Dachroeden, "The 
Reinforcement of the German Army and the development of the ground situation in 
Italy up to the latter's defection," Kesselring 9/24/117 (LHCMA, 1947), 4-5. 
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success. ,,213 
Gathering key commanders at Gerbini, Sicily shortly after the surrender, 
Kesselring laid out his plans to defend the island. A cadre of divisions would be 
formed from the troops available in Italy. OKW created three new commands, one 
each for Sicily, Sardinia, and the mainland. The staffs and various battalions of the 
ISh Panzer (reformed now as aPanzergrenadier division) and Hermann GOring 
divisions began rebuilding their parent formations. The staff of the XIV Panzer 
Corps reached Italy on May 19, while elements of the 16th Panzer Division moved onto 
the peninsula. Nonetheless, all three combat formations suffered appalling 
weaknesses. Hider noted at his May 19 conference that the 16th Panzer Division held 
just eight tanks and eight unarmed command tanks in its inventories, while 
Hermann Goring units disposed of only seventy-three armored vehicles. They had an 
authorized strength of two hundred Panzers each.214 
Elements of the 3rt! and 2fJ" Panzer grenadier divisions moved into Italy during 
June. The 3rt! Panzer grenadier took up positions around Orveto and Viterbo and 
assumed responsibility for defending in central Italy. The 2fJ" Panzer grenadier 
moved farther south to Foggia, where it protected the vital complex of airfields on 
2l3Kesselring, 9/24/117, 3. 
2l40ffice of Headquarters 101st Airborne Division, the A C of S, "Conference 
of the Fuehrer with Feldmarschall Keitel, 19 May 1943," Stenographic Account of 
Staff Conferences of Adolf Hider and German High Command. 53 parts, U.S. Army 
Military History Institute (Carlisle, Pa.), 1-8; Haupt, Kriegsschauplatz [talien, 18; U. 
S. War Dept., Handbook on German Military Forces (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana 
State University, 1990 (reprint of 1945 U. S. Army manual)), 102. 
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the Apulian plains. The Hermann GOring Division moved the farthest south, ringing 
Caltagione, Sicily with its forces. Four Italian divisions and assorted coastal defense 
units constituted the Italian contribution to Sicily's defense. Of the Italian units, 
only Livomo deployed a full contingent of up-ta-strength units. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Axis braced for invasion, the embrace of the its primary partners had 
seriously weakened. Mussolini, politically and physically enfeebled during the past 
three years, no longer possessed the will or means to defend his regime. As 
opposition to his personal rule mounted, he struggled to maintain a precarious 
balance. He needed German help to defeat an Allied invasion. Italy's depleted 
armed forces required a strong German contingent to defend the peninsula. But by 
accepting German aid, Mussolini opened the door for the eventual Nazi takeover of 
his state. 
In contrast, Hitler's position in Italy grew stronger with each passing day. 
Although the dictator feared Italian treason, increasing numbers of his divisions had 
entered Italy. Italian military commanders, who entertained thoughts of defection 
even before the Allied landing in Sicily, had no course other than to allow a growing 
German contingent within their borders. Hitler, almost in spite of his desires and 
designs, emerged the clear victor in this contest of wills. By securing his lines of 
communications through Switzerland and infiltrating the Italian state, he had laid 
the groundwork for the seizure of Italy. These developments added up to a German 
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victory that paid rich dividends for many long months to come. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SICILY 
"It's better to fight the war in Italy than here at home." 
Ficld Marshal Erwin Rommel, 3 August 1943zu 
INTRODUCTION 
The battle for Sicily revealed the Italian campaign's future course. On the 
Allied side, strategic division concerning the importance and conduct of operations 
emerged from the invasion's first days. British commanders seriously mistrusted 
American combat capabilities. An unwieldy system of command compounded a bad 
situation, leaving the American and British armies to conduct the campaign 
rudderless and suspicious of each other. On the Axis side, the campaign 
demonstrated similar mistrust and outright contempt between German and Italian 
commanders and forces. German suspicion that Italy planned to abandon the Axis 
alliance soared before the Allied landing in Sicily when Italian troops failed to 
2lSErwin Rommel, "Extracts from Rommel's Letters to his wife (& Manfred) -
Jan. 1941 - July 1944," Various Rommel Relics 9/24/20 (LHCMA), 1;, Rommel 
Papers, 434. 
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defend the Pelagian island chain, part of Italy proper. Suspicion grew into hostility 
after the landing when most Italian troops rejected the Fascist regime and 
continuation of the war, voting with their feet for a quick end to both. Mussolini's 
fall on July 25, 1943 merely confirmed what Adolf Hitler had long suspected and 
feared. 
But this campaign demonstrated the trUism again that the side making the 
fewest errors will emerge in a stronger position. The Allies, by not moving 
simultaneously into the toe of Italy's boot-like geography and blocking the route into 
Sicily, allowed both the reinforcement and evacuation of the island. Hitler exhibited 
confusion and operated as if the Balkans remained the primary target, even after 
Sicily had emerged as the focal point of the theater. Nonetheless, he made the right 
decisions and reaped significant benefits from his Sicilian investment of men and 
blood. Driven by anger and strategic necessity, Hitler effectively took control of the 
Italian state from Badoglio's tottering government and laid the foundation for 
OPERATION ACHSE, the occupation and exploitation of Italy that continued until 
May 1945. 
PRELUDE TO INVASION: PANTELLERIA AND THE PELAGIAN 
ISLANDS 
Before the assault on Sicily, Allied planners opted to seize the Italian-held 
Pelagian islands, situated astride the Sicilian invasion route. Pantelleria, the largest 
island, encompassed approximately thirty-two square miles and boasted an airfield 
capable of handling eighty single-engine fighters. Pantelleria's smaller sisters, 
133 
Lampedusa, Lampione, and Linosa formed the remainder of the island chain. 
Although fearing heavy losses of men and landing craft, Eisenhower 
authorized the conquest of this Axis outpost on May 10,1943. The occupation of the 
Pelagian chain promisd several important benefits. Italian forces on the islands, just 
fifty miles from the closest tip of Sicily, seriously threatened the invading forces' 
security during the passage to that island. Possession ofPantelleria promised to 
significantly improve the safety of all Allied shipping. Seizing the island also would 
eliminate Axis radar sites providing early warning of invasion and allow the 
installation of Allied radar equipment. Moreover, Pantelleria's airfields, 100 miles 
closer to Sicily than those currently held by the Allies, offered improved fighter 
coverage of Sicilian invasion beaches. Five vital fighter squadrons could be stationed 
on the islands. The airfield provided an invaluable haven for damaged Allied 
aircraft facing lengthy and hazardous journeys back co North Africa. Finally, 
capturing Pantelleria's airfield would drive Axis planes back to remote fields. Allied 
fliers then could focus greater attention on Sardinian and Sicilian airbases.216 
Pancelleria, long used to jail political prisoners and criminals, impressed 
observers as being a hard nut to crack. Mussolini had decreed the island a fortress in 
216Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 302; Garland and Smyth, Sicily 
and the Surrender of Italy, 69-70; Murray, Strategy for Defeat, 164; AFHQ G-3 Section, 
"9 May - 10 May. AFHQ G-3 Section. Operations undertaken as a preliminary to 
HUSKY. The capturing ofPANTELLERIA and LAMPEDUSA." 
"MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff," "FILE NO.4 Volume II. SICILIAN 
CAMPAIGN OPERATION "HUSKY." PLANNING. PREPARATIONS. January 
1943 - July 1943. Volume II: May - July 1943," WO 214/21, Item 43, (London: 
Public Record Office [Hereafter PRO]), L 
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the late 1930s. Italian engineers had fortified it since 1937, constructing artillery 
strong points, hardening aircraft bunkers, and building a desalinization plant that 
supplied fresh water to the garrisonts 12,000 troops. Engineering work focused on 
the 5,000 foot-long airfield and the massive 1,100 foot-long, hardened, two-story 
underground hanger sheltering Italian fighters. A much-impressed Mussolini 
inspected their work on August 18, 1938. 
In reality, Pantelleria presented less of a threat to Allied operations than 
expected. Antiquated coastal artillery and antiaircraft guns guarded its beaches and 
skies. Unlike Malta, Pantelleria had no organic air units and could not expect succor 
from the hard-pressed Axis squadrons defending Sicily. Land forces stationed on 
Pantelleria lacked modern equipment and served under the naval command 
strUcture, effectively isolating them from army commanders on Sicily. By early 
June, Pantelleria's 10,000 civilians inhabitants faced imminent starvation because 
the Allied blockade had prevented supplies from reaching them for six months.217 
Allied air forces, joined by cruisers and destroyers, pounded Pantelleria 
unmercifully during the first eleven days of June 1943. The Luftwaffe, which lacked 
the resources to defend the tiny base, did not intervene.218 Despite the absence of 
Axis fighter cover, the 6,400 tons of bombs dropped on the Italian garrison proved 
2I7Benito Mussolini, The Fall of Mussolini: His Own Story, trans. Frances 
Frenaye (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, [1948] 1975), 13-14; Bragadin, Italian 
Navy, 254-55; Mario Roatta, Otto Milioni di Baionette (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 
1946),231. 
218Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer 1940-1945, 610-11. 
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singularly ineffective. Only slightly more than ten percent of the island's artillery 
pieces (sixteen of 130) suffered damage. The raids raught Allied sraff officers the 
lesson that a pre-invasion attack of seventy ro one hundred strategic bombers would 
render only a small number of fortified artillery emplacemenrs ineffective, many of 
which could be brought back into service in less rhan six hours.219 Hindsight shows 
that the inexperienced troops slated to invade Sicily benefitted from the lack of 
proper Axis defensive positions like those encounrered by the 1st U.S. Infantry 
Division less rhan a year later at Normandy's OMAHA Beach. 
Kesselring's headquarters relayed to Berlin reports of the Allies' preliminary 
bombardment on June 8 and 9. Iralian commanders indicated rhat prepared 
positions had suffered heavy damage and that the constant barrage of air and sea fire 
had paralyzed communications on rhe island. Attacks against the besieged island 
continued on June 10, broken only by a welcome afrernoon respite when Allied 
planes dropped leaflers demanding Pantelleria's surrender.220 
Iralian defenders proved eager ro surrender rheir island fortress after the 
219Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 329-30; Ian Gooderson, "Heavy 
and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Tactical Close Air 
Support Role During World War IT?" The Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 3 
(September 1992): 372-73. 
22°Oberbefehlshaber Slid Flihrungsabteilung, "Ic-Meldung fUr 8.6.43," OB 
Siid, Fiihrungsabteilung!Ic: Ic-Meldungen v. 18.5.-30.9.1943, RH19 X 
(Heeresgruppe C), Band 9 (BAMA: Microfiche), 32; Oberbefehlshaber Slid 
Fiihrungsabteilung, "Ic-Meldung (bis 10.6.1943, mittags)," OB Slid, 
Fiihrungsabteilungllc: Ic-Meldungen v. 18.5.-30.9.1943, RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), 
Band 9 (BAMA: Microfiche), 34. 
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interminable bombardments. Supported by fire from Allied warships and heavy 
bombers, amphibious forces poured ashore shortly before noon on June 11. 
Pantelleria's defenders fired a few artillery rounds at the approaching landing craft, 
and a small number of Italian troops offered resistance as the assaulting forces 
consolidated their positions. Kesselring's headquarters learned from the daily noon 
air reconnaissance that Italian artillery had ceased firing. Admiral Gino Pavesi, 
Pantelleria's commandant, had previously rejected two Allied demands that the 
island surrender. Nonetheless, at 12:34 that afternoon, he quit the fight, notifying 
his superiors that the lack of fresh water compelled unconditional surrender both for 
the sake of his forces and the island's civilian inhabitants.221 Mter a minimal effort, 
Allied forces captured 12,000 Italian troops, seventy-eight German communication 
specialists, and airfields vital for the support of Operation HUSKY. 
Some German accounts have disputed the Italian explanation of Pantelleria's 
brief defense, rejecting the claim that a water shortage forced the island's surrender. 
Kesselring received reports from a German officer commanding a machine-gun unit 
on the island claiming that underground springs were available to the defenders.222 
2210berbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung, "Ic-Meldung (Erdlage) bis 11.6. 
mittags," OB Siid, Fiihrungsabteilung/lc: Ic-Meldungen v. 18.5.-30.9.1943, RH19 X 
(Heeresgruppe C), Band 9 (BAMA: Microfiche), 36-37; Mussolini, Fall of Mussolini, 
16-17. 
222Siegfried Westphal's comment that "the population and garrison of the 
island found in the rock caves secure protection against the air attacks and an acute 
shortage of water was impossible." This German staff officer professed being 
perplexed as to why Mussolini would permit surrender knowing that the reasons 
offered were flagrandy false. Westphal claimed in his memoirs that Pantelleria 
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Allied forces found that their attacks had destroyed the island's fresh water plant and 
wells. While a supply of potable water remained for Italian troops, Pavesi had not 
manufactured his complaint that the civilian populace was suffering. Pantelleria's 
inhabitants, already short of food, had endured three long summer days of constant 
Allied bombardment without water.223 
Nonetheless, this Italian surrender of a heavily fortified position did not 
auger well for German forces cast as Italy's defenders, substitutes for the Italian 
military, which had suffered material decline since the ill-fated invasion of Greece in 
1940. This quick surrender also damaged morale throughout the Italian armed 
forces.224 Moreover, German estimates of their Italian counterparts' combat 
capability and will to continue the war fell sharply after the island's quick 
capitulation. Some of Sicily's German defenders later recounted that the surrender 
ofPantelleria was "not a good omen" for them. They knew that if their Italian 
possessed underground streams sufficient to take care of both the garrison's and the 
population's requirements, a claim burrressed immediately after the war by General 
Paul Deichmann's somewhat confused account of the operation. Mussolini himself 
stated, while head of the SaIo Republic, his belief that Admiral Pavesi was a traitor 
who did not even wait for French-manufactured water distillation equipment to 
reach the island. Paul Deichmann, "The Italian Campaign, Ch. 1," trans. Janet E. 
Dewey, in Foreign Military Study MS T-la. (Carlisle, Pa. and Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Military History Institute and Center for Military History, [1948] 1989), 30-32; 
Baum and Weichold, Krieg der "Achsenmiichte, II 334-35; Mussolini, Fall of i\1.ussolini, 
18; Westphal, Heerin Fesseln:, 219; Siegfried Westphal, Eninnenmgen (Mainz: v. 
Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1975),215. 
223Bragadin, Italian Navy, 257-58. 
224Mussolini, Fall of Mussolini, 26. 
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comrades fought with the enthusiasm of their comrades defending Pantelleria and 
Lampedusa, which had surrendered to a stranded British air-sea rescue pilot on June 
12, Sicily would be a lonely battleground for German troopS.225 
ASSAULT ON SICILY 
The bombardment and invasion ofPantelleria introduced Field Marshal 
Wolfram von Richthofen to the enormous power of the Allied Mediterranean air 
forces. Richthofen arrived from Russia on June 12 and assumed command of 
Luftflotte 2, freeing Kesselring to act as theater commander. After Pantelleriafs 
ordeal, Richthofenfs meager Lufrwaffe units faced an aerial onslaught aimed at 
22SGerhard Schreiber charts falling German esteem for Italian capabilities as 
well as Hitler's preparation for future disparagement of them in a recent volume 
detailing German war crimes in occupied Italy. As of this moment, however, no 
significant study exists documenting the political, racial, and military elements that 
led to this state of affairs. Given the irrationally high starus accorded the Italians by 
Hitler as late as August, 1939, the absence of a study tracking the subsequent decline 
still hinders a complete understanding of the German-Italian relationship during the 
Second World War. Deichmann, Tla Ch. 1,32; Enno von Rintelen, liThe Italian 
Campaign, Ch. 2: The Italian Command and the Armed Forces in the first half of 
1943,11 trans. Janet E. Dewey, in Foreign Military Study MS T-1a. (Carlisle, Pa. and 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Military History Institute and Center for Military History, 
[1947] 1989),10; Raymond De Belot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939-1945, 
trans. James A. Field a r.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 
209-10; Haupt, Kriegsschauplatz Italien, 21; Rintelen, IIDer Feldzug in Italien,1I 8-11; 
Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, 362; Gerhard Schreiber, Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen in Italien, 
22-25; Johannes Steinhoff,Die StTasse von Messina (Miinchen: List Verlag, 1969), 34; 
Joachim Lemelsen, Walter Fries and Wilhelm Schaeffer, 29. Division (Bad Nauheim: 
Podzun-Verlag, 1960), 266. As early as May, 1943, Hider blamed the 1939 Italian 
declaration of non-belligerency for the outbreak of war. His statements that he was 
concerned solely for the Duce also did not bode well for the treatment of Italians, 
whom Hitler felt were a bastard, mixed-race. Domarus, Hitler: Reden und 
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critical targets throughout his command. This renewed bombardment forced 
Richthofen to pull back the forces that he counted on most to fend off an Allied 
amphibious landing. The pullback of Lufiwaffi and Italian air force long-range 
aircraft from Sicily to airfields in Italy and southern France significantly reduced the 
Axis counterinvasion capability. 
Allied airmen rained blows on their opponents, pounding Sicily's airfields 
long before the first Allied soldier set foot in Sicily. A meager 120 to 130 German 
pilots rose to engage between 300 and 500 Allied aircraft assigned Sicily's reduction. 
Lack of fuel, engines, and construction troops to rebuild the island's airfields after 
each day's bombardment seriously handicapped Lufiwaffi operations. The absence of 
radar warning further stymied the German fighter force's ability to fend off the 
stream of attackers. 226 
The incessant aerial assault also prevented Lufiwaffi reconnaissance flights 
over North Africa. The fifty planes available for this mission confronted the 
impossible assignment of observing more than 3,000 miles of vulnerable 
Mediterranean coastline. Units flying reconnaissance missions encountered strong 
aerial opposition and suffered heavy losses. 
The Lufrwaffi's remaining bombers managed only a handful of attacks against 
226Johannes Steinhoff, commander ofJagdgeschwader 77, vividly recounts the 
desperate air defense of Sicily in Die Strasse von Messina. His memoir details the 
difficulty of defending Sicily with worn-out planes, exhausted pilots, and 
inadequately staffed ground crews. Constant attacks on German airfields quickly 
forced this scarecrow force to retreat to the Italian mainland. See: Johannes 
Steinhoff, Die StTasse von Messina (Miinchen: List Verlag, 1969). 
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North African ports filled to the brim with Allied shipping. Constant aerial combat 
devoured the German air reinforcements dispatched to Sicily at an alarming rate. In 
May 1943, Hitler sent Adolf Galland, head of the German fighter arm, to supervise 
the air defense of Sicily. Even the presence of this inspirational airman could not 
counterbalance the odds faced by his pilots. German pilots flew from rough airfields 
using equipment leftover from operations in Tunisia. During Galland's six weeks of 
command, Luftwaffe combat units suffered a debilitating sixty percent loss rate. 
Combat casualties and transfers from Sicily to other sectors reduced Luftwaffe 
strength on the island from 415 aircraft in May to a mere 175 planes on July 10, date 
of the Allied landing. Allied air assaults eventually compelled the withdrawal of all 
Axis air units on Sicily.!..'" 
EMBA TILED ISLE: ANOTHER SICILIAN CAMPAIGN 
Sicily, the Allied target in July 1943, encompassed an area of 10,000 square 
miles. Its triangular sides varied in length. The l80-mile-long northern shore was 
Sicily's longest coastal boundary. The 170 miles of the southwestern shoreline 
nearly matched it. The eastern edge, smallest of the three, stretched a distance of 
125 miles. The harsh Sicilian climate and barren soil restricted vegetational growth, 
221Cooper, Germarl Air Force, 287-89; Galland, "German Day Fighter Arm," 
38-39; Lee, German Air Force, 139-40; Herhudt von Rohden, "The German Air Force 
in the Mediterranean, 16 May 1946. Part IV. Broken Axis. 1943," U.S.S.T.A.F. 
Historical Section: German Historians' Project: European Contributions to the 
History ofW.W.ll. The German Air Force in the Mediterranean. (Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C., 1946),4-5; Steinhoff; Die Strasse von Messina, 18-19. 
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creating an island whose value in 1943 consisted, as it had for the armies of Rome, 
Carthage, and Islam, of its location astride the shipping routes of the central 
Mediterranean. 
Rough terrain covered the island. The rocky plains of Sicily's southeastern 
tip gradually rise to become the imposing heights of the Caronie Mountains, which 
hover over the northeastern apex of the Sicilian triangle. By choosing landing 
beaches on Sicily's southwestern tip, Allied forces shortened the invasion fleet's 
voyage but ensured themselves a bitter uphill fight for the conquest ofSicily.228 
The Allied fleet could not hide its invasion preparations in the North African 
ports. On July 5, air reconnaissance revealed a concentration of hospital ships, sure 
sign of an impending invasion. An Italian agent passed on valuable information 
locating Montgomery's British Eighth Army near ports favoring the invasion of 
Sicily. IL Fliegerkorps reconnaissance flights detected the approaching armada at 
4:30 p.m. on July 9. Reports informed OKW that five separate convoys, each with 
150-180 landing craft and covered by a strong escort, were headed toward Sicily. 
Further information on the flotilla's progress made its way to Axis commanders on 
Sicily the remainder of the day.229 
228Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 52-53. 
2.."9II. Fliegerkorps, "II. Fliegerkorps Bericht, 9. Juli 1943," RH19 X 
(Heeresgruppe C), Band 12 (BAMA: Microfiche), 67; Frido von Senger und Etterlin 
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Microfiche Publication MI035 Fiche 0093 Foreign Military Studies, C-Series eRG 
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Despite advance notice, the fleet's departure and apparent destination 
surprised Adolf Hitler. He had expected a move against Greece and the Balkans. 
Fear of a move against the Balkans long dominated German strategic plans for the 
theater, continuing even after the commitment of substantial Allied forces to Sicily. 
Hitler belatedly acted on the reports, placing the German 1. Fallschirmjager Division 
on alert. This enabled the unit's rapid movement from southern France to Sicily, 
where it was to fight its counterpart, the British 1st Airborne Division, upon 
landing.230 
On July 9, Allied air forces gave Kesselring additional evidence that the Allies 
had targeted Sicily. ULTRA intercepts during June had revealed that Kesselring's 
headquarters was situated with the II. Fliegerkorps in Taormina's San Domenico 
Hotel. A daring daylight raid demolished the facility, inflicting heavy casualties on 
the command staff. Kesselring once more escaped injury, having visited Rome that 
day. Nonetheless, the loss of communications with this advanced headquarters 
seriously the German response to the invasion the next day.231 
INVASION AND COUNTERA IT ACKS 
At 11:30 p.m. on July 9, the Hermann GOring Panzer Division's II Panzer 
230Roger Edwards, German Airborne Troops 1936-45 (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1974), 116; Irving, HitIers War, 534; Mitcham and StaufIenberg, Battle of 
Sicily, 77, 79. 
231J6sefGarlinski, The Enigma War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
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Regiment, positioned near Caltagirone, Sicily, received alarming reports of paratroop 
attacks on division positions. Radio messages announced assaults on the divisional 
artillery group and antiaircraft fire at Allied air transports. The regiment readied its 
quick response unit at 1:00 a.m. on July 10,1943. Commanders increased the level of 
alert at 3: 10 a.m. after receiving reports that paratroopers had dropped at San Pietro 
airfield. At 5:00 a.m., after other units reported viewing transports unloading 
invasion troops at Gela, commanders dispatched a tank company to conduct 
reconnaissance west of its position and to link up with an armored engineer battalion 
positioned east of Gela airfield. Troops conducting this reconnaissance took 
prisoners from Allied airborne forces. War had come once more to the men of the 
Hermann GOring Division.232 
The Allied soldiers struggling to seize a foothold on Sicily came ashore under 
a split command. British and Dominion troops landed at the southeastern apex of 
the Sicilian triangle. The British 5th and 50th infantry divisions, supported by 3 
Commando, formed the initial British assault southwest of Syracuse. At Cape 
Passero, which forms Sicily's extreme southern tip, forces of the 23P[ Infantry 
Brigade, the British 51S [ and Canadian IS[ infantry divisions landed. Royal Marine 
Commandos 40 and 41 provided defense for the extreme right flank of the 8th Army. 
Airborne forces, already engaged with German and Italian opponents, consisted of 
23Z"Hermann Goring Panzer Division War Diaries, Ktb. 1 II./pz. Rgt. 
Hermann Goring (9.11.42 - 15.9.43)," AL 2841, EDS 373 (IWM), 10.7.1943; Senger 
und Etterlin and Mueller-Hillebrand, "War Diary of the Italian Campaign," 22-23. 
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the British 1st Glider Regiment, part of the 1st Airborne Division, and the SOSth 
Parachute Regiment (reinforced) of the U. S. 820d Airborne Division. The American 
7th Army, commanded by General George S. Patton, landed along Sicily's 
southwestern rim. The untried 45 th Infantry Division hurried from its landing craft 
on the American right while the experienced r t Infantry Division, reinforced by 
American Rangers, assaulted Gela, a port vital to the campaign's success. At Licata 
on the American left, regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division dropped ramps and 
stormed Sicily's beaches. Reserve forces still at sea, readied themselves to exploit 
initial landings and drive quickly into the Sicilian interior once assault troops had 
cleared the beaches. 
Confusion reigned in Berlin as reports of the Allied landing arrived. 
Luftwaffe air reconnaissance between 1348 and 1840 hours revealed [hat the seaways 
from Licata to Syracuse were crowded with ninety-four freighters, one tanker, forty-
two LSTs, and 160 large and 248 small landing craft. A battleship, two cruisers, 
eighteen destroyers, and three Kanonenboote escorted them. Numerous landing craft 
and escorts had also entered Augusta's harbor. The bay between Augusta and 
Syracuse sheltered 100-200 ships, twenty to thirty of which were large ships at 
anchor. Shuttle traffic was observed between the ships and coast. Luftwaffe 
observers counted 100-150 vessels in the POrt of Syracuse and adjacent coastal area 
with German naval sources providing similar intelligence. Given the vast scale of 
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the Allied undertaking, the confusion in Berlin seems mystifying.233 
Nonetheless, OKWhesitated in providing information to Hitler, unsure of 
the scale of the operation and its purpose. A clear picture emerged by midnight of 
the invasion day. Troops had located seven separate landing sites. Italian forces 
were reported as putting up strong resistance and the two German divisions were 
moving to bring their forces into battle. Reconnaissance disclosed the daunting scale 
of the Allied undertaking, revealing that a second wave of Allied landing ships was 
unloading men and cargoes, while a third was advancing from the area of Bizerta 
north towards Sicily. 
Despite evidence of a large-scale Allied commitment to Sicily, Hitler 
exhibited the same uncertainty that would immobilize him in June 1944. Earlier 
OKW reports exaggerating Allied strength and clever deception operations now bore 
fruit. The Filhrer agonized over whether the stroke against Sicily was the main 
Allied operation or was a clever diversionary move before an operation against the 
Balkans. This confusion lasted for several days as the critical moments for a decisive 
response to HUSKY slipped away.234 
The invasion found Mussolini near Lake Bracciano, north of Rome. Field 
233[(riegsragebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945, ed. Werner Rahn, Gerhard 
Schreiber and Hansjoseph Maierhofer (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1994), 
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Marshal Kesselring, General von Rintelen, and General Antonio Ambrosio had 
joined the Italian leader as he inspected the progress made by the new 'M' (Militia) 
Armored Division, still in its early stages of training. TheDuce seemed his old self as 
he inspected the recently-supplied German armor. He rushed back to Rome upon 
receiving news of the invasion, as did King Umberto, who had slipped away to his 
country estate. 
Facing a deteriorating situation in Sicily, Italian officials mounted a 
concerted effort to pry loose German air reinforcements for the embattled island. 
When Bastianini's approach on July 12 failed, Mussolini personally appealed to 
Hitler.23S Nonetheless, despite the crisis facing his nation, theDuce refrained from 
requesting German ground troops for Italy's defense. Rintelen reported to Berlin 
that preservation of Italian prestige at home, the cost of additional German divisions 
to the Italian economy, and Mussolini's faulty assessment of Italian combat 
capability kept him from asking for German ground forces.236 
While the two Axis leaders responded hesitantly to the invasion, fighting 
raged in Sicily. Montgomery's British 81b Army had landed and driven north toward 
the volcanic slopes of Mount Ema. Panon's American 71b Army had similarly 
23SSee telegram from Georg von Mackensen [German Ambassador in Rome] 
to Reichsminister Ribbentrop, 12 July 1943 in: Germany. Auswirtiges Amt,Akten 
zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik 1918-1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswartigen Amt, 
Serie E (1941-1945) (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1979),245-46. 
236Mussolini, Fall of Mussolini, 32; Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 371, 372-373; 
Plehwe, End of an Alliance, 26; Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, 207. 
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assaulted Sicily's southwestern coast with the twin goals of capturing vital supply 
ports and protecting Montgomery's left wing. 
While most American landings went offwithout a hitch, U.S. Army Rangers 
found themselves locked in the deadly embrace of their Italian opponents. Italian 
defenders of the 429th Coastal Defense Battalion fought fiercely from their prepared 
positions, inflicting severe casualties on the unsuspecting Rangers. The Italians 
suffered 192 men killed and wounded. This and similar firefights proved that well-
led and prepared Italian soldiers remained dangerous foes, even though the cream of 
Italian manpower had long since vanished.237 
On July 11, German and Italian troops launched a stinging counterattack 
against the veteran U.S. pt Infantry Division, which was consolidating its beachhead 
at Gela. The Italian Livorno Infantry Division's men and the antiquated French-built 
Renault tanks of Mobile Group E bitterly contested ownership of the port ciry, while 
elements of the Hermann GOring Panzer Division moved against 1st Infantry Division 
positions further east. Although intended to be a coordinated counterstroke, spotty 
communications disrupted coordination among the attacking columns. 
Paratroopers of the U. S. 82ad Airborne Division kept up a withering fire that 
forced the Italian infantry to ground, leaving the Italian armor to continue its 
advance in a highly vulnerable state. The lightly-armed airborne troops relied on 
naval gunfire to beat off the attack, while on their left flank, a joint Ranger-Engineer 
237Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the SUTTenderofItaly, 137-38; Mitcham and 
Stauffenberg, Battle of Sicily, 98-99. 
148 
force met the second wing of the Italian armored assault. Small arms fire and naval 
gun support obliged Italian infantrymen to desert their tanks, which advanced into 
Gela. The unprotected tanks fought a series of sharp actions with Gela's American 
defenders, retreating only after losing three of their number. 
German attackers joined the fighting five hours later than originally 
anticipated. General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, German liaison with the Italian 
6Ua Army, attempted to push the assault ahead. Despite Senger's intervention, the 
division's attack stalled when it came under the combined fire of American warships 
and the defending paratroops. Later efforts by the GOring Division's vaunted Tiger 
company stalled after breakdowns prevented the tanks from advancing down the 
narrow road assigned them. A second effort nearly broke through [0 the weakly-held 
beach, faltering only when an American infantry force arrived in the nick of time. At 
this point, having lost half of its original tank complement, the German assault 
collapsed when the men making this last effort broke and fled the field ofbatde.238 
As the fighting showed, the Anglo-American landings succeeded because the 
invaders fought with determination to keep their hard-won gains. Winning 
beachheads on Sicily was a difficult task for men making their first amphibious 
assault against a contested shore. A combination of luck, fierce resistance, excellent 
naval gunfire support, and the fruits of Ultra determined the outcome. Had German 
238Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 147-53; Schroder, 
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and Italian forces, diverted by Allied deception operations to Sardinia, Corsica, and 
the Balkans, been present on Sicily, catastrophe may well have overtaken the strUng-
out American units defending the beachheads. 
The failure to defeat the landing at the water's edge cannot be assigned 
solely to poor Italian performance. The doleful Axis counterattack shows that this 
fiasco resulted from the dearth of first-rate German and Italian combat troops. 
Moreover, Kesselring had insisted that German forces be scattered across Sicily, a 
move opposed by Italian and German officers. This strategy deprived Axis 
counterattacks of the mass necessary to destroy the far-flung Allied landing sites, 
given the two German divisions' lack of transport.239 
BITTER BA TILES: FIGHTING FOR SICILY 
The batde for Sicily reflected Hider's continued indecision concerning 
operations in Italy. Abandoning Sicily without a fight was a bitter pill for Hider to 
swallow. He had to consider the effect that surrendering Sicily would have on Italian 
public opinion, already teetering on the brink of collapse. Nonetheless, the 
developing campaign took on a life of its own, gradually pulling in German air, sea, 
and ground forces as Italian and German defenders successfully denied Allied forces 
a swift conquest of Sicily. 
Luftwaffe forces attempted penetrations of Allied fighters guarding the 
239Mitcham and StaufIenberg, Battle of Sicily, 53; Frido von Senger und 
Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1964), 128-30. 
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invasion fleet from July 10 to July 12. Richthofen's planes sank several ships, but 
German losses mounted after Allied aircraft occupied newly-won airfields on Sicily. 
Nine days after the landings, twenty-five Allied fighter squadrons were operating 
from Sicilian airbases. Allied fighter sorties rose rapidly to 1,200 a day, 
outnumbering German efforts that never totaled more than 300. Moreover, losses of 
150 aircraft in the four days after the invasion wrecked German air power over Sicily. 
The Lufrwaffe ordered Me-110s used as fighter cover for attacking bombers, a move 
that demonstrated the decline in German air strength. Twin-engine Me-llOs had 
been withdrawn from similar duties after proving obsolescent while operating 
against Britain in 1940. 
German air transports rushed men and supplies to Sicily until Allied air 
forces made the efforts suicidal. By a dint of a herculean labor, German airborne 
forces first reached the island on July 13,1943. Their arrival did not pass unnoticed 
by the Allies, who greeted them shordy thereafter with a saturation bombing attack. 
Allied air raids on German air bases soon after forced German squadrons into a hasty 
withdrawal to unprepared Italian airfields in southern Italy.240 
Axis naval forces made vain attempts to repel the invasion. Although the 
Italian navy prepared to intervene, the batde fleet never departed its harbors. The 
240Rohden, "German Air Force in the Mediterranean," 5-7, 78, 79; Lee, 
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superiority of Allied naval forces, the absence of fighter cover, and the distance from 
north Italian ports to Sicily forestalled the Italian naval forces' swift movement to 
battle. The Italian navy's two attacks with surface units, nighttime sorties by Italian 
cruisers on August 4 and 7, failed owing to Ultra's invisible hand. The warships 
broke off the missions before contacting their intended targets.241 
Axis submarines attacked transports carrying Allied troops to Sicily. Four 
German and ten Italian submarines in the western Mediterranean moved rapidly to 
join the single German U-boat in the Strait of Messina. One German and four 
Italian submarines in the eastern Mediterranean, supported by two vessels from 
Toulon, shifted operations to Sicilian waters.242 
Ignorance of the position of Axis minefields hindered German and Italian 
subs.243 An Italian submarine sank the 10,000 ton British cruiser Cleopatra on July 
11. German naval forces later claimed the sinking of a cruiser, two destroyers, and a 
motor gun boat, amounting to 38,000 BRT. Submarines also reported damaging one 
destroyer, a cruiser, several motor torpedo boats, and two steamers, totaling 13,000 
BRT. They paid a prohibitive price for their few successes. Allied antisubmarine 
241KTB SKL, 47:218-19; Friedrich Ruge,DerSeekrieg: The German Navy's 
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forces destroyed six Italian and two German sUbmarines.244 
Facing a disaster on the ground, Kesselring told Berlin that Sicily could not 
be held without substantial German reinforcements. Hitler responded by 
strengthening the German defenders of Sicily. The lsi Fallschirmjiiger Division 
received orders that rushed it to the island. Air transport quickly carried the 3rd 
Fallschirmjiiger Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Heilmann to 
Sicily, while the remainder of the division transited Italy by rail. Similar 
instructions hastened the 2~ Panzer grenadier Division, moving south from Eboli 
near Salerno since July 8, to Sicily. The divisional advanced guard crossed the Strait 
of Messina on July 14 and reinforced the 1 Sth Panzer grenadier Division, which had 
been decimated by heavy losses during the first round of fighting.245 
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Meanwhile, combat in Sicily quickly consumed the Italian divisions' 
remaining strength. Of the units that did not surrender or melt away into the 
population, only the tattered remnants of the Assietta andAosra infantry divisions 
fought on alongside the Germans. With collapse threatening, Kesselring and Roatta 
agreed on July 15 to establish the main line astride Mount Ema, substantially 
reducing their defensive perimeter.246 The front gradually stabilized as the Hermann 
GOring Panzer Division fended off the main British thrust, which Montgomery 
intended to quickly drive up Sicily's southeastern coast and grab Messina. 
Reinforcements from the pr Fallschirmjiiger Division slowed the British assault. The 
15th Panzergrenadier Division, joined by the remaining Italian troops and 29'" 
Panzergrenadier Division, likewise stalled the American attack on the center and right 
of the German line. 
While fighting raged on Sicily, Hider and Mussolini conducted their final 
meeting on July 19 during which Mussolini served as leader of an undivided Italian 
state. Mussolini met Hider at Treviso airport, after which the Duce escorted the 
Fuhrer to Feltre, an hour and a half journey by rail. 247 The Chief of the Italian 
General Staff, Ambrosio, had briefed Mussolini concerning the bankrupt state of 
Italy's military capabilities. Ambrosio extracted a promise from the ailing dictator 
that he would confront Hider with the news that Italy could not continue war. 
246Rintelen, Tla Ch. 2, 11. 
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The conference seemed a promising opportunity for passing this information 
to Hitler, given the limited number of participants. Field Marshal Keitel, German 
ambassador to Italy von Mackensen, and Generals Warlimont and von Rintelen 
represented Germany. General Ambrosio, Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry 
Bastianini, Italian ambassador to Berlin Alfieri, and Badoglio's representative, 
Colonel Cesare Cordero di Montezemolo, anended for Italy. 
Hitler conducted the conference as if he were the sole participant, using the 
convocation at Feltre's Villa Gaggia to reiterate his warped world view. Launching 
into a two-hour soliloquy, the Fuhrer dismissed fears of American war production 
tipping the tide against Germany. Although the Axis had failed to conquer me 
Caucasian oil fields, victory required nothing but summoning the will to fight and 
using me resources already available to me Axis. Promising a revived U-boat 
campaign to isolate the Allied armies in Sicily, he rejected sending Luftwaffe 
reinforcements to Italy. Hitler criticized Italian ground facilities for German 
squadrons already deployed. He warned that further exertions would tie down air 
resources vital to defending iron ore convoys from Sweden as well as the German 
factories producing the planes mat the Italians demanded. 
Addressing Sicily, Hitler continued his monologue, nourishing fantasies of 
going on the offensive and retaking the island. The situation simply required that 
the Italians fight to the last man while Germany rebuilt its Panzer forces. He 
proposed that Italian troops be concentrated for the defense of southern Italy, 
knowing that this deployment would empty north Italy of Axis troops and force 
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Italian agreement to German movement into that region. Incredibly, Hider did not 
halt his remarks even when an Italian officer gave Mussolini news that Allied 
bombers had struck Rome for the first time. Instead, the Fuhrer resumed his wide-
ranging address, preventing the meeting from taking up issues that might have 
challenged his far-fetched arguments. 
Despite his belief that the presentation had brought his allies firmly back into 
the Axis camp, nothing of the like emerged from the conference. Hider's lengthy 
monologue did not garner support for his strategic views. This time Mussolini did 
not fall under the sway of Hider's delusions. Von Rintelen claimed later that 
Mussolini told Hitler that Italy could not continue in the war. Reports after the 
conference state that theDuce spoke openly of ending the German alliance by mid-
September. Nonetheless, Mussolini's failure to defend Italian interests and fatalistic 
silence in the face of Hider's calumnies against the Italians turned many officials 
against the Italian dictator and contributed materially to his overthrow.248 
Events in Sicily after the conference confirmed Mussolini's growing 
suspicion of his erstwhile German allies. He had accepted Keitel's demands that the 
German 76th and 305th infantry divisions move to southern Italy, a measure meant to 
secure German lines of communications with their forces fighting in Sicily. 
Moreover, General Hans Hube had arrived on Sicily and assumed command of 
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German forces there during the night of July 16-17. His new position created an 
awkward command structure, as the arrival of German reinforcements gradually 
squeezed out remnants of the Italian divisions from the front. German units, as they 
had in North Africa and Russia, provoked hostilities with Italian forces by stealing 
transport from their allies. By July 25, Italian units had all but disappeared from 
combat, and Guzzoni's role as supposed commander of Sicilian operations ended. 
Admitting defeat on July 31, Comando Supremo ordered Guzzoni to subordinate 
himself to Rube's command. Guzzoni complied with his orders, and after August 1, 
released his command authority over the German presence on the island.249 
Rommel's appointment on July 15 to head a newly-formed Army Group B 
(AGB), whose staff set up shop in Bavaria, would not have elicited Italian confidence, 
had Italians been told of this formation's mission. Hider ordered the new formation 
to ready itself to takeover north Italy and secure German communications 
throughout central and north Italy after an Italian defection to the Allied side.250 
DENYING THE ALLIES VICTORY: THE GERMAN EVACUATION OF 
SICILY 
Rube eliminated his command from Italian oversight just events broke like a 
violent summer storm. The Fascist Grand Council and King Victor Emmanuel 
removed Mussolini as head of government on July 25, replacing him with an 
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implacable foe of Germany, Marshal Pietro Badoglio. The new Italian leader 
nourished litde affection for theDuce, who had made the Marshal the scapegoat 
when the invasion of Greece went awry in 1940. Mussolini had not cared that 
Badoglio had opposed the venture. The new government in Rome restored the king 
to his post as head of the military, while retaining Ambrosio as Chief of Staff of 
Comando Supremo and Roatta as Chief of the Army General Staff.251 
Hider, despite having expected this tum of events, was surprised by the coup. 
A policy of neglect had kept the two nations from establishing regular 
communications. The German embassy in Rome had fed the Fiihrer a steady stream 
of information highlighting the positive aspects of the situation right up to 
Mussolini's fall. Hitler had no one to blame but himself for this misinformation, 
because he possessed a low tolerance for bad news. Direct communication with 
Italian officials came from less-than-capable envoys like Hermann Goring and 
Heinrich Himmler. Only after the fall did Hitler's military aides, Keitel and Jodi, 
find time in their hectic schedules to visit Italy and judge conditions there for 
themselves.252 
Badoglio's accession to power fulfilled Hitler's worst-case scenario. Badoglio 
and the king assured Hitler that Italy would continue as Germany's faithful ally. 
Nonetheless, if the new Italian government turned against the Axis cause, German 
251Rintelen, "Der Feldzug in Italien," 11. 
252Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 24. 
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forces in Sicily would be trapped in an island prison. Allied forces would need only 
to accept a German surrender to complete their triumph. Hitler received news of 
Mussolini's overthrow with great trepidation, proposing to redeem the situation by 
having the 3rt! Panzer grenadier Division, stationed north of the capital city, storm 
Rome. The 2nd Fallschirmjiiger Division, located in southern France, would seize 
Rome's airfields and isolate the city from the south. In concert with the descent on 
Rome, meant to capture the new Italian government, Hitler proposed abandoning 
Sicily and withdrawing his troops with little more than their uniforms and side 
arms. Naval units would seize or destroy the Italian fleet, while securing harbors 
vital for staging future operations. 
Additional steps would be taken to secure the army's safe withdrawal from 
Sicily. The pI SS Panzer Division would depart Russia and provide an assault force 
in Italy. Rommel's divisions would secure the vital French and Italian Alpine 
passes, through which German units would pour into Italy.2S3 Although the actions 
taken to defend Rome by its new government dissuaded Hitler from immediately 
marching on the city,2S4 he ignored the protests of the new Italian government and 
2S3For Hitler's response to the immediate crisis with Italy and information 
concerning his inordinate attention to the details of this projected operation, see the 
minutes of his Evening conference of 25 July 1943 in: Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 
309-25; Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 
1982),47-52. See also Rintelen, "Der Feldzug in Italien," 12. 
254Comando Supremo encircled Rome with five divisions, including the 
"Militia" Armored Division, now commanded by Lieutenant General Conte di 
Bergolo. This step-son of King Victor Emmanuel ensured that the best division left 
to Coman do Supremo would serve the new government. Furthermore, the Italian 
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took the crucial step of rapidly moving eight German divisions from southern 
France and the Tyrol into north Italy. 
These decisive actions laid the foundation for all else that transpired in Italy. 
When Italy finally cast aside its alliance with Nazi Germany, the industrial and 
agricultural areas of north Italy rested securely in German hands. German units 
there also controlled the Italian railway net, by which Germany could supply its 
forces in the SOUth.2SS If for no other reasons than these, the occupation of northern 
Italy justified the earnest effort expended in defending Sicily during July and August 
1943. 
Nonetheless, Hitler still worried about an Allied attack on Greece. His 
directive of July 26, 1943 showed that even at this advanced stage of the campaign, 
German attention focused on the vulnerability of the Balkans. He expected a move 
against the line of the Peloponese - Crete - Rhodes, perhaps in conjunction with a 
stroke against the eastern Adriatic coastline. To ward off these dangers, 
Oberbefehlshaber SUdost assumed broader responsibilities in the Balkans, 'supporting' 
army quickly disbanded or assigned new officers to the remaining Fascist militia 
forces. Rintelen, Tla Ch. 2, 15. 
2SSlbid., 14-15; "Niederschrift iiber die Besuch des Ob.d.M. beim Fuhrer 
26.-28.7.1943," Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine. B.Nr.1. Ski. I b 2240/43 gKdos. 
Chefs., MA-I0(3), SKL-Besprechungen beim Fuhrer 1939-1945, Teil ill (Admiralty 
London) Akz. Nr. 1204/53 (IFZ), 368-69; Rintelen, "Der Feldzug in Italien," 12; 
Schreiber, Deutsche Kriegroerbrechen, 39. 
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the Italian 11th Army, which occupied the region.2S6 Orders on August 3 and 8 
prepared for a switch of sides by the Italians, which would have left German forces 
dangerously exposed to being cut off and left to wither on the vine.2S7 
Throughout August, Badoglio's embryonic government met with its German 
ally. On August 6, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop joined his new Italian counterpart, 
Raffaele Guariglia, for discussions at the Tarvis train station. During Keitel and 
Ambrosio's military conference, Ambrosio demanded the return of Italian control 
over railway security. He cast a wide net, hoping to catch the new German divisions 
entering Italy. Keitel rejected placing recently-arrived German units under Italian 
command. He deflected the Italian by insisting that currently-unemployed Italian 
units be moved south in preparation for the expected Allied invasion. 
Roatta, unhappy with the first meeting's results, requested further 
discussions, which took place at Bologna on August 15. This time Hitler's other 
military assistant, JodI, represented OKW, while Field Marshal Erwin Rommel 
joined the assemblage as Army Group B commander. Discussions again centered on 
Italian demands that all German divisions in Italy be subordinated to Comando 
256"Weisung 48 fUr die BefehlsfUhrung und Verteidigung des Sudostraums," 
OKW/WFSt/Op.Nr. 661637/43 g.K.Chefs. 26.Juli 43, liZ Fd 40/2 (Fuhrer 
Weisungen) Akz. 3370/64, 213-219 (IFZ), 213. 
257Wilhelm Keitel (Field Marshal), "Besondere Anordnungen N r. 2 fUr 
Weisung48," OKW/WFSt/Op.Nr. 661811/43 Gkdos. Chefs. WFST/Qu. (Verw.), IfZ 
Fd 40/2 (Fuhrer Weisungen) Akz. 3370/64,220-221 (IFZ); Wilhelm Keitel (Field 
Marshal), "Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 3 fUr Weisung 48," Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht. F.H.Qu., dem 7.8.1943. Nr. 004124/43 g.K./WFST/Qu.!(Verw/V), liZ 
Fd 40/2 (Fuhrer Weisungen) Akz. 3370/64,222-225 (IFZ). 
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Supremo. The Italian army Chief of Staff took personal umbrage at German queries 
concerning the movement of two Italian divisions into the Alps, near the line of the 
'Wallo Alpino del Littorio,' or Alpine fortifications. Roatta also argued for the return 
to Italy of four Italian divisions occupying southern France. 
Jodi took the offensive and insisted that Kesselring command all German 
units serving in central and southern Italy, including Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. 
His new position would require him only to report to the Italian king, effectively 
ending Comando Supremo control over German forces in Italy. In like vein, Rommel 
would control German and Italian troops located in the north. The Italians grasped 
that agreeing to the German demand that Nazi troops be freed from Italian 
command was equivalent to turning Italy over to German control. Roatta rejected 
the German conditions, and nothing concrete resulted from the discussions, other 
than a widening of the breach between the two allies.2S8 
Meanwhile, Hitler prepared his plans to seize and defend Italy. On August 8, 
he summoned General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, assigned to Rommel's staff in early 
August, and gave him command of the newly-formed German lrf' Army. Vietinghoff 
assumed control of German divisions assembling in southern Italy units of the XIV 
Panzer Corps, which was disengaging from battle and attempting to escape Sicily.2S9 
2S8Germany. Auswartiges AmI, ADAP, E-VI, 1. Mai - 30. September 1943, 412-
413; Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 207-09; Rommel Papers, 441-42; Rintelen, "Der 
Feldzug in Italien," 14; Fraser, Knight'S Cross, 444-45; Rintelen, T1a Ch. 2, 16-17. 
2S9Heinrich von Vietinghoff, "Assessment of the situation by the High 
Command as of August 1943," OCMH MS # 0-117, trans. Janet E. Dewey (Austria, 
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On August 10, the German dictator bowed to necessity and approved the 
retreat from Sicily. JodI proposed the evacuation, given the declining strength of 
German units, the difficulties in provisioning those forces, and the certainty that 
transport in Italy would come to standstill when either OPERATION EICHE or 
ACHSE got underway. Admiral Donitz opposed voluntarily surrendering, believing 
that it would free enemy naval forces for use against southern Italy or the Balkans. 
Hider's naval commander also argued that falling back to the mainland meant the 
inevitable loss of Calabria and Apulia. Hider, for once worried about his troops 
remaining in an exposed position, agreed that such developments were possible, but 
given the uncertainty in German-Italian relations, a pullback was necessary.260 
The Axis evacuation of Sicily still mars the record of the Allied generals 
tasked with the island's capture. Ultra offered tantalizing tidbits of information that 
gave Eisenhower and Alexander early warning of Axis intentions. Kesselring, 
having witnessed the Tunisian fiasco, refused to duplicate it in Sicily. Early in the 
campaign, he secured Sicily's rear door against it suddenly swinging shut and 
trapping his forces.261 Kesselring tipped his hand on July 14 by appointing Colonel 
Ernst-Guenther Baade as commander of ' Fortress Messina,' with orders to ready his 
n.d.), 3; Martin Blumenson, "Will'Ultra' Rewrite History?" Army, August 1978,45. 
260IINiederschrift uber Besprechungen im Fiihrer-Hauptquartier vom 9. 
-11.8.1943," Der Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine. B.Nr. 1. Ski. Ib (Kr) 2805/43 
gKdos Chefs., MA-10(3), SKL-Besprechungen beim Fuhrer 1939-1945, Teil ill 
(Admiralty London) Akz. Nr. 1204/53 (IFZ), 384-86. 
261Bidwell, "Kesselring," 278-79. 
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troops for an evacuation. Baade received wide-ranging powers over the district, 
which later ensured a smooth withdrawal. Acting as commandant, he controlled the 
anti-aircraft batteries protecting the narrow passage through which men and 
equipment slipped back to mainland Italy.262 
The evacuation succeeded because special staffs made a prompt and effective 
effort to establish and maintain a ferry service using ad hoc methods almost as varied 
as the British sealift staged from Dunkirk's beaches in 1940.263 The presence of 
roving Allied fighter-bombers forced most evacuations to be conducted at night. 
Kesselring insisted that the marshaling points on Messina's beaches be covered by 
strong concentrations of German flak guns. The Luftwaffe commander, Richthofen, 
so strongly opposed the measure that tears of rage filled his eyes upon being ordered 
to comply with Kesselring's directive.2M 
Nonetheless, the Luftwaffe made a laudable effort to cover the evacuation. 
Summoning up its few remaining pilots and aircraft, German squadrons flew 150 
sorties a day during the crucial interval. In comparison with the Allies's 1,200 
missions daily, it was miraculous that the Luftwaffe's all-out effort was not brushed 
262Bennerr, Behind the Battle, 206; Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for 
Sicily, 1943 (New York: Harper, 1988, 1991), 314. 
263Conrad Seibt, liThe Evacuation of Sicily and Sardinia in August 1943," 
NARA Microfiche Publication MI035 Fiche 0066, Foreign Military Studies, 
D-Series (RG 338) D-0091. (1947), 2. 
2640bM Conference, 9-11 August, 1943,381-82; Westphal, Errinnerungen, 217. 
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aside and the German retreat halted by Allied air power.26S 
The Sicilian campaign concluded on August 17 when the last three tanks of 
the Hermann GOring Panzer Division's II Panzer Regiment crossed the Strait of 
Messina. Lieutenant Thatenhorst's tired men departed with mixed feelings. 
Although they felt the sting of defeat, they could not help but remark on their good 
fortune at escaping Sicily. Further dangers awaited them on mainland Italy, but the 
men of this combat-tested division departed believing that they could meet and best 
any Allied divisions that they would confront.266 
Between August 1-17, 1943, Italian and German naval forces conducting 
OPERATION LEHRGANG evacuated 39,569 German troops, 9,605 vehicles, forty-
seven tanks, ninety-four artillery pieces, 2,000 tons of munitions and fuel, 15,000 
tons of other war materials. 62,000 Italian soldiers also escaped from Sicily with 227 
vehicles and forty-one artillery pieces.267 
More than ftfty years after the events on Sicily, this successful evacuation still 
mystiftes observers. Why and how were the Germans permitted to slip out of the 
noose prepared for them? German forces benefttted from General Alexander's lax 
26SCooper, German Air Force, 290. 
266"HGPD War Diaries, 2 Pz. Rgt., (9.11.42-15.9.43)," 17.8.1943. 
267Der Oberbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung Ie, "Erfolgsmeldung iiber 
die Kampfe in Sizilien," 107; Friedrich von Ruge, "Translation of Report on the 
Evacuation of Sicily (August 1943) with Enclosures (Register No. 59)," MS X-HI, 
(NAIl, n.d.), Record Group 338; Fechter and Hiimmelchen, Seekriegsatlas, 106; 
Sadkovich, "The Italian Navy in World War II: 1940-1943," 148. 
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control of operations. His reluctance to coordinate the campaign forfeited a decisive 
victory when Patton dashed off to Palermo, rather than drive through the island's 
center and smash the German front. This lack of strategic direction when the 
campaign concluded meant that no plan existed to prevent the Axis evacuation. By 
default, this mission fell to the Northwest African Tactical Air Force, whose 
commander, Air Vice Marshal Coningham, shifted his heavy bombers off this task 
on August 11, just as the evacuation shifted into high gear. Moreover, had Allied 
airmen moved decisively against roads leading to Messina and the beach transit sites, 
the Axis withdrawal would have suffered irreparable harm.268 
That the Allies made no such effort assumed a wider significance in German 
eyes. The 'miracle' of the straits allowed Hitler to retain an effective fighting force 
within Italy's boundaries; not only in the vital north, but also in that nation's 
southern half. Allied planners could not ignore the forces whose escape had been 
facilitated by faulty planning. General von Vietinghoff was right when he 
commented that the escape from Sicily was critical to everything that took place later 
in Italy. The presence of four German divisions that escaped from Sicily accounts 
for Allied hesitation in moving decisively against Rome and the Po valley that 
September.269 
CONCLUSION 
268M ark, Aerial Interdiction, 51, 78-79. 
269lbid., 78-79. 
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Assessing the outcome of the Sicilian campaign still sparks controversy today. 
In August 1943, Anglo-American leaders praised their troops for winning a clear-cut 
victory. General Marshall's congratulatory radio message to General Eisenhower on 
August 17 reveals the Chief of Staffs pride in the fledgling American army's role in 
capturing Sicily. 
Congratulations and my profound thanks for the brilliant success with 
which you have brought another tremendous job to a victorious 
conclusion. You have carried your vast responsibilities in a most 
impressive manner in the preparation, co-ordination, and direction of 
the Sicilian operation.270 
Yet, Marshall did not have the final word concerning this campaign. Critical 
assessments have become commonplace among military historians. Marshall's 
official biographer offered a restrained assessment of the victory years later, noting 
that although the Allies had defeated their opponents after thirty-eight days of 
combat, "part of this force escaped to the mainland .... "2il 
The official American army history wrote diplomatically that "[ n lone of this 
should be construed to mean that HUSKY was a perfect military campaign, that 
there were no flaws in the planning and execution of the operation." This volume 
laid the blame for the failure to trap and annihilate Axis forces at the doorstep of 
270"Aggressive and Determined Leadershipll June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944, vol. 4 
of The Papers 0/ George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Rittenour 
Stevens (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),92. 
271Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizero/Victory 1943-1945 (New 
York: Viking, 1973),248. 
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Montgomery's "cautious and conservative" design, which avoided "calculated risk or 
gamble for high stakes," betting instead on a sure-thing.272 
British historians Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell have argued 
forcefully that: 
the German commanders in Sicily had with great courage and professional 
skill not only halted Generals Patton and Montgomery, but removed 
60,000-80,000 men and much equipment across the Straits of Messina to the 
mainland in spite of the attacks of the Allied air forces. Wars, however, are not 
won by glorious retreats. The German divisions in central and southern Italy 
were mere wrecks, requiring to be re-manned, re-equipped and re-trained. 
Montgomery's failure to annihilate his foes receives but a cursory and somewhat 
embarrassed treatment. Nonetheless, it seems fair to note that wars are also not won 
by incomplete victories of the type [hat the Allies attained in Sicily.273 
Allied forces 'won' the battle for Sicily, driving Axis defenders from its 
shores. They achieved that goal by engaging and defeating the Axis divisions of the 
Italian 6th Army and German XIV Panzer Corps. But the Germans did not lose Italy 
or the war because of the incomplete Anglo-American victory in Sicily. Patton's 
drive to Palermo provided American GIs with welcome column inches in the press. 
Nonetheless, his action dispersed the American 7th Army when a drive coordinated 
with Montgomery's forces might have broken the German front and gained a 
272Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 419, 420. 
273Forest Pogue, General Marshall's biographer, likewise speaks of the 
evacuation of Axis forces on the island as an 'escape.' However, Allied planners had 
not included the evacuation/escape as an stage in their overall design. Pogue, 
Organizer of Victory, 248; Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 25. 
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decisive victory.274 Given that the brilliant use of deception measures and air power 
weakened the Axis opposition facing Allied divisions, one can only wonder what 
would have happened had Eisenhower, Alexander, Montgomery, and Patton faced 
the full might of the German war machine.275 
In contrast with Allied bungling, Hider purchased a vital interval, during 
which he moved troops into Italy. Moreover, the German divisions evacuated from 
Sicily, battered as they were, formed the keystone upon which the Kesselring would 
build a series of rugged defensive lines across the Italian peninsula. Allied divisions 
would have many occasions on which to rue their commanders' conservative conduct 
of the Sicilian campaign. The poisonous combination of strategic ineptitude and 
internecine conflict prevented the attainment of a truly decisive victory, upping the 
cost of future operations to an appalling degree. 
Italian leaders correcdy judged Hider's purpose in allowing the campaign to 
consume Italy's exhausted military resources. A lengthy fight for Sicily and Italy 
274Fechter and Hiimme1chen, Seekriegsatlas, 106. 
275Recent critical accounts accord the Allies at best a modest success in Sicily. 
Gerhard Weinberg awards the Allies a "local victory," while Carlo D'Este's lengthy 
narrative, descriptively entitled Bitter Victory, blames "the conservatism of the 
HUSKY plan and the failure of the senior Allied commanders to organize a joint 
command headquarters to administer it, [laying] the foundation for what ensued." 
Mitcham and Stauffenberg, convinced the Allies made a major strategic error in 
moving on Sicily instead of Sardinia, close with their own sharp criticism, agreeing 
that the "[b ]attle of Sicily had been a turning point: the Allies' best opportunity to 
win a decisive victory in the Mediterranean had gone by the wayside." Weinberg, A 
World at Arms, 594-95; D'Este, Bitter Victory, 524; Mitcham and Stauffenberg, Battle 
of Sicily, 303. 
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would hold back the Allied armies from Germany, while the campaign in Russia, the 
heart of Hitler's war, absorbed the bulk of the German effort. Italian Ambassador to 
Germany, Alfieri, and General Ambrosio saw in this idea the outline of German 
policy as it emerged in July 1943. That German planners spoke bluntly of the same 
would not have surprised any knowledgeable Italian commander.276 
Erwin Rommel's honest (if somewhat blunt) assessment that it was better to 
fight the war in Italy than at home was true. The war would remain far from 
German borders for another year. The Germans also saved their forces from the 
Allies, which they had failed to do in Tunisia. This army's escape ensured that Italy 
could and would be bitterly defended by the Wehnnacht. Moreover, the Sicilian 
campaign gave Hitler an interval during which he refined his scheme for seizing 
Italy, an important aspect of the battle for Sicily not fully understood or explained in 
most histories. The slow conquest of Sicily and escape of German troops provided 
Hitler with the time and military force with which he won Italy's industrial and 
agricultural assets. 
276Plehwe, End of an Alliance, 27-28. 
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CHAPTERS 
FROM AVALANCHE TO STALEMATE 
ASSESSMENT AND PREPARATION 
Germany's fortunes in the Mediterranean plummeted after its forces 
surrendered possession of Sicily. The remaining German divisions in Italy, most 
mustering a third of normal strength, were stretched thin and could cover only a 
small portion of the Italian coastline. Allied air forces had inflicted horrendous 
losses on the Lu/twaffi, which lacked sufficient aircraft to contest control of Italian 
skies. The German navy in the Mediterranean offered little more than token support 
to the Italian navy. Nonetheless, appearances were deceiving. Allied leaders 
struggling to define their common strategic vision again allowed Hider and his 
troops time to rebuild the Wehrmacht's combat prowess and infiltrate the Italian 
Peninsula, ultimately preventing the quick Allied seizure of the Italian heardand. 
Nonetheless, events in Italy between August 1943 and January 1944 remain 
enigmatic and raise perplexing questions. How did the Germans overcome this dire 
set of circumstances? What did Hitler and his military leaders do right in Italy? 
How did they manage the resources that they discovered in Italy? Moreover, how did 
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the Filhrer reverse his expressed desire to wash his hands of most of Italy and end up 
retaining the Italian heartland, especially the important agriculmral and industrial 
centers of north Italy? On the other hand, the question also must be asked, did the 
Allies do anything to cause this reversal of fortune? Did they fumble away their best 
opportunity to seize Italy in late 1943? 
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION 
Events during July and August 1943 bode ominously for Adolf Hider. His 
men had suffered severe defeats in Russia and the Mediterranean. Operation Citadel, 
the long-planned offensive designed to annihilate Russian troops concentrated in the 
Kursk salient, failed badly. German forces fell back before a massive counterstrike 
unleashed by Stalin's men even before the German drive had shuddered to a 
complete stop. Soviet troops and tanks (hereafter drove the hard-pressed Nazi 
divisions back through the Ukraine. 
In the Mediterranean, Anglo-American troops likewise held the initiative. 
German forces had successfully escaped a deadly trap on Sicily. Nonetheless, Nazi 
hopes had suffered a serious setback as impending defeat on Sicily laid the 
foundation for Mussolini's overthrow. Combat on Sicily had decimated Hider's 
combat divisions in Italy. In early August 1943, the Filhrer's remaining forces in 
southern Italy could not have repelled an Allied invasion, had the Allies swifdy 
followed up their Sicilian victory. 
Hitler also faced a deteriorating home front, as he had long feared. The Nazi 
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warlord believed that the German home front's collapse had cost his nation victory 
in the First World War. He therefore paid inordinate attention to his citizens' 
comfort. Now, the combined weight of losses at Stalingrad and Kursk, alongside the 
evacuation of Sicily and the collapse of Mussolini's government, threatened to 
undermine the German public's support for the war. 
In August 1943, Hitler's security apparatus, theSicherheitsdienst, reported 
that public opinion had turned sharply against the Nazi regime. The present 
difficulties gave heart to government opponents. Germans across the Reich were 
voicing their belief that the Nazi government was vulnerable to a collapse like that 
which had felled Mussolini's regime. The corruption and war profiteering of some 
Nazi leaders provided a focal point for many of the sharpest critics. Ominously, 
much of the growing resistance took the form of humor mocking Hitler's supposed 
'infallibility.,277 
Horrific Allied fire raids against Hamburg during July 1943 further 
weakened Hitler's standing with Germans. The apparent ease with which Allied air 
forces devastated one of Germany's great cities threatened the complete destruction 
of domestic morale. The staggering death toll and poor response by Nazi officials to 
the catastrophe sharpened criticism of the regime. Many German leaders expressed 
bitterness that antiaircraft guns slated for Hamburg's defense had been diverted to 
277Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New 
York: Oxford University Press, [1987] 1989),210-11. 
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defend Italian cities.278 
Reports from Italy offered little solace. The Italian populace was openly 
contemptuous of its German ally after Mussolini's fall from power. Taking 
advantage of the chaos, angry Italians targeted German consulates for attack. 
Subsequent reports painted a picture of Badoglio's government reestablishing 
control of city streets, but the tenuous nature of current conditions in Italy was 
apparent to Germans following events there.279 
Confusion likewise reigned among German leaders making plans to deal 
with Italy. Hitler adopted a policy premised upon an imminent Italian betrayal of 
Germany. His partner's contribution in Sicily convinced him that the average 
Italian had little fight left in him. Moreover, Hitler correctly estimated that moves 
concentrating Italian forces in northern Italy, where they could confront German 
troops infiltrating Italy, as well as Italian demands that German troops be assigned 
solely to southern Italy, pointed toward impending treason. Nonetheless, other 
German officials were convinced that Italy would not desert Germany, even after 
Mussolini's removal from power. Field Marshal Kesselring and German diplomats 
in Rome defended Italy as an ally that would continue to fight despite its war-weary 
278Irving, Hitler's War, 544. 
279Der Oberbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung Ie, "Lagebericht Italien vom 
30.7.1943," RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), Band 12, (BAMA: Microfiche), 81. 
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state.280 
Ignoring the confidence of Kesselring and German diplomats in Italy, 
German headquarters staff in Berlin carefully laid plans to deal with an Italian 
surrender to the Allies, which would leave German forces exposed to annihilation.lSi 
The notion that the Allies might land near La Spezia or Genoa evoked particular 
fear. Close to ninety Italian warships still anchored at La Spezia, guarded by four 
Italian army divisions assigned to defend the port. This combination of forces 
seriously threatened German units stationed in southern Italy. Had the Allies 
coordinated a landing with Italian naval and ground forces, German troops assigned 
to the region could not have countered it. Although staff officers considered this 
possibility highly unlikely, given the record of Allied conservatism, a thrust here 
would have quickly led the Allies into the heart of the Po River valley.282 
In his memoirs, Kesselring thanked Allied indecision and conservatism for 
permitting German forces to escape Sicily. Moreover, he viewed the delay between 
the Sicilian campaign's close and the initiation of operations on the Italian mainland 
as the key to ensuing events. This pause allowed him to reorganize and rebuild his 
Germans divisions. Moreover, Kesselring's staff digested lessons learned on Sicily 
while awaiting the next round of fighting. Kesselring concluded that German forces 
2SOWestphal and Humboldt-Dachroeden, "Reinforcement of the German 
Army," 8-9; Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 4. 
28IIbid., 5-7. 
282Ibid., 6-7. 
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would not be allowed the time to muster their strength for a massive counterattack 
against Allied troops landing on Italian beaches. A successful response would 
require a defense in depth, with prepared fallback positions already mapped out. 
The breathtaking scope of Allied fire power would vanquish the best coastal 
defenses. This time he would have to correctly guess the site of an Allied invasion, 
and position his reserves close enough to allow them to be brought forward during 
the first night. If all went well, both armor and infantry would be ready to 
counterattack the next dawn.283 
For this strategy to work, Kesselring and his staffhad to divine Anglo-
American intentions. Allied shipping concentrations in North African and Sicilian 
harbors during the late summer of 1943 provided the essential clue. Studying the 
deployment of invasion forces, OBS concluded that the invasion would fall upon 
either Sardinia or the west coast of Italy. The range of Allied aircraft operating from 
Sicilian airfields ruled out a landing farther north. Intelligence also led OBS to 
expect a secondary crossing somewhere in Calabria, the toe of the Italian boot.284 
Allied intelligence officers attempted to conceal the invasion plans from the 
German supreme commander in the West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, and 
Kesselring. Actions by naval and air units raised the possibility of an assault on 
France. Von Rundstedt did not succumb to the temptation presented him. 
283Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 199-200. 
284Kesselring et al., German Version otthe Italian Campaign, 3-4. 
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Recognizing that time was too short for a successful Allied invasion of France that 
September, von Rundstedt redeployed his divisions to likely danger points. Of his 
thirty-six divisions, he had shifted twenty-seven to Italy or Russia by December and 
replaced them with units burned-out on the Russian front.28S 
Attention in Berlin also focused on the Mediterranean, with Sardinia and 
Corsica considered probable targets. Allied forces stationed on the two islands could 
have delivered decisive blows against central and northern Italy or the southern 
coast of France.286 Kesselring and his staff insisted that the Allies would attack 
southern Italy. The lack of ports that could handle shipping needed to sustain an 
invading army highlighted Naples and the surrounding region as an invader's most 
likely goal. Moreover, the range of ground-based Allied fighter coverage made the 
small Italian port of Salerno stand out on the list. The suitability of its wide beaches 
spotlighted it as an attractive target.287 
ALLIED STRATEGY AND PLANNING AFTER SICILY 
As the Sicilian campaign wound down, Anglo-American strategists gathered 
for the Quadrant Conference in Quebec, Canada (August 17-24, 1943). Planning for 
future operations hinged on a simple fact. American representatives had not 
28S Anthony Cave Brown, "e': The Secret Life of Sir Stewan Menzies, Spymaster 
to Winston Churchill (New York: Macmillan, 1987),513; Howard, Strategic Deception, 
79,81-82,95. 
286Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 3. 
287Klinkowstroem, "Italy's Break-away," 2-3, 14. 
177 
developed a coherent strategic plan to guide Mediterranean operations. General 
George Marshall, the most influential American voice, merely demanded that this or 
another theater not be allowed to siphon off resources earmarked for invading 
France. 
Nonetheless, Marshall did not derail plans to continue the Mediterranean 
campaign. His British counterparts successfully argued that the Sicilian victory 
must lead to further advances in Italy, Sardinia, and Corsica. Arguments that Italian 
operations could divert German divisions needed in Russia and France weighed 
heavily in calculations. Allied air forces also hoped to grab northern Italian airbases 
for attacks against southern German industrial areas. Marshall ultimately agreed 
that troops from seven veteran divisions set aside for OVERLORD could be retained 
for Mediterranean operations, although this delayed their refitting for the invasion 
of France. 288 
AXIS PREPARATIONS 
Marshal Badoglio had become the new head of the Italian government after 
the coup against Mussolini. Italy's new leader did not take up the reins of power to 
conduct a revolution. Aware of his tenuous hold on power, Badoglio accommodated 
the surviving Fascist hierarchy, rather than engage in wholesale arrests and 
executions. His strong right arm, General Mario Roatta, employed state violence 
only against Italian citizens, who wrongly thought the occasion an opportunity to rid 
288Marshall Papers, 4:90-91. 
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themselves of the dictatorship's worst elements. Roatta and the Italian Secret Police, 
DVRA, brutally repressed peaceful demonstrations, shooting down Italian protestors 
without hesitation.289 
In a similar vein, Badoglio did not immediately provoke a German response 
against his new government by publically wooing the Allies. He bought time by 
maintaining the fiction that Italy would remain loyal to the AxiS.290 The German 
public stance and reaction to his reassurances showed Hitler's view of Badoglio's true 
intentions. German troops poured across the border, respecting neither the new 
government nor its cover story. Badoglio reacted by hastily dispatching 
representatives to meet Allied representatives, justifying his actions by an appeal to 
Realpolitik, placing Italy's national survival above its obligations to Germany.291 
THE INVASION OF ITALY 
ULTRA AND THE DECISION TO LAND AT SALERNO 
The Allied invasion plan, Baytown/Avalanche, relied heavily upon the 
insight that Ultra provided into German p!ans. From Kesselring's messages to 
Berlin, Allied commanders learned that he expected a landing north of Naples. The 
289Roy Palmer Domenico, Italian Fascists on Trial, 1943-1948 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 14. 
290Pietro Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1948),43. 
291Ibid., 55-56. 
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beaches there led to a flat plain extending twenty-five miles inland to Capua and 
Caserta. From Capua, the fabled Via Appia (Highway 7) ran to Rome along the coast, 
while the inland route, the Via Casilina (Highway 6), offered an interior route 
through Cassino to the Eternal City.292 
Magic intercepts, including those originating with Japanese officials serving 
in Europe, revealed the widening schism between Germany and Italy, the internal 
collapse of the Fascist state, and the stirring of serious dissent within the Fascist 
leadership.293 This information contributed to a growing belief in Allied quarters 
that Italy would soon collapse, and that this calamity would compel German forces to 
flee that nation or face destruction. 
Ultra also disclosed that German measures focused on securing north Italy, 
even at the cost of writing off that nation's southern half. The allocation of potent 
SS Panzer and Panzer grenadier divisions to Rommel's Army Group B and an 
unwillingness to apportion Kesselring reinforcements beyond those absolutely 
necessary to complete his mission convinced Allied observers that little serious 
fighting was to be expected no matter where the Allies made their initial foray onto 
the peninsula. To some degree, the dreadful fight up the length of the Italian 
292Garlinski, Swiss Conidor, 142. 
293Carl Boyd, Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic 
Intelligence, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 
152-54; Alexander S. Cochran, "The Influence of "Magic" Intelligence on Allied 
Strategy in the Mediterranean," in New Aspects of Naval History, ed. Craig L. 
Symonds et. ale (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981),343. 
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peninsula from 1943-1945 can be laid at the door of that erroneous notion. Allied 
commanders relied too heavily on Ultra, as if it could somehow unveil the future. In 
so doing, they did not consider the possibility that Hitler might change his mind if 
the Allied assault did not develop sufficient speed and power to quicldy drive his 
men back beyond Rome. 294 
CALABruA, TARANTO, AND SALERNO 
On September 3, 1943, British and Commonwealth troops of Montgomery's 
8th Army launched the first Allied invasion of the European continent, crossing the 
narrow Strait of Messina. Montgomery's commander, General Alexander, set two 
goals for Operation Baytown. First, Allied forces should secure freedom of navigation 
through the strait. Second, British units were to engage German forces defending 
southern Italy, preventing them from reinforcing Kesselring's troops at Salerno. 
Montgomery's operation faded into a sideshow because he lacked the men and naval 
transport necessary to race up the toe of the Italian boot. British forces secured the 
Strait of Messina, but failed in their second aim. Montgomery's divisions rendered 
small assistance to the Allied forces at Salerno.29S 
Hider and Kesselring correctly surmised that the Calabrian landing did not 
comprise the main Allied effort. Moreover, Hider worried that massive air attacks 
294Bennetr, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 246; Blumenson, "Will 'Ultra' 
Rewrite History?" 44-45. 
29SBernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Vzscount 
Montgomery of Alamein, K. G. (London: Collins, 1958),192-95. 
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against Germany and shipping concentrations in the West indicated an imminent 
invasion. Kesselring was of another mind. Although convinced that the main blow 
would fall at Naples or Salerno, he did not rule out an operation targeting Rome. His 
headquarters ordered the JrtI Panzergrenadier Division's transfer from Orvieto to 
positions north of Rome, which would allow the unit to counter an invasion of 
central Italy.296 
Meanwhile, Luftwaffi bombers raided North African ports, seeking to 
hinder invasion preparations. The pinprick raids inspired a counterblow against 
Foggia by Allied P-38 fighters and B-17 bombers that left forty-seven wrecked and 
thirteen damaged Luftwaffi craft littering the cratered airfield complex. This and 
other raids weakened the Lufiwaffo's bomber force, which shrank to less than sixty-
five combat-ready machines, incapable of intervening against the landings in 
Calabria. Richthofen conserved his strength for employment against the main 
assault, expected near Naples. Nonetheless, had he chosen to attack Montgomery's 
forces, the lack of suitable airfields and ground support facilities in Calabria would 
have prevented operations.297 
AVALANCHE AT SALERNO 
296TagebUchervonJoseph Goebbels, 9/ll:445; Kesselring et al., German Version of 
the Italian Campaign, 12. 
297Lee, German Air Force, 141; Gundelach, Die deutsche Luftwaffo im Mittelmeer 
1940-1945,665,670; Mark, Aerial Interdiction, 89. 
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Colonel General von Vietinghoff commanded the 1 rJ" Army defending southern Italy. 
LXXVI Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Traugott Herr controlled the 26rh 
Panzer and 2CJ" Panzergrenadier divisions. General Hube's XIV Panzer Corps with 
Panzer Division Hermann GOring, the remnants of 1SU' Panzergrenadier Division, and 
the newly-formed 16rh Panzer Division, provided VietinghofPs second striking force. 
The rt Fallschirmjager Division, deployed near Taranto, took orders directly from 1 rJ" 
Army. Troops of the Luftwajfe's lllA Flak Corps covered Rome.298 
Aerial reconnaissance on September 8 determined that the approaching 
Allied invasion convoys' most likely targets lay near Naples. Kesselring took heart, 
having correctly forecast Allied intentions. Vietinghoff placed his men on a 
heightened state of alert upon receiving the warning, but undertook no further 
action, given the possibility of a landing in either [he Gulf of Naples or at Salemo.299 
Operation Avalanche, an unambitious scheme, fit in with previous landings 
in Calabria and at Taranto that were meant to be mutually supportive. American 
298Heinrich von Vietinghoff, (GenOberst a.D.), "Die Kaempfe der 10.Armee 
in Sued- und Mittelitalien unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Schlachten bei 
Salerno, am Voltumo, Garigliano, am Sangro, und um Cassino," Der Feldzug in 
Italien, Kapitel6, (1947)., Box 162 CT-001a to T001a K1), RG 338, Records of U.S. 
Army Commands. Records of the European Command. Records of the Historical 
Division. Foreign Military Studies. "T" Studies. German. (NAIl, 1947), 13-14; 
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General Mark Clark's new 5th Army would land at the Gulf of Salerno, establish a 
beachhead, and seize the port city. Clark would then link up with Montgomery's 8!h 
Army and drive north to Naples. Ifsuccessful, Allied planners did not rule out 
capturing Rome in 1943.300 
On the afternoon of September 8, XIV Panzer Corps headquarters alerted its 
forces that air landing and paratroop operations might be conducted in conjunction 
with an invasion.30l Warning of a possible Italian armistice with the approaching 
Allies also raced down the line early that same evening.302 The Germans would not 
be taken by surprise this time, a deadly fact that escaped British and American 
soldiers celebrating news of Italy's surrender aboard [he convoys nearing Salerno. 
The Allied armada arrived during the early morning hours of September 9. 
Men and equipment rook advantage of the weak German position, grabbing a long, 
shallow beachhead. 5!h Army troops landed along the Gulf of Salerno's crescent-
shaped shoreline, with the British X Corps' two infantry divisions assaulting the 
northern rim, inclusive of the port of Salerno. The American VI Corps landed two 
3OOD'Este, Bitter Victory, 36. 
3Ol"XIV.Pz.Korps Ia Nr. 1625/43. 8.9.43," Frame 000009. Ro11540. Enclosure 
to War Diary 5, Operations Branch, 8-30 Sep 1943, AK XIV, 47702/8. T-314. 
Records of German Field Commands. RG 242. Captured Enemy Documents 
(microfilm), (NAIl), 000009. 
3OZ"Ia XIV Pz. Korps to 16th Pz. Div. Funkspruch Nr. 326. 8.9.43," Frame 
000010. Ro11540. Enclosure to War Diary 5, Operations Branch, 8-30 Sep 1943, AK 
XIV,47702/8. T-314. Records of German Field Commands. RG 242. Captured 
Enemy Documents (microfilm), (NAm, 000010. 
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additional infantry divisions further south, wading ashore at the ancient Greek 
temple site ofPaestum. 
The men of the 16th Panzer Division awaited the disembarking invasion 
forces. [See map below.] This newly-rebuilt division covered a front forty-eight 
kilometers long, stretching from Salerno to Agropoli. The unit lacked training in 
both repelling an invasion and mountain fighting. Neither did quartermasters did 
have stocks of equipment for the 16th Panzer Division's men suitable for these types of 
combat.303 German forces wisely avoided pinning mobile reserves to static defensive 
positions. Eight strongpoints, each manned by one platoon of infantry, heavy 
machine guns, mortars, flak, and antitank guns, covered the beaches. The division's 
remaining four battalions and two and a half companies of infantry combined with 
armored units, providing it with a mobile reserve.304 
303Wolfgang Werthen, Geschichte tier 16. Panzer Division 1939-1945 (Bad 
Nauheim: Verlag Han-Henning Podzun, 1958), 144. 
304lbid.,143. The division formed three battlegroups (Kiimpfgruppen) to cover 
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Widespread Allied landings created confusion in the division's ranks. Darkness 
prevented a quick determination of the attack's focal points. Despite the muddle, 
only two landings succeeded among those unfortunate enough to disembark directly 
opposite German strongpoints. German mobile reserves quickly moved against the 
disorganized invasion forces, but halted as Allied battleships and cruisers rained fire 
down upon them. Dawn brought further destruction as Allied air forces swept the 
skies and employed their limited ground attack forces against the 16th Panzers with 
some success. 
When later assessing its performance, the divisional staff noted that the 
presence of more fortified troops might have impeded the invaders. They also 
warned that if counterattacks were to have the slightest chance of success, they must 
be made early enough to engage landing forces during darkness and as close to the 
beaches as possible. Only a rapid counterattack under the cover of night could 
negate the enemy's superiority at sea and in the air. Nonetheless, 16th Panzer 
Division's determined resistance kept British and American troops apart the first 
day. lOS 
Meanwhile, the Italian fleet finally sortied during the morning hours of 
lOStl16th Panzer - Division. 16. September 1943. Erfahrungsbericht tiber 
Feindlandung,tI Frames 000353-000360. Roll 540. Enclosure to War Diary 5, 
Operations Branch, 8-30 Sep 1943, AK XIV, 47702/8. T -314. Records of German 
Field Commands. RG 242. Captured Enemy Documents (microfilm), (N Am, 
000353-55. 
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September 9, as Kesselring and Berlin had long hoped. However, it sailed not to 
engage the vulnerable transports anchoring off the Bay of Salerno, but to surrender 
to the Allies. German naval forces could not prevent the Italian battle fleet from 
departing. The sudden surrender caught German submarines out of position and 
unable to intercept the exiting Italian warships. Rommel's troops hastily occupied 
the port of La Spezia, but this proved poor consolation as the great prize had already 
escaped his grasp. 306 
Admiral Bergamini, sailing with three battleships, three heavy cruisers, and 
eight destroyers, joined up with three additional heavy cruisers shortly after 
departing La Spezia. From his flagship, Roma, Bergamini ordered a course toward 
Sardinia. He altered his tack away from the island at 1340 hours, a move that 
German reconnaissance planes observed from high above the Straits of San 
Bonifacio. It proved a fateful moment for his task force. 
The Italian fleet suffered the misfortune of operating within range of a 
unique German bomber force. Major Bernhard Jope's eleven Do-217-K 2s, stationed 
at Istres airfield near Marseilles, France, rose quickly from their base and set an 
intercept course for the slowly maneuvering Italian warships. J ope's command was 
equipped with the first guided missiles ever used in naval warfare, the FX-1400, a 
three-thousand pound armor-piercing guided glider bomb. The Fritz-X, product of 
Rheinmetall-Borsig's Dr. Max Kramer, weighed 1570 kilograms and carried 350 kg 
306Klinkowstroem, "Italy's Break-away," 13-14; Franz Kurowski,Kampffild 
Mittelmeer (Herford: Koehlers, 1984), 14. 
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of explosives. This projectile could penetrate 120 mm of armor, allowing it to easily 
punch through the Italian warships' vulnerable deck armor.307 
German airmen overtook Bergamini's warships near the island of Asinara. 
Their Do-217s attacked the Roma, striking the vessel twice. One hit started a fire 
that detonated the battleship's forward magazine, breaking the vessel's keel. It sank 
quickly, taking with it 1,352 crewmen of the ship's complement of 1,948. Admiral 
Bergamini died with his sailors. Another attack damaged the battleship ltalia, 
causing it to ship 800 tons of seawater. Italian escorts hastened to assist the stricken 
vessel, accompanying it during the lengthy voyage to Malta and internment.308 
Although Ultra had revealed operational testing of the new weapons in 
August, Allied shipping in the Gulf of Salerno suffered similarly devastating attacks 
by Do-217s equipped with both the FX-1400 and the smaller, 1,000 pound rocket-
powered Hs-293 guided bombs. Here planes of Kampfgeschwader 6 joined 
Kampfgeschwader 100's Do-217s, launching an average offive to ten raids daily.309 
German pilots struck the British battleship Warspite and cruiser Uganda, the 
American cruiser Savannah, while the British monitor Abercrombie hit a mine. The 
307Brian Ford, German Secret Weapons: Blueprint for Mars (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1969), l35; Rudolf Lusar, Die deutschen Waffen und Geheimwaffen 
des Zweiten Weltkrieges und ihre Weiterentwicklung, 6th ed. (Miinchen: J. F. Lehmanns 
Verlag, 1971), 211-l3; Lee, German Air Force, 142-43. 
308Bragadin, Italian Navy, 317-18; Fechter and Hiimmelchen, Seekriegsatlas, 
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availability of limited Allied fighter cover, lack of trained crews and specialized 
aircraft for the attacks, and teething problems inherent to the introduction of any 
arms technology prevented the Roma disaster from overtaking Allied naval forces in 
the gulf. Nonetheless, Allied commanders retained a healthy respect for the 
Luftwaffe's new strike capability throughout of the Italian campaign, although they 
soon learned that laying smoke impeded the guided weapon's accuracy.310 
Air attacks on the crowded shipping significantly influenced the land 
campaign, making it difficult to shift Allied fighters away from defending the fleet. 
Plans to interdict German troop movements at key road and rail junctions suffered 
delays as the aircraft remained over the beachhead.3l1 Meanwhile, German forces 
arrived in slow procession. Hermann GOring Panzer and 15th Panzer grenadier divisions 
made their way to the northern edge of the gradually expanding Allied foothold, 
arriving on September 11. Elements of the 2gtJJ Panzergrenadier Division took up 
positions south of the 16th Panzers, which then held the center of the German line. 
A severe fuel shortage prevented Vietinghoff from concentrating his forces 
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and counterattacking. 1 (J" Army lacked an organic logistical staff. It relied upon the 
strained resources of Kesselring's command, which struggled to maint:ain 
communications with Vietinghoff's far-flung divisions. Daily reports moved slowly 
back to higher headquarters, creating delays in shipping supplies. The harsh Italian 
terrain and climactic conditions also degraded fuel efficiency. A normal unit of fuel 
that supplied a movement calculated at 100 kilometers in other theaters barely 
covered twenty-five to thirty kilometers when traveling in Italy. This precarious 
situation worsened when a tanker captain mistakenly sank his vessel at Sapri and 
burned fuel supplies ashore when a misunderstood telegram panicked him. 
Vietinghoff argued later that the lack of fuel played a decisive role in the German 
defeat at Salerno.312 
The fuel shortage played havoc with the 1 rJ" Army's divisional movements to 
Salerno. This in tum caused the planned single counterattack against Allied forces 
to degenerate into a series of disjointed assaults. Although Allied forces found 
themselves hard-pressed to deal with each arrack, Vietinghoff could not bring the 
full weight of his troops to bear simultaneously against the beachhead. Allied 
warships concentrated their fire on the piecemeal blows in quick succession, 
rendering them harmless and frustrated because they were unable [0 return fire 
against their tormentors.313 
3l2Vietinghoff, Tla Ch. 6,24-25. 
3l3Kesselring et al., German Version oithe Italian Campaign, 14-15. 
192 
Although the Allies finally united and swept forward to begin the long and 
difficult journey up the Italian peninsula, neither man nor fate had predetermined 
such an outcome. Kesselring maintained that the battle at Salerno need not have 
ended in the Allies' favor. 
The German land combat forces in southern Italy, including Rome, eight 
divisions strong, were opposed by the Allies' ten divisions and several brigades 
and groups, two airborne divisions, and five Italian divisions--in all seventeen 
divisions. There were eight and a half German divisions in northern Italy 
which took no part in the decisive battles. Two of them would have sufficed to 
repel the Allied landing at Salerno.314 
Nonetheless, Allied forces were ashore. It remained to see what they would do with 
their expensive victory. 
OPERATION "ACHSE" 
PREPARATION FOR ACHSE 
On July 27, Hitler ended his hand wringing over Italy. While conferring 
with Admiral Donitz, he initiated plans to rescue Mussolini, reestablish a Fascist 
state in Italy, gain control of the remaining Italian fleet, and act so that German 
forces could occupy Rome and as much of Italy as was feasible. But more than 
concern for Mussolini and grabbing Italian territory drove Hitler's policy. His 
concern for the security of the Balkans overrode all other maners. While Hitler 
worried that he lacked the military forces to defend the Italian Peninsula, his policy 
of securing the economic advantages accruing to Germany from the Balkans never 
314Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 220. 
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wavered.31S 
OPERATION ACHSE, designed to secure Italian assets and use them for 
Germany's benefit, placed the highest priority on Wehrmacht forces seizing key 
transportation nodes. Harbors, railroads, and other communications centers were to 
be taken first, which would permit the rapid movement of German forces throughout 
Italy. Securing the Alpine passes received the highest priority, as without them, new 
troops could not be introduced and nor could existing forces be supplied. While 
Rommel's army group took control of these facilities in north Italy, German troops 
in southern and central Italy would fall back upon the firm base that Rommel 
created. 
The plan also called for the disarming of Italian troops. Although the 
Italian Army was seriously weakened after lengthy combat, German troops still 
confronted a daunting task. OKW set events in motion July 27, ordering Field 
Marshal Rommel, who had been bound for Greece, to assume control of German 
forces based in Italy north of the Alba-Ancona line. His Army Group B would 
protect Kesselring's vulnerable lines of communications with Germany, prepare 
defenses in the northern Apennines, and ready measures to disarm Italian forces in 
the region. 
By September 8, Rommel commanded the headquarters of the LXXXVII 
31SObM Conference, 26-28 July, 1943," 368-69; Hinsley, Hitlers Strategy, 
228-29,231. Although Hitler relented from his original desire to immediately attack 
Rome, he sketched the pattern that OPERATION ACHSE later followed. 
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Army Corps, II SS Panzer Corps, and the U Mountain Corps. The 26th Panzer Division, 
76th, 94th, and 305th infantry divisions from France, 44th and 65th infantry divisions 
from Germany, SS Panzergrenadier Division Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler and 24th Panzer 
Division (transferred from the Eastern Front), and 7Ist Infantry Division from 
Denmark, formed his command. Few had more than token strength, and 
reinforcements arrived from Germany (l62nd Infantry Division) and from France 
(356th Infantry Division). OKW assigned command of the 9r1" Panzer grenadier Division 
on Sardinia and Corsica to Rommel's army group. The 36zM and 363Td infantry 
divisions also began refitting under Rommel's command.316 
Outside Rome, the German 2nd Pallschirmjiiger Division confronted seven 
Italian Army divisions, which varied greatly in strength and combat-readiness. The 
German 3rtl Panzer grenadier Division, located to the north of Rome, had been assigned 
the dual tasks of guarding Kesselring's headquarters at Frascati and then moving to 
Rome. A logistical base for these operations existed in the Alban Hills. Plans called 
for the 9r1" Panzer grenadier Division to evacuate first Sardinia and then Corsica, 
assisted by whatever German naval resources could be concentrated. The SS 
ReichsfUhrer Brigade and the 9r1" Panzer grenadier Division would then fall back (0 
mainland Italy and assist as necessary. Other units would simultaneously disarm 
and imprison Italian forces occupying southern France and the Balkans. 
German naval forces received orders to prevent the defection of Italian 
3l6Westphal and Humboldt-Dachroeden, "Reinforcement of the German 
Army," 9-10. 
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warships and merchantmen. Naval units also had to secure Toulon and other 
harbors as well as to ensure sufficient sea transport to evacuate the islands and 
support ground operations in Italy.317 
THE IT ALO-GERMAN WAR FOR ITALY 
Hitler received notice of Italy's surrender when Badoglio telegraphed him 
on 8 September. Badoglio confronted Hitler with Italy's dire situation, bad news 
that the German dictator had previously avoided hearing. "One cannot demand of a 
people that they continue the war, if every legitimate hope, I say not for victory, but 
for a successful defense, has disappeared. Italy, in order to avoid its complete ruin, 
has been forced to approach the enemy in order to make an attempt at an armistice." 
Unfortunately for Italy, BadogIio's botched effort at surrender resulted in the ruin 
that he sought to avoid.318 
Whereas Eisenhower and Badoglio were unprepared to capitalize on Italy's 
capitulation, Hitler promptly ordered Rommel and Kesselring to activate 
OPERATION ACHSE. The coded message, 'Bring in the Harvest,' set in motion 
3l7Wilhelm Keitel (Field Marshal), "Stichwort "Achse,'111 OKW/WFSt/Op 
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what Gerhard Schreiber has called "the Wehrmacht's last victory.,,319 On 7 
September, OKW had prepared an ultimatum designed to force the Italians to tip 
their hand and reveal Italy's course. It became superfluous when Italy surrendered 
the next day. 320 This unnecessary ultimatum might have brought to light the 
confusion that reigned among Italian authorities. 
The Italo-Allied armistice negotiations had remained a tightly-held secret in 
Italian circles. Few had been initiated into this coterie other than the King and 
commanders at the highest levels. The sudden and unexpected announcement of 
surrender by Eisenhower and its confirmation by Badoglio compromised their joint 
response to German operations. 
Badoglio and Ambrosio had laid careful plans to defend the Italian state 
between the time that the new government assumed power in July and surrendered 
on 8 September. Their strategy concentrated on defending high-value assets. They 
singled out the naval base at La Spezia for protection against a sudden German 
descent. The remaining combat power of the Italian Army consisted mainly of the 
seven divisions assigned the defense of Rome. 
Badoglio agreed [0 Ambrosio's recommendation that General Carboni be 
given the critical task of commanding Rome's defenders. The laner had 
approximately five full strength and two understrength divisions. While the forces 
319Schreiber, Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen, 40; Bidwell, "Kesselring," 279-80. 
32'13aum and Weichold, Krieg tier "Achsenmiichte," 363. 
197 
defending Rome lacked the means to counter a strong German armored thrust, they 
were sufficient to erect a defensive perimeter around the city. Italian commanders 
hoped that this isolated force could defend Rome until Allied reinforcements 
arrived. 
This design failed to account for the uncertainty regarding how soon 
negotiations might prove fruitful, and how officers in the Italian military would 
respond to the unexpected news of Italy's surrender. Badoglio lacked the 
ruthlessness that the situation demanded. He did not move boldly against German 
forces, which would have taken them unaware. Instead, Badoglio played his hand 
close to his chest, holding back his orders to commanders until after the surrender. 
Government ministers also did not receive timely warning of the capitulation. Even 
the chiefs of the General Staff for the Navy and Air Force learned of the plans only 
on September 3. Badoglio understood that many in the armed forces desired 
continuation of the German alliance, even in September 1943. Although the 
Germans later accused the Italians of treachery, the mania for secrecy stemmed as 
much from Badoglio's uncertainty concerning his officials' reaction to the surrender 
as it did from fear of German reprisals.321 
Upon receiving news of Italy's capitulation, Kesselring implemented 
measures to capture Rome and the Italian government, evacuate the islands of Italy, 
321Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, 79-80; Jens Petersen, "Deutschland 
und Italien 1939 bis 1945," inDer Zweite Weitkrieg, ed. Wolfgang Michalka (Munich: 
Piper, 1989), 113. 
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and secure his headquarters and lines of communication [0 Germany.322 German 
units encountered a variety of Italian responses as they raced to accomplish their 
designated tasks. 
The 16th Panzer Division met minimal resistance as its men replaced Italian 
defenders at Salerno. Most war-weary Italians in this sector proved only too happy 
to be disarmed and return home.323 The surrender triggered an angry response 
among the Hermann GOring Division's men. They too found that nearby Italian units 
surrendered when confronted by energetic action.324 In the Balkans, Bulgarian 
divisions assisted in disarming Italian units, which were hampered by the presence 
of German staff officers serving with them and the confusion that the sudden 
surrender generated.325 
The situation around Rome proved different. Comando Supremo had 
assigned nearly half of the army's effective strength for the city's defense. The seven 
divisions, including two possessing armored forces, presented the Germans with a 
severe problem. Just two Nazi divisions were at hand to engage this force, and OBS 
worried that they could not simultaneously capture Rome and fend off a nearby 
322D'Este, Bitter Victory, 38. 
323Erlc Morns, Salerno: A Military Fiasco (New York: Stein & Day, 1983), 
56-59. 
324"HGPD War Diaries, 2 Pz. Rgt., (9.11.42-15.9.43)," 10.9.1943. 
325J. Lee Ready, The Forgotten Axis: Germany's Partners and Foreign Volunteers 
in World War II Gefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1987),335-36. 
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invasion.326 Kesselring had long argued in vain for the transfer of the Italian 
garrison of Rome and the Alpini Division in north Italy to the poorly-defended 
beaches of southern Italy. The Italian 7th Army had thinly screened invasion sites 
since early September, using its 5th Infantry Division and three underequipped coastal 
defense divisions.327 
Fortunately for the Germans, Italian intelligence provided army 
commanders with an inaccurate estimate of the forces arrayed against them. The Jrd 
Panzergrenadier Division, the keystone of Kesselring's plan, deployed only three 
command tanks instead of the one hundred and fifty credited them by Italian 
intelligence officers.328 Moreover, an unexpected airborne landing at Monte Rotondo 
by the zUI Battalion of the German Fallschirmjiiger Regiment 6 captured Italian army 
headquarters, further confusing the situation.329 
Italian forces defending Rome not only oumumbered their German foes, 
they were better equipped. TheAriete Armored Division had been outfitted with 
newly-issued tanks and self-propelled guns that easily matched German armored 
326Westphal and Humboldt-Dachroeden, "Reinforcement of the German 
Army," 7-8; Siegfried Westphal, "Chapter 7 The Army Group's Appreciation," 
Kesselring 9/24/117 (LHCMA, 1947), 1-3; Klinkowstroem, "Italy's Break-away," 6; 
Ceva and Rochat, "Italy," 594-95. 
327Westphal and Humboldt-Dachroeden, "Reinforcement of the German 
Army," 7-8. 
328MacGregor Knox, "The Italian Armed Forces, 1940-3," in Military 
Effoctiveness, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1988),3: 157. 
329Edwards, German Airbome Troops, 116-17. 
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vehicles then fighting in Italy. Commanded by the respected General Raffaele 
Cadorna, the Italians gave the 3rt! Panzer grenadier Division a hard time on September 
8-9. 
Badoglio's actions after the surrender seriously undermined what began 
well. His failure to move boldly in the chaos that followed the surrender caused 
command to devolve upon his subordinates. Ambrosio did not know details of the 
plans, having assigned that responsibility to General Mario Roatta. Command of the 
armored corps defending Rome rested upon General Giacamo Carboni. This officer 
not only held a field command during these critical days. He also oversaw SIM, 
Italian Military Intelligence, which had badly bungled estimates of German strength 
around Rome. None of these officers exerted their authority while the highly 
complex situation unraveled around them. Instead, intrigue ruled as each distanced 
himself from the developing fiasco and escaped the angry Germans. 330 
Carboni defended Rome until ordered to cover the governmental transfer to 
Tivoli and then south to Bari. Many Italian soldiers quit their units in the Rome 
area, but others put up fierce resistance along the fabled Via Appia and at Ciampino 
airfield. Badoglio later defended this dishonorable decamping from the ciry, arguing 
that maintaining communications with the Allies took priority with him. 
Nonetheless, although defending the ancient city threatened its destrUction, evading 
33OKnox, "Italian Armed Forces," 171. 
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capture by the Germans also ranked high on Badoglio's list.331 The headlong flight 
from the city later cost Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel dearly. The 
government's exodus threw the defenseless Roman populace upon the tender 
mercies of the Germans and their Fascist allies, who claimed their pound of flesh as 
retribution for events since that July.332 The abandonment of the city, which 
undermined the remaining small measure of legitimacy that the King and 
government possessed, contributed to the postwar problems that racked Italy.333 
The Allied invasion at Salerno boosted German efforts to capture Italy. As 
Field Marshal Kesselring noted, the landing at Salerno did not directly threaten the 
German divisions stationed deep in southern Italy. A landing at Rome, supported by 
Allied airborne troops, might have joined with Italian divisions resisting the 
Germans and taken the ancient Italian capital. The two understrength German 
divisions engaged there would have been isolated and without reinforcements from 
northern or southern Italy. Had Allied troops captured the Alban Hills, the two key 
roads south would have been cut, and the entire German force locked in mortal 
combat at Salerno would have found itself trapped at the base of the Italian boot.334 
The immediate consequence of conceding Rome to the Germans was the 
331Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, 81-82. 
332Domenico, Italian Fascists on Trial, 11,47-48. 
333Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, Total War, 406. 
334Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 14,23; Westphal 
and Humboldt-Dachroeden, "Reinforcement of the German Army," 2. 
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loss of communications with and transportation for the Italian army. Rome served 
as the focal point of the Italian communications net, and its loss meant that already 
mystified field commanders found themselves without instructions or any means of 
clarifying their situation. Moreover, loss of the central rail office in Rome kept 
Italian army units from concentrating and taking action. Like a victim struck with a 
malady simultaneously assaulting several lobes of the brain, the Italian army fell to 
pieces as it lost its faculties of speech and movement.33S 
Westphal acted on Kesselring's behalf in overseeing negotiations for Rome's 
surrender. Lieutenant Colonel Giaconne of the Centauro Armored Division 
represented General Carboni. Concerns over the extent of Carboni's command of the 
divisions at Rome slowed consultations. The German representative guaranteed fair 
treatment of Italian troops, although nothing was said about their internment and 
forced labor in Germany. Worried about possible unrest in Rome or an Allied 
landing at Ostia, Westphal asked that Italian forces pledge that they would prevent 
Rome from falling into Allied hands. In return, Westphal promised not to attack the 
city, nor permit reprisals against Rome's inhabitants, something forgotten later when 
Rome was again firmly in German hands.336 
33SKari Theodor Koerner, "Rail Transportation Problems in Italy," OCMH 
MS # D-010 (1947), 6-7. 
336"Verhandlung uber die Einzelheiten der Aufforderung an ital. mot-Korps 
zur Waffenniederlegung bzw. Anschluss an deutsche Truppen," RH19 X 
(Heeresgruppe C), Band 6, Ob. Sud: Abkommen zwischen dt. OB Sud und dem 
BeEd.ital. Truppen LRom v. 10.9.43 (BAMA: Microfiche), 1-3. 
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OPERATION ACHSE provided the Wehrmacht with its 'last victory.' 
Kesselring's forces captured 126,634 men and a vast amount of war material. 88,285 
small arms, 13,850 machine guns, 364 mortars, 247 artillery pieces, 232 antiaircraft 
guns, sixty-one antitank guns, 159 flame-throwers, 213 armored fighting vehicles, 
fifty-seven armored cars, 257 scout cars, and 1,516 trucks were seized. Horses and 
donkeys, fuel and motor oil, 30,000 tons of munitions, and a variety of other useful 
equipment also fell into German hands.337 
On September 19, Rommel reponed that his men had captured more than 
13,000 officers and 402,600 enlisted men. An astonishing number, some 183,000, 
had already been shipped to Germany and shortly thereafter would be working as 
slave labor. Rommel's discovery of stockpiles of military equipment especially galled 
him, given previous complaints by Comando Supremo that its cupboard was bare.338 
Offsetting this captured booty was the Italian fleet's escape. Nonetheless, 
the German navy commandeered the cruisers Bolzano and Taranto, destroyers Zeno, 
Corazziere and Maestrale, torpedo-boats Ghibli, Lira, Procione, Cascino, and Montanari, 
as well as numerous smaller ships during the Italian navy's capitulation. German 
naval crews later repaired and outfitted many of the ships for service.339 
337Der Oberbefehishaber Slid Flihrungsabteilung Ie-EntwUrf, "Bericht liber 
das Ergebnis der Entwaffnungs-Aktion und die Haltung der Italiener im Bereich 
O.B. Slid," RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), Band 12, OB Slidwest 18.Juni 1943-
23.Februar 1944 Abt. Ie (BAMA: Microfiche),204-05. 
338Fraser, Knight's Cross, 444-45, 450. 
339Kurowski, Kampffild Mittelmeer, 16. 
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The final tallies made in December recorded a wealth of useful material. 
330,064 sidearms, 16,236 pistols, 13,906 machine pistols, 1,285,871 rifles and 
carbines, 39,007 machine guns, 8,736 mortars, 1,173 antitank guns, 1,581 antiaircraft 
guns, and 5,568 artillery pieces were added to the German inventory. German 
officials also discovered more than 500 tons of rubber, 24,450 tons of various 
chemicals and compounds for production, and 16,150 tons of metals suitable for war 
production. These items helped equip German and satellite forces as well as swelling 
the production of war materials in Italy and Germany.34O 
Nonetheless, it would bea mistake to describe the results of OPERATION 
ACHSE as an unadulterated German triumph. Propaganda Minister Joseph 
Goebbels portrayed the surrender as an act of moral cowardice and treason on the 
part of Italians, a line of reasoning that many Germans found all too comfortable and 
one central to Germany's postwar interpretation of September's events. But German 
officials at home and in Italy seriously erred when they mistakenly equated the 
Italian armed forces' collapse with the surrender of Italy itself. Although severely 
traumatized by events, some Italians immediately took up arms against the Germans 
and resisted the terrible catastrophe that had befallen their nation. This national 
mood of resistance slowly grew and matured until the war's end in May, 1945, when 
340nZusammenfassung der im Sept. bis Dez. 1943 durch die H.Gr.D, 
Ob.Siidwest und Ob.Siidost aus der Entwaffung der ital. Wehrmacht als erfasst 
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Italians could take pride in their fight for Italy's freedom and national honor.341 
ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ITALY 
Conquest of Italy opened the door for the exploitation of the Italian 
economy. This new asset was an important addition to German war production. 
German production as a share of world industrial capacity in 1939 totaled 10.7%. 
The Italian portion amounted to 2.7 percent. Although the Allied coalition that 
existed in 1943 represented 70 percent of world industrial capacity, the addition of 
Italian production represented a potential 25 + percent increase in the German 
industrial base.342 
This welcome gain arrived at a vital moment for Germany. On September 8, 
Hider had assigned Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, complete 
authority to reorganize the German war economy. He was to rationalize production, 
using large numbers of foreign workers in German industry in the place of native 
workers, many of whom were drafted into the expanding Wehrmacht. In addition, as 
shall be seen, Speer concentrated arms production in Germany and shifted the 
341RudolfLill, "NS-Deutschland als BesatzUngsmacht in Italien," in 
Deutschland - Italien 1943-1945: Aspekte einer Enrzweiung, ed. Rudolf Lill, Reihe der 
Villa Vigori: Deutsch - italienische Studien (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1992), 2; Luigi Vittorio Ferrais, "Die Italiener zwischen Faschismus und 
Demokratie," in Deutschland - Italien 1943-1945: Aspekte einer Enrzweiung, ed. Rudolf 
Lill, Reihe der Villa Vigori: Deutsch - italienische Studien (Tiibingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 1992),35-36; Petersen, "Deutschland und Italien 1939 bis 1945," 
114. 
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manufacture of consumer goods to occupied states.343 
A 'Commissioner of the Reich Minister for Armament and War 
Production,344 oversaw Italian affairs. That official, subordinate to the Reich 
Ministry, worked hand-in-hand with the OKW Plenipotentiary General of the 
German Armed Forces in Italy. Speer's representative was assigned to work with 
Italian officials and industry. This announcement did not mean that Italy would 
supply German forces fighting there. Instead, Italy was to be integrated into the 
German war economy. The requirements of German forces fighting in Italy would 
be supplied from the entire war effort, not just from the Italian industrial base. 
Although Kesselring fought to change this, he failed in the short term. Speer's 
ministry continued this inefficient production scheme until 1944.345 
Hitler organized the administration of occupied Italy during a conference on 
September 12, 1943. Gauleiter Franz Hofer of the Tyrol took control of Italy south to 
Verona. His counterpart in Carinthia, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, became administrator 
of Venezia and Trieste. Hitler stipulated that Speer retain authority over industrial 
production in Italy. 
343Tagebiichervonjoseph Goebbels, 9/II:447; OronJ. Hale, "Notes on 
Discussions with Keitel and Jodi. 26 July 1945," Government Service, War 
Department, Historical (Schuster) Commission Interrogation of Former German 
Officials, University of Virginia Special Collections (Charlottesville, Va.: Alderman 
Library), 2. 
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Hitler confirmed Speer's responsibility for Italian economic matters the 
next day, despite the daring liberation of Mussolini by German commandos.346 
Little more than lip service would be paid to the Fascist state in matters affecting 
control of Italy's industrial plant. Speer's Ministry controlled production in 
occupied Italy and directed the economy of the AlpenvorIand and Adriatic coastal 
region. The economic exploitation of Italy followed a path similar to that blazed in 
France. TheAWP assigned administrative responsibility to Italian industrialists, 
who then organized committees that planned output, distributed raw materials, and 
set deadlines for production targets. Italian businessmen were permitted a modicum 
of control in the hope that this would maximize production.347 
General Dr. Hans Leyers led theA WP staff in Italy. His organization 
undertook three tasks. First, Italian industry should be adapted, integrated, and 
correlated with German war production. Second, Italian production facilities were to 
be kept from enemy hands where possible. Third, the A WP mission was to seize raw 
materials from Italian stockpiles and see that they were returned to Germany, where 
these items were in short supply.348 
346 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Clara Winston and Richard 
Winston (New York: Macmillan, 1970),308,549; DeutschIands Riistung im Zweiten 
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Leyers used the Italian business community effectively, even though its 
sympathies lay with a quick end to the war and an Allied victory. He discovered that 
preservation of their holdings guided most Italian businessmen. Their plants had 
not yet fully geared up for war production, and the German occupation offered them 
the chance to recoup losses incurred by the Italian government's failure to pay war 
contracts. However, their workers openly detested the German occupiers, which 
made cooperation with A WP a dangerous choice for the industrialists. 
Despite this, it quickly became clear thatAWP offered Italian 
manufacturers several advantages. Germany was the only possible source of 
contracts that would keep labor at work and provide a measure of social peace. 
Moreover, many A WP officials had long standing ties with Italian industry and 
protected it against arbitrary transfers of plants, equipment, and critical workers to 
Germany, as well as insulating the owners against Fascist attempts to replace factory 
management with party hacks. As long as factories met production quotas, A WP 
officials protected Italian factory owners.349 
Three immediate and serious problems confronted German officials 
concerned with getting Italy's factories up and running. Shortfalls in coal supplies 
and other vital raw materials, the disruption of transportation, and the delicate state 
of German control in Italy stymied initial efforts aimed at quickly restoring Italian 
349Leyers, "Italian War Production," 32-38. 
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indus trial production.35o 
Italy had long been dependent on its ally for specialized raw materials. 
Shortages of chemicals and metals necessary for arms and munitions production 
limited the restoration of the Italian war economy. In addition, transport needed to 
make good critical shortages in such items constantly competed with pressing 
military requirements, given the sad state of the Italian rail and road net.3S1 
Italian railroads required immediate attention. A survey of the rail net 
revealed choke points at the Po River bridges and railway junctions, which, though 
few in number, appeared especially vulnerable to attack. Communications with 
central Italy rested on the maintenance of two mountain railways, lined with 
numerous bridges and narrow track ways exposed to air attack. 
Marshaling yards at Rome and Florence offered inviting targets that would 
provide determined attackers with high returns for their efforts. Allied researcher 
Solly Zuckerman's team of operational analysts reached this same conclusion in 
December 1943, after studying the paralysis of Sicily and southern Italy by similar 
3S0Kesseiring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 21; Technical 
Control Economic and Financial Branch Field Information Agency, Commission for 
Germany (B.E.) B.A.O.R., "Report of Examination of Reichsminister Albert SPEER 
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Report No. 42," Government Service, War Department, Historical (Schuster) 
Commission Interrogation of Former German Officials, University of Virginia 
Special Collections (Charlottesville, Va.: Alderman Library, 15 September 1945), 
9-10; Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis und Ausbeutung," 649. 
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Munitions Production," NARA Microfiche Publication MI035 Fiche 0009, Foreign 
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attacks on Naples, Foggia, San Giovanni, Reggio, Palermo, and Messina. German 
planners were fortunate that this study did not reach Allied commanders during 
operations in September and October 1943, when an aerial assault inspired by 
Zuckerman might have seriously diminished German forces' ability to hold off 
Allied ground assaults.352 
As part of planning for OPERATION ACHSE, the Wehrmachts-Verkehr-
Direktion Cw. V.D.) or Directorate of Transportation for the Armed Forces, assumed 
control of railroad operations, drafting 10,000 men from the armed forces and 
German National Railways. The lack of resistance by Italian railway workers during 
the takeover and their subsequent service until May, 1945 materially assisted the 
W. V.D. German administrators operated from Verona with a branch station at 
Florence. They assigned their men and machines the task of rapidly upgrading 
Italian rail capacity.353 
Despite raw materials shortages and transportation bottlenecks, A WP 
officials implemented their plans to exploit Italy in September and October 1943. 
They transferred 4,800 tons of machine tools and other production equipment, as 
well as 68,200 tons of raw materials, back to Germany between 15 September and 31 
October 1943. Moreover, the requisitioning of 97,700 tires from Italy alleviated a 
352Koerner, "Rail Transportation Problems in Italy," 7-8; Mark, Aerial 
Interdiction, 95. 
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211 
shortage of vehicle tires across the Reich.354 
German surveys uncovered a hoard of raw materials supplied to Italian 
industry, but still in warehouses. Leyers thought Italian industry had stored the war 
materials hoping to begin manufacturing operations immediately after the war 
ended. The lack of centralized controls on the distribution and use of raw materials 
had reduced Italian output, something that German officials corrected upon taking 
over the Italian industrial base.3S5 
The Italian surrender further benefitted the German war economy by 
bringing large numbers of Italian civilian workers and military internees under 
direct German control. By 1943, German officials had become well schooled in 
training of large numbers of unskilled foreign laborers from Ukraine and other 
occupied areas and quickly turning them into effective factory workers.356 
Nonetheless, the problem of securing foreign workers worsened during the 
spring of 1943 after Germany's defeat at Stalingrad and the intensification of the 
Allied air campaign against German cities. Speer shifted his plans for the war 
354Deutschlands Riistung im Zweiten Weltkrieg,308. See Chart V-3 for statistics 
from September 1943 until September 1944. 
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economy, making adjustments to compensate for the labor shortage. Starting in 
June 1943, he transferred consumer production from German factories to facilities in 
occupied Europe. This eased the twin problems of workers' unwillingness to either 
move to or work for Germany, if that meant manufacturing arms. The creation of 
'blocked factories' (Sperrbetriebe or S-betriebe), plants protected from drafts for forced 
labor in Germany, first in France, Belgium, Holland, and later in Italy, helped Speer 
avoid conflict with an increasingly restive workforce and freed up German 
production for military ourput.3S7 
Italy was a special case, providing the Reich with both voluntary and forced 
laborers. Italian economic officials had not subjected Italian workers to centralized 
labor control before the German takeover in September 1943. Speer mobilized 
Italian workers with the same aggressive efficiency that he did Italian factories and 
resources. He reaped enormous benefits, and drove German production levels to 
new heights by using Italian military internees in arms production. Speer regarded 
Italian soldiers not as prisoners of war protected by the Geneva Convention, but as 
internees who could not refuse his demands that they labor in arms factories, as did 
Russian prisoners. Speer's testimony at Nuremberg documented that 400,000-
3S7IMT, XVI:459-60; Eleanor Hancock, The National Socialist Leadership and 
Total War 1941-5 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991),95; Edward R. Zilbert,Alben 
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600,000 Italian military prisoners were drafted for this work.358 
And work they did. Laboring under conditions severe enough to evoke pity 
from Russians living near them, 40,000 died before the war concluded in May 
1945.359 The deaths resulted from Italian military internees working in an 
environment similar to and under regulations like those that forced concentration 
camp inmates to work. Speer did not hesitate in requesting Keitel's assistance in 
enforcing stringent rules against the Italian internees. Both guards and workers 
were severely punished when caught malingering. Speer also wanted attacks on 
German co-workers to be regarded as capital offenses.360 
Italian and other slave laborers provided a much needed measure of support, 
which helped delay the day of reckoning for the German war economy. The 
importance of Italy's retention can be seen in that of 2.5 million foreign laborers 
recruited or forced into work between early 1943 and May 1945,600,000 were Italian 
military prisoners. As labor historian Ulrich Herbert notes, "By the summer of 
1944,46 per cent of all agricultural workers and a third of the workers in mining, the 
metal industry, chemical and construction were foreigners. Foreign forced labor had 
358IMT, XVI:451-52; Mueller-Hillebrand, Gennany and Its Allies, 73; Ulrich 
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become the backbone of the German war economy.,,361 
The value of the Italian addition to production came into focus that fall 
1943. As the Italian contribution grew, strategic plans for the first time included 
efforts to retain major production facilities. Italian production also made the defense 
of Italy possible after transportation difficulties with Germany led to Italian 
factories's output going directly to the support of that front. 362 
DEFENDING ITALY 
The German army did not display tactical brilliance during the Italian 
campaign. Fortunately, it did not need to. Here, as upon the Russian front, Hitler's 
divisions engaged in a protracted struggle employing a rigid defensive line. In so 
doing, the Fuhrer's men relived the Western Front experiences of the First World 
War. The hastily-constructed defensive lines spread across the peninsula shared a 
lack of depth with similar defensive works in Russia, which would have gained 
defenders time to gather their strength and drive out penetrating forces. Unlike the 
vast steppes of Russia, the topography of the Italian mainland offered German forces 
terrain that compensated for this lack of reserves.363 
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The German defense after Salerno fell upon Kesselring's decimated 
divisions, which had suffered heavy losses among their Panzer and artillery 
formations. Moreover, German troops fought in a hostile Italy, whose population 
provided little intelligence to their occupiers. German commanders also lacked an 
intelligence infrastrUcture through which to uncover their opponents' intentions. 
Luftflotte 2's weakness prevented its few reconnaissance aircraft from penetrating into 
Allied-held regions because its planes lacked protective fighter coverage. Poor air 
cover left German supply lines prey to marauding Allied aircraft. Likewise, the 
reassuring presence of German airmen over their much-harassed comrades on the 
ground became a rare event. 
On the other hand, Kesselring's army possessed decided advantages. Its 
ranks contained veteran officers and NCOs, who had wide-ranging combat 
experience from the tundra of Norway to the mountains of the Soviet Caucasus.364 
Moreover, German forces in Italy served under a unified command and with a 
commander in whom they had the greatest confidence. Although "Smiling Albert" 
was at times too optimistic in his outlook, his confident attitude bolstered his 
commanders' and men's morale during the campaign's worst days. 
German troops also benefitted from their superior equipment, even as the 
Wehrmacht dwindled toward ruination. Although Allied commanders often 
outnumbered their opponents, they frequently balanced out the life-and-death 
364Bidwell, "Kesselring," 281. 
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struggle by employing their material plenitude with little skill. John Ellis rightly 
highlighted the "German officer [in Italy] who complained that, though the enemy 
insisted on charging their Shermans right down the barrels of his battery of 88s, and 
were picked off one after another, he ran out of ammunition before they ran out of 
tanks. ,,365 
THE SWISS ROLE IN LATE 1943 
Swiss cooperation with. the German occupation of Italy became essential 
after the Italian surrender. German forces in Italy depended on ten rail routes 
linking Germany with Italy for their logistical support. The Brenner Pass bore the 
lion's share of almost fifty percent. The two Swiss passes ran a close second, 
supplying another thirty-eight percent of rail capacity. Seven other railroads from 
France and the Balkans furnished but twelve percent.366 Had Switzerland closed the 
lines after Italy surrendered, and had the Allies moved boldly to close the Brenner 
Line, the Germans could not have sustained their campaign in Italy. Their forces 
would have faced the unpleasant choice of withdrawing or withering on the vine. 
36S Ellis, Brute Force, xvii. Michael Doubler's perceptive work, Closing With 
The Enemy: How GIs Fought The War In Europe, 1944-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 1994) challenges the widely held belief in poor American 
military performance during the Second World War. American forces in France 
collected and disseminated detailed tactical information about German activity 
there. Doubler does not deal with that process in Italy, only mentioning the 
development of Close Air Support (CAS) after Anzio. A similar study of how 
American intelligence processed and delivered tactical information on the Italian 
front has not been done. 
366Mark, Aerial Interdiction, 91. 
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Swiss officials accommodated German needs rather than move decisively to 
the Allied side at that time. Some Swiss forces mobilized to head off any risk of a 
sudden German or Fascist Italian move against their nation, but the disruption to 
Switzerland and its economy remained minimal.367 Despite the worsening Axis 
situation, Switzerland's industry afforded the German war economy substantial 
support until growing Allied pressures and the clear trend in German fortunes 
reversed Swiss policy in late 1943. In December, 1943, Bern judged a shift of policies 
in its best interest and reduced exports of vital war material and foodstuffs to 
Germany by some sixty percent.368 These policies, however, left a lingering bad 
feeling among groups that suffered under German occupation and contributed to the 
groundswell of opinion that arose in the 1990s demanding Swiss reparations for the 
extensive aid rendered Germany during the Second World War. 
EXTRACfING THE COST: THE DEFENSE OF ITALY, FALL 1943 
After Salerno, Kesselring's men conducted a delaying action as they fell 
back from the battlefield. His engineers destroyed railroads, roads, and bridges, 
slowing the pursuing Allied forces. Allied divisions again encountered strong 
resistance across the Sorento Peninsula, north of Battipagiia, and along the Ofanto 
river. The German willingness to offer battle to the Allied spearheads stemmed from 
367Kurz, Geschichte der Schweizer Armee, 168-69. 
368Denis J. Fodor, The Neutrals (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1982),58; 
Helmreich, "The Diplomacy of Apology," 26-28. 
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the need to delay Allied advances long enough to allow German engineers the chance 
to demolish Naples' port district and to wreck roads and railroads. Kesselring hoped 
that the destruction would prevent the Allies from quickly driving deep into the 
plains of Campania. 
The German 10th Army would thereafter defend the line of the Voltumo 
river. If Allied forces breached this line, German troops would then pull back to the 
G or Gusta1J Line, which ran along the Garigliano River and included the strong 
position of Cassino. Kesselring, knowing the innate strength of this final defensive 
line, ordered engineers to develop strong points along the river from which his 
defenders might dominate attackers.369 
THE EVACUATION OF CORSICA AND SARDINIA 
In August 1943, American commanders agreed at Quebec to the capture of 
Corsica and Sardinia. 370 Churchill hoped that the Italian garrisons on the islands 
would assist in disarming or defeating the German troops stationed there. 371 
The Germans did not believe that they could hold the islands, given their 
troops' poorly-fortified state, and the impossibility of resupply from the mainland. 
369Kesselring et al., German Version oitke Italian Campaign, 15-16. 
370pogue, Organizer of Victory, 243-44. 
371Winston S. Churchill, "C.C.S. 341/1 - 693-3 10 September 1943 "Combined 
Chiefs of Staff - Review of the Strategic Situation in Light of the Italian Collapse" 
(From ABC 384 Italy (9 Sept 43))" (George C. Marshall Research Library, 
Lexington, VA), 3-7. 
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Italian forces on Sardinia possessed few tanks, and the men assigned to coastal 
defense units were elderly reservists. Moreover, units defending Sardinia would be 
cut off from replacements. Defenders would fight without resupply owing to the 
absence of suitable shipping and the difficulty of unloading at the island's wrecked 
harbors. Even if men and supplies reached the island, the battered railway system 
could not support a major effort, despite exertions by German engineers that 
included shipping additional rail engines and cars to the island. If by chance men, 
supplies, and dock space could be found, the attempt still might flounder given the 
unrelenting assaults of Allied air forces.372 
The evacuation of Sardinia and Corsica had been foreseen and became a 
major concern as the invasion of Italy made the islands untenable. The fate of the 
nearly 50,000 German defenders on Sardinia and 4,000 on Corsica worried Hider 
and OKWas fighting raged around Salerno. They launched efforts to evacuate 
German troops, even if that meant abandoning their military equipment.373 The 9cf' 
Panzer grenadier Division provided Sardinia's garrison. Its units stood at a high state 
of combat readiness, having received priority shipments of troops and materiel. The 
372Der Oberbefehlshaber Siid Fiihrungsabteilung., IIBeurteilung der Lage auf 
den Inseln Sizilien, Sardinien und Korsika," 46-47; Rintelen, "Beurteilung der 
derzeitige Kampfkraft der italienischen Wehrmacht," 46-50; Seibt, "Stockpiling 
Supplies for Sardinia and Sicily," 3-4; Rohden, "German Air Force in the 
Mediterranean," 10-12. 
3730bM Conference, 26-28 July, 1943,368-69; TagebUchervonJoseph Goebbels, 
9/II:460-61; Ralph Mavrogordato, IIHider's Decision on the Defense of Italy,U in 
Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1960), 
313. 
ReichsfUhrer-SS Brigade defended the craggy southern coastline of French Corsica. 
The High Command had reinforced its units after aerial reconnaissance in late 
August and early September revealed that the islands might be the next Allied 
targets.374 
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OPERATION ACHSE dictated that the 9rJ" Panzergrenadier Division 
evacuate Sardinia by falling back to Corsica. Naval staff officers estimated that this 
movement would require between ten and fourteen days.37s German forces would 
then retire to the Italian mainland, using sea and air transport. When orders arrived 
on September 9 to executeACHSE, forces on Sardinia escaped as planned. Marshal 
Badoglio sought Allied help during the German evacuation from Sardinia and 
Corsica. Allied forces could not offer assistance, and the fighting rested primarily on 
Italian shoulders.376 The division commander, General Lungershausen, negotiated 
an agreement with the Italian command of the Maddalena naval base that forestalled 
further attacks against his forces as they crossed between the two islands, 
threatening to employ force to ensure his forces' safe transit. Hider's order to 
recover his last gift to Mussolini, a complete set of Nietzsche's books, almost scutded 
the arrangement. Only after German officers searched the rooms in which Mussolini 
374Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 7-8. 
37sObM Conference, 9-11 August, 1943,381-82. 
376Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, 101-02. 
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was thought to be held did the retreat conclude.m 
Corsica was a different story. Fighting erupted as the German exodus got 
underway. Corsican guerillas, supported by French forces landing on the island's 
western side, attacked the departing Nazi formations. Despite originally assuring 
General von Senger otherwise, Italian troops under General Magli fought the 
withdrawing Germans, which led to several sharp encounters near Bastia. 
Nonetheless, German forces captured the harbor and embarked their men and 
equipment for Livorno, 120 kilometers away. They (Ook with them units of the 
Italian Nemho Parachute Division, which remained loyal (0 the Germans by whose 
side they had fought the past three years. 
Substantial numbers of the German and Italian forces escaped the islands on 
the Ju-52 and Me-323 air transport that created an air bridge (0 the Italian mainland, 
covered by Luftflotte 2's remaining fighters. During September and October, 1,580 
flights carried 23,192 soldiers and 618 tons of equipment back to Italy. Nearly 100 
fighters opened the way for returning German troops until driven from the air by 
intercepting Allied airmen. Heavy losses forced the evacuation to continue at night. 
Even so, when the evacuation concluded on October 5, thirty-two of the lumbering 
transports had fallen victim to marauding Allied fighters. German pilots were 
mKeitel, "Stich wort "Achse", 58-59; Anton Salzer, "Bericht iiber meine 
Tatigkeit seit den Abschluss des Waffens tills tan des Italiens mit den Westmachten 
bis zu meinen Eintreffen auf Korsika. 11. Oktober 1943," Fd. 55, Akz.3085/62, 
(IFZ), 1-4, 12-14; Kesselring et al., German Version o/the Italian Campaign, 8-9; 
Klinkowstroem, "Italy's Break-away," 6-7; Mavrogordato, "Hitler's Decision," 310. 
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fortunate that demands for air cover over Salerno tied down substantial numbers of 
Allied aircraft.378 
General Westphal, Kesselring's Chief of Staff, summed up the mystified 
attitude of many Germans who wimessed the second escape of their forces from 
Allied clutches in as many months. 
It was completely incomprehensible to us that the withdrawal of the German 
effectives from Sardinia and Corsica could have been carried out with almost 
no interference by the Allied and [sic] sea and air striking forces. This enabled 
over 30,000 soldiers with full equipment to be transferred safely to the 
mainland 379 
This second evasion of Allied forces permitted Kesselring the luxury of 
strengthening his front without stripping his rear areas of troops. The returning 
forces bought him time to slow the Allied advance, and to convince Hitler that Italy 
could be held on a line far south of that established by OKW. 
THE DECISION WHERE TO DEFEND IT AL Y 
German forces in Italy operated under a divided command structure when 
Allied forces landed at Salerno. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Army Group B ran 
operations in north Italy, while Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's OBS conducted 
378Klinkowstroem, "Italy's Break-away," 12-13; Seibt, "Evacuation of Sicily 
and Sardinia," 3; Rohden, "German Air Force in the Mediterranean," 10-12; L~ 
German Air Force, 142; Fritz Morzik, Die deutschen Transportflieger im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg, ed. Gerhard Hiimmelchen (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1966), 
119; Ruge, Der Seekrieg, 335-38; Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope, 160. 
379Siegfried Westphal, "General Westphal's Replies To Questions From L.H. 
On The Italian Campaign," Liddell Hart Papers, 9/24/149 (LHCMA, n.d.), S. 
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them further south. This disjointed arrangement worked against a swift response to 
the Allied invasion.3S0 Why did Hitler permit its existence? A variety of factors 
contributed to the adoption of this organization. Hitler and Rommel distrusted the 
Italians, believing that they would soon surrender, while Kesselring did not. This 
belief caused Hitler to favor defending Italy farther north than Kesselring thought 
necessary.381 Hitler also employed his 'divide and control' strategy in Italy, as he did 
elsewhere in his domain.382 He used the existing rivalry between the two men that 
had begun in the North African desert to prevent either man's building a strong 
personal power base.383 
Nonetheless, Hitler did not easily decide where to defend Italy. Rommel 
and Kesselring held diametrically opposed views on this matter. Rommel, fearful of 
Allied air superiority that he had experienced first-hand in North Africa, argued that 
southern Italy could not be defended. The threat of Italian treachery meant that 
forces stationed there were vulnerable to isolation and annihilation. Kesselring 
presented the Nazi dictator with a more optimistic scenario. Given the necessary 
forces, he might defeat an invasion. If that pro\"ed impossible, he would take 
advantage of Italy's mountainous terrain and conduct a lengthy fight up the 
peninsula. This plan provided advantages in that the Italian peninsula narrows in 
380Bennen, Wtra and Mediterranean Strategy, 249. 
38IFraser, Knight's Cross, 439, 440-49. 
382Bidwell, "Kesselring," 277. 
383Goebbels Diaries, 263; Winterbotham, The Wtra Secret, 112. 
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the south and holding the Allies to positions below Rome would increase Allied air 
forces difficulties in attacking southern Europe. Moreover, willingly surrendering 
Rome might fatally undermine Germany's position with its remaining allies in 
southeastern Europe. 384 
The matter thoroughly confused Hitler, who finally took Rommel's advice. 
At that time, Rommel was the more experienced field general. Kesselring had 
shown promise as a theater commander, but some of his earlier estimates had proven 
overly optimistic. Hitler obstinately refused to reinforce Kesselring when the Allies 
landed at Salerno. North Italy alone would be defended. Kesselring's forces would 
fight delaying actions and fall back upon Rommel's positions in the northern 
Apennines.385 
Developments at Salerno and after that battle's conclusion caused Hitler to 
reassess the situation. North Italy now rested firmly in his hands, and Allied forces 
had not shown that they could exploit their hard-won victory in the south. The slow 
withdrawal up the peninSUla showed no signs of becoming a German rout. When 
Kesselring proposed that his troops maintain themselves in their newly-fortified 
positions, the Field Marshal found Hitler agreeable to his proposal. Kesselring had 
not proven overly optimistic this time. Rommel had been too pessimistic in his 
384Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 34-35; Siegfried 
Westphal, "General Westphal's answer to questions," Liddell Hart Papers, 9/24/149 
(LHCMA, n.d.), 1; Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, 25-26. 
38SVietinghoff, "Assessment of the situation by the High Command as of 
August 1943," 3-8; Bidwell, "Kesselring," 280-81. 
views. Hider ordered a turnover of command to Kesselring, which took place on 
November 21, 1943. 
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The appointment of Kesselring as commander in Italy was the most 
important command assignment of the Italian campaign. Given supreme command, 
Rommel withdrawn to the northern Apennines, giving the Allies all they hoped for 
at a small cost. Designating Kesselring as commander meant that German troops 
would contest every inch of Italian soil. While they fought, Italy's industrial and 
agricultural production would fuel Hider's war. 
CONCLUSION 
Winter's arrival heralded great promise for Hider's forces in Italy. 
Although Allied forces had a secure foothold in southern Italy, the overall German 
situation was good. OPERATION ACHSE concluded with the Italian industrial 
base and the rich agricultural areas of north Italy firmly in German hands. As 1944 
began, the value of these resources rose steeply. Allied forces had not driven as far or 
as fast as their leaders had hoped. Rome remained a distant prize whose cost in 
Allied blood and resources increased daily. Kesselring's design to stalemate his 
opponents had worked out in his favor. Now he wanted to maintain this 
advantageous position for as long as possible. Allied miscalculations and blunders 
greatly eased this task. The divisions that had escaped from Sardinia and Corsica 
provided OBS with a golden opportunity to reinforce the Italian front and defend 
the vulnerable flanks of the Italian peninsula. 
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None of this had come without a struggle and the cost had been high for the 
Germans. Nonetheless, the situation in Italy as 1943 ended was far better than that 
which Hitler had expected upon Italy's surrender that September. The dictator 
would take good news wherever he could find it. 
Chart V-3 
Overview 
Evacuation Totals from the Fwi Ks employed in Italy since 1 Oct. 43 
Amounts in Tons 
Time Period FwiKI FwiK4 FwiK6 FwiK2 FwiKS FwiK8 Totals 
Oct. 43 7,893 14,407 22,300 
Nov. 43 10,430 5,711 9,270 25,411 
Dec. 43 10,156 16,533 61 2,022 41,242 70,014 
IV 43 28,479 36,651 61 2,022 50,512 117,725 
1an.44 660 5,591 5,188 1,684 9,366 22,489 
Feb. 44 933 3,466 15,793 1,859 32,709 54,760 
Mar. 44 220 4,032 23,488 2,830 18,236 16,079 64,885 
I 44 1,813 13,089 44,469 6,373 60,311 16,079 142,134 
Since employment 30,292 49,740 44,530 8,395 110,823 16,079 259,859 
April 44 650 692 8,291 1,982 11,070 17,910 40,595 
May 44 76 342 4,266 5,216 5,654 12,756 28,310 
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Chart V-3 
Overview 
Evacuation Totals from the Fwi Ks employed in Italy since 1 Oct. 43 
Amounts in Tons 
Time Period FwiKl FwiK4 FwiK6 FwiK2 FwiKS FwiK8 Totals 
June 44 519 5,236 207 34,035 14,512 54,509 
1144 726 1,553 17,793 7,405 50,759 45,178 123,414 
Since employment 31,018 51,293 62,323 15,800 161,582 61,257 383,273 
July 44 7 1,986 3,676 3,181 9,493 15,841 34,184 
Aug. 44 2,850 2,345 1,274 15,527 7,669 11,836 41,501 
Sept. 44 9,093 1,432 1,206 17,130 6,108 7,809 42,778 
III 44 11,950 5,763 6,156 35,838 23,270 35,486 118,463 
Since employment 42,968 57,056 68,479 51,638 184,852 96,743 501,736 
Source: RG242, T77 (Records of the German Armed Forces High Command, OKW Wehrwinschafts- und Riistungsamt, Roll 592: Italien 
Abtransporte Verlagerungen, Frame 1773633. 
228 
CHAPTER 6 
HOLDING THE LINE 
INTRODUCTION 
229 
Mter an arduous campaign, 1943 ended with German forces firmly in 
control of central and north Italy. Nonetheless, serious problems lay ahead. The full 
economic potential of north Italy needed to be tapped. Accomplishing this task 
required maintaining labor peace and providing factories with capable management 
that could restore production. Military problems also abounded. Defending Italy 
demanded a regular flow of supplies that Allied air forces sought to sever during 
OPERATION STRANGLE. Although the Gustav Line held throughout a series of 
flawed anempts to breach its strongest point, Monte Cassino, Allied naval forces 
could still move an invasion force deep behind the German rear, flanking 
Kesselring's defensive line. Partisan activity added to German burdens. Movement 
in undefended areas was dangerous for civilians and military alike. Roving bands of 
Italian patriots tied down large numbers of German forces as the situation developed 
ominous parallels with the 'Bandit war' raging in Yugoslavia. Hope of extracting 
substantial benefits from Italy looked bleak throughout the fall of 1943 and winter of 
1944. 
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BLOODY STALEMATE AT CASSINO 
German forces grudgingly surrendered ground as they fell back on the 
prepared positions of the Gustav Line. Initial dispositions enplaced the strongest 
units on the two coastal flanks. The formidable mountainous terrain of the Italian 
spine permitted weaker forces to hold the central sector. The western flank, where 
American forces operated, received special attention. German engineers laid out 
their defenses in depth, using the Garigliano River and nearby heights of Monte 
Camino, Monte Della Difensa, and Monte Rotondo to anchor this threatened flank. 
German commanders named their defensive position the Winter Line; Allied forces 
referred to it as the Bernhardt Line. Vietinghoffs 1 rJ" Army retained responsibility for 
defending the vulnerable Tyrrhenian Sea coast. The eastern side, with more open 
terrain that tempted Allied commanders as a place to employ their greater mobility, 
created a dilemma for Kesselring. A breakthrough here could rapidly develop into 
the loss of Italy. British mechanized and seaborne forces penetrating German 
positions might well unhinge the entire defensive line and force him to abandon the 
peninsula.386 
German troops flooded vulnerable coastal areas along the Tyrrhenian and 
Adriatic seas to compensate for their weakness. 1 r:1' Army engineers enlarged the 
Lago di Fondi in their area, while OBSW engineers inundated suitable sectors in the 
Pontinian marshes, along the Tiber river mouth, and at Grossetto and Follonica. 
386Kesselring and et al., German Version a/the Italian, 38-39. 
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Corresponding measures taken at the Po river mouth immersed large portions of the 
Adriatic coastline of north Italy. The carefully planned inundations used only fresh 
water so that salt would not prevent future cultivation.387 
TERMOLI 
British forces reinforced the German fear of flanking attacks from the sea 
when they launched a surprise assault on October 3,1943. British commandos 
landed at Termoli, bypassing German attempts to reform their defenses along the 
Biferno river. Infantry of the British xm Corps joined in the fighting. Kesselring 
worried that this landing presaged a major British effort to capture Rome. Weak 
units of the 1st Fallschirmjiiger Division held Termoli while awaiting the reinforcing 
16th Panzer Division. Heavy losses included the commander of the Fallschirmjiiger 
battalion defending the city. 
A mixup in orders impeded the arrival of reinforcements. Kesselring 
sharply criticized his subordinate, Vietinghoff, for not properly overseeing their 
movement. Many of the division's vehicles broke down in the harsh terrain, causing 
reinforcing units to arrive piecemeal and be chewed up by Allied forces. The battle 
was touch-and-go as the British defeated a determined German effort to retake 
Termoli that reached within 400 yards of the city while the British 381h Infantry 
387Kesselring et at., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 39-40; Graf 
Karl-Heinrich von Klinkowstroem, "The Italian Campaign, Ch. 10,11 trans. Janet E. 
Dewey, in Foreign Military Study MS T-Ia. (Carlisle, Pa. and Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Military History Institute and Center for Military History, [1947] 1989),2-4. 
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Brigade hastily deployed from its landing ships. After three days of bitter combat, 
lrl' Army pulled its forces back to new positions along the Sangro river. Allied 
intelligence discovered the timing of a final assault, allowing well-prepared British 
troops to defeat it and launch their own attack. Although the loss of the city and this 
strong position weakened the German defense, Kesselring learned to take personal 
charge in critical situations, a valuable lesson which he later drew on at Anzio.388 
On the western flank, the capable General Senger once more took the reins 
as commander of the XIV Panzer Korps. Having overseen the withdrawal of German 
forces from Sardinia, Senger assumed control of this sector. The forces at hand did 
not inspire confidence in him. He had two infantry divisions, the 94th and 305th, both 
defending zones larger than those normally entrusted to such units. Moreover, the 
latter division lacked the organic antitank units necessary to halt Allied armor. 
Senger's two mobile units differed greatly in quality. The 3rti Panzer grenadier Division 
consisted of Volksdeutschen enlisted from conquered Poland. Its men had tasted 
defeat too often and had long endured Nazi mistreatment of their families. The 
division's troopers now avoided combat, seeing how few of even its bravest soldiers 
388Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 227; Kesselring et al., German Version of the 
Italian Campaign, 33-34; C.M.H.Q. Historical Section, "Special Interrogation Report, 
General Richard Heidrich, Commander First Parachute Division, Commander 1 
Parachute Corps. (13 Nov 46)," u. S. Army Military History Institute Archive 
(Carlisle, Pa.), 1; Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, 112; Werthen, 16. Panzer Division, 
160-69. See also the diary entries for 3, 5, and 9 October 1943 in: Item 4/1, Personal 
Diary of Lt. Gen. C. W. AUfrey, CB DSO Me, The Italian Campaign with 5 Corps, 
11 Sept.-21 Dec. 1943, Papers ofLt Gen Sir Charles Walter Allfrey (1895-1964), 
(LHCMA). 
received promotions. The 1 srn Panzergrenadier Division provided Senger with a 
stalwart force, stationed on the key heights of Monte Faito and Monte Camino.389 
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Kesselring's forces defended a series of parallel defensive lines on the 
western side of Italy. German divisions first greeted their advancing enemies from 
the Barbara Line, which began at the Tyrrhenian Sea and covered the entrance to the 
vital Mignano Gap along Highway 6. At the beginning of November, two American 
infantry divisions, the 34th and 45th, drove forward into the Mignano Gap. While 
they negotiated the approach to Monte Rotondo and seized it, their German 
opponents extracted a high price for the meager advance. Senger received timely 
assistance in the arrival of the 29'" Panzergrenadier Division, which replaced the 
unreliable 3rt! Panzergrenadier Division. The 26th Panzer Division squeezed into a 
narrow front, ensuring that no Allied forces penetrated vital positions. By 
November 15, 5th Army gave up and pulled its ravaged divisions back to refit while 
Allied planners rethought their scheme.390 
On November 20, British forces took up the fight when General 
Montgomery's men breached the Sangro river line. Prolonged rains had raised that 
river above its flood crest, slowing their advance. When the rains persisted, the 
Sangro rose to flood stage and destroyed the bridges linking the advancing British 
forces with their logistical support. The German 65th Infantry Division received 
389Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope, 182-83. 
390lbid., 185-86. 
234 
reinforcements during the pause. Fresh troops from north Italy and a division 
shifted from the western side of the peninsula fought the assaulting British, Indian, 
and New Zealand troops to a standstill. Thirty days of hard fighting and heavy 
casualties bought but fifteen additional miles of soggy soil. 
ORTONA 
The battle for Ortona brought troops of the lS[ Canadian Infantry Division 
into combat with the remnants of the German 65th Infantry~ 1st Fallschirmjiiger, and 
9(Ji' Panzergrenadier divisions. This town of 10,000 inhabitants lay astride the coastal 
road stretching from Termoli north to Pescara. Kesselring hoped to keep Ortona's 
port out of Allied hands as well as maintain control of [his important crossroads. 
German paratroopers contested every street and house, hosing obvious avenues of 
advance with the copious numbers of automatic weapons allotted them. 
Armored vehicles found advancing both difficult and dangerous as German 
engineers demolished houses to fill Ortona's narrow streets. Machine gun fire 
pinned down the Canadian infantry before antitank weapons killed the isolated and 
vulnerable tanks. The Canadian advance often halted as booby-trapped houses 
suddenly exploded, driving the attackers to ground. German forces took advantage 
of every gap thereby created and repeatedly infiltrated back into areas already 
cleared. 
Allied artillery, always feared by German troops, proved little help 
throughout the close-in fighting. It was impossible to identify targets and delivering 
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precise bombardments upon a single target in the confusing warren of streets. The 
stout stone buildings lining Ortona's narrow avenues resisted the fire of even the 
heaviest guns supporting the Canadian advance. 
Canadians either quickly became experts in city-fighting or died. Field 
guns assisted with direct fire, gouging holes in the rubble piles and allowing armor 
to advance. Canadian infantry, stymied by fire commanding city streets, simply blew 
their way from one to another of Ortona's interconnected houses. Explosive charges 
created interior doors between neighboring homes, allowing unwanted visitors 
entrance. 
Ortona fell on December 27, although the vigorous German defense had 
drained Montgomery's men of their strength. He halted them less than ten miles 
south of Pes car a and the intended westward turn along the good road to Rome. 
While German troops suffered heavy losses, Vietinghoff found his men in good 
spirits and was proud that they had stopped the British from either taking Pescara or 
breaking through German lines. The defense had fended off the British drive and 
bought time to consolidate the German hold on Italy.391 
391Item 4/8. Ortona H.O. 1 Cdn. Inf. Div. Italy Date: 16-Feb.-1944. Papers 
ofLt Gen Sir Charles Walter Allfrey (1895-1964). (LHCMA), 1-6; Robert Wallace, 
The Italian Campaign, World War II (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life, 1978), 107-08; 
Westphal, Errinnerungen, 235-236; Heinrich von Vietinghoff, (GenOberst a.D.), "Die 
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sichtigung der Schlachten bei Salerno, am Volturno, Garigliano, am Sangro, und urn 
Cassino," Der Feldzug in Italien, Kapitel6, (1947), Box 162 (T-OOla to TOOla K1), 
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(NAn, 1947),88. 
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In early December, Sill Army resumed offensive operations, this time making 
better progress. The important heights fell as American, British, and French units 
breached the Bernhard Line and seized the all-important Mignano Gap. German 
forces gave up the contest and assumed positions in the Gustav Line, the maintenance 
of which depended upon controlling the mountains commanding the town of Monte 
Cassino.39Z 
Kesselring created a small reserve force to back up this position by depleting 
the his overstretched forces. In late December, the 71st Infantry Division transferred 
from upper Italy closer to the fighting front. The 9rr Panzergrenadier Division, which 
had provided the Adriatic front with additional muscle, also moved into reserve. 
These troops and units pulled from combat for rest and refitting, gave him a quick 
reaction force. 
OKW understood the danger that a landing behind the new line in Italy 
represented and readied forces to rush there. The 715th Infantry Division, Panzer, and 
artillery units waited in France. The 114th Jager Division would come from the 
Balkans. Forces to be sent from the Reich included the LXXV Anny Corps 
headquarters and two infantry and armored infantry training regiments, supported 
by artillery and smoke mortar training regiments. Tiger, radio-controlled tank 
battalions, and two heavy antitank battalions, would supplement forces despatched 
from Germany. Although the units assigned this task lacked combat experience and 
392Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope, 186-88. 
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would reach Italy slowly, they were nonetheless needed.393 
In mid-January 1944, Kesselring's depleted forces reported their strength to 
Berlin. Of twenty-two and one-half divisions in Italy, only twelve qualified as fit for 
combat. Three others were reorganizing, four were reforming, and one and one-half 
were suited solely for rear area security duties. An additional division handled 
training for formations engaged in combat. 10th Army mustered 150,000 men on the 
main front opposite Allied armies. 14th Army's 71,000 troops occupied north Italy 
and prepared for an Allied amphibious landing. The 24,000 men of the 1st 
Fallschirmjager Korps gave Kesselring an elite force that helped maintain the German 
grip on Monte Cassino. Forces commanded by OBSW and carried on the roles 
while wounded amounted to an additional 21,000 men. The Bevollmachtiger deutschen 
General had 5,000 men at his disposal with which to secure rear areas.394 
Kesselring and his Chief of Staff, Westphal, worried constandy about a 
possible Allied landing. An invasion behind the main line threatened OBSW with 
complete catastrophe. Its forces scarcely sufficed to hold the front and maintain 
communications with Germany. While visiting Italy in January 1944, Admiral 
Wilhelm Canaris, head ofAbwehr, German military intelligence and 
393Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 60-61. 
394lbid., 62-64; OB Siidwest Ie, "StarkverhaItnisse der in italien eingesetzten 
Verbande (15.1. 1944)," RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), Band 13 (BAMA: Microfiche), 
16. Claims that Ultra revealed a total of750,000 Germans serving in Italy just before 
the invasion at Anzio do not agree with figures received by OKW. See Bennett, Ultra 
and Mediterranean Strategy, 254. 
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counterintelligence, reassured the two officers that an Allied landing was not in the 
cards. Allied forces were busy concentrating for the invasion of France. Kesselring 
and Westphal, unable to ascertain the position of Allied amphibious forces, warily 
accepted this information and shifted all but a scant two battalions away from guard 
duty at Rome's doorstep.395 
ANZIO 
Just how wrong Canaris was became clear at 0300 hours on January 22, when 
Westphal awakened to the news of an Allied landing at Anzio. He ordered the 
immediate execution of Fall Richard, a theater-wide response to a major Allied 
landing in Italy. General Kurt Student took command at Anzio with the staff of his 
1st Fallschirmjiiger Korps (formerly the X! Fliegerkorps). Major General Malzer, 
commandant of Rome, hastily armed troops recovering from their injuries in Rome. 
Soldiers suffering from venereal diseases likewise found themselves hustled off to 
fight at Anzio. 
Jodi informed Kesselring that Hitler had authorized the Field Marshal to 
assume command of all Wehrmacht and SS formations stationed in Italy. OKW also 
promised divisions from southern France and Yugoslavia. Reserve Army forces in 
Germany swiftly loaded for rail shipment to Italy. Closer to the front, 14th Army 
dispatched the 65th Infontry Division from Genoa, the 362M Infantry Division from 
395 Albert Kesselring, "Rapido River Crossing," NARA Microfiche Publication 
MI035 Fiche 0071 Foreign Military Studies, ETHINT Series (RG 338) ETHINT 
071 (1946), 4-5; Westphal, Errinnerungen, 247-48; Irving, Hitler's War, 604-05. 
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Rimini, and the 16'" SS Panzer grenadier Division from Goerz. The meager 10th Army 
forces available also responded. Nonetheless, the road to Rome stood open for 
twenty-four critical hours. Westphal held for the remainder of his life that the 
36,000 Allied troops at Anzio could have taken the city.396 
This long-awaited Allied turning movement caught German forces ill-
prepared. Kesselring's men were engaged in heavy fighting along the Gustav Line, 
fending off an Allied assault launched during the night of January 17/18. Allied 
forces hit the thinly-held line of the 94'" Infantry Division, forcing the Garigliano 
river and turning this position, while British commandos crashed ashore behind the 
German river defenses. The fierce battle drew in German mobile reserves, tying 
them down far from Anzio's beaches. The 29'" and 9rJ" Panzergrenadier divisions 
reinforced Kesselring's crumbling front in the nick of time, but quickly spent their 
strength and could not extricate themselves for duty at Anzio. Unfortunately, three 
nights of standing ready for an imminent invasion had already tired German 
reserves throughout Italy and led Kesselring to rest them the night of the 
amphibious assault. Allied invaders found their advance contested only by resited 
German anti-aircraft batteries that normally ringed Rome.397 
396"Telegram fromJodl to OB Suedwest, 19.1.1944," 553/44 g.Kdos., RH19 X 
(Heeresgruppe C), Band 35 - Verschiedenes Jan.-Juni 1944, Bl. 35 (BAMA: 
Microfiche), 35; Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 61-62, 86; 
Westphal, Errinnerungen, 249. 
397Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 84; Kesselring, A 
Soldier's Record, 227-33; Vietinghoff, "Tla Ch. 6," 103; Klinkowstroem, "Tla Ch. 10," 
8-9,10; Westphal, Errinnerungen, 237; David M. Toczek, "The Rapido Crossing: A 
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The German ability to form Kampfgruppen (battlegroups) paid rich dividends. 
General Hans Georg von Mackensen took command of the 14ti1 Army, which 
originally consisted of the staffs of the I Fallschirmjager and LXXVI Panzer corps. 
The new army operated north of the 1 rf' Army, dividing responsibilities at a line 
drawn encompassing Terracina - Artena - west of Tivoli. Kesselring surrounded the 
dangerous protrusion in his rear with Eastern volunteer battalions guarding the 
region and hastily-improvised infantry formations, flung together from troops 
grabbed from trains while returning from furlough and Luftwafft and Marine men 
able to bear arms. These forces provided the sole means of impeding an Allied drive 
on Rome. More than one German officer later expressed his thanks at not having to 
wage war against Lucas' divisions with ad-hoc infantry formations lacking everything 
save rifles and entrenching tools.398 
Luftwaffo units engaged in their own desperate holding action. Allied air 
forces had concentrated upon German air bases prior to the landing at Anzio, 
striking at airfields as far away as southern France. The Allied air strategy hindered 
the Luftwaffo's rapid reinforcement after the invasion and eliminated air support for 
the embattled 1rf' Army. The few bombers vied with the overwhelming Anglo-
American air superiority required escorts numerically stronger than the attacking 
Battle Analysis," Infantry 83, no. 6 (November-December 1993): 18. 
398Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 233-35; Vietinghoff, "T1a Ch. 6," 104; 
Klinkowstroem, "T1a Ch. 10," 10; Siegfried Knappe and Ted Brusaw, Soldat: 
Rejlectionsofa German Soldier, 1936-1949 (New York: Dell, 1992),275-77. 
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aircraft.399 
The damage to airfields slowed the buildup of planes to support German 
defensive operations and counterattacks at Anzio. 140 bombers slowly arrived and 
conducted pinprick raids against Allied shipping. Although the Allies employed 
three specially-equipped electronic warfare ships to defend against guided bomb 
attacks at Anzio, on January 23, the II. Fliegerdi'Dision's Sonderoerbiinde sank the 
British destroyer :Janus with torpedoes, while a Hs-293 launched by the II./KG 100 
damaged its sister ship,:Jervis. Luftwaffe aircraft followed up this success on the 
night of 24/25 January by damaging the U.S. destroyer Plunkett with an Hs-293 
strike. On January 29, the British cruiser Spartan and a single merchant ship fell 
victim to Luftwaffe air raids. Nonetheless, during the first ten days of Anzio, the 
Allies lost only four ships and reported two more as damaged. The 475 Luftwaffe 
aircraft could do litde when arrayed against Allied air forces that outnumbered them 
more than five to one.400 
Kesselring did not know (hat Lucas' inactivity stemmed from the absence of 
orders other than to simply capture a beachhead and see what happened. When 5th 
Army divisions suffered bloody repulse in the south, Allied troops at Anzio no 
longer served the purpose for which they had landed. The failure to breakthrough 
399Gundelach,Die deutsche Luftwaffe im jHittelmeer 1940-1945, 763-64. 
4OOIbid., 771, 772; Cooper, German Air Force, 330-31; Ruge, Der Seekrieg, 
338-39; USAAF, ULTRA and the History oithe United States Strategic Air Force in 
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German lines at Cassino doomed the plan that Lucas' men would drive forward to 
meet Clark's advancing divisions. British and American troops did not dare drive 
their limited forces toward Rome in the face of the rapid German buildup, lacking 
the strength to challenge their opponents and accomplish the original design by 
themselves.401 
By early February, the 14th Army had concentrated its units and surrounded 
Anzio. (See Chart 6.1) The buildup had not escaped notice by Allied intelligence 
officers. Ultra intercepts revealed Hitler's decision to shift nine divisions stationed 
in the Balkans to counter the two Allied divisions ashore at Anzio. Clark and 
Alexander counseled caution to their confused battlefield commander, who operated 
out of the Ultra loop. Aware of the growing striking power available to Kesselring, 
Lucas' superiors ordered him to prepare his men for a massive German 
counterstroke. Hitler, sensing a great opportunity to injure Allied morale, had 
demanded the annihilation of the Allied position at Anzio.402 
Preparations for a counterattack finally completed, the divisions of the 14th 
Army left the start line on February 16. 'Sunny' Italy once more frustrated an 
anacker's plan, as a downpour bogged down the German advance in a sea of mud. 
The counterattack had been purposely delayed until the onset of the rainy season in 
4OlBidwell, "Kesselring," 282. 
402Blumenson, "Will 'Ultra' Rewrite History?" 47-48; David Kahn, "The 
Significance of Code breaking and Intelligence in Allied Strategy and Tactics," 
216-17,218; Irving, Hitler's War, 604-05. 
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hopes of preventing effective Allied air and naval support. Despite this wait, the 
lethal combination of overwhelming Allied firepower deployed at sea and on land 
combined with the adverse weather to crush the German assault. Nazi armor, 
confined to the roads that iaced the swampy region, became vulnerable targets. 
Other German units could not assist the assault, which halted the arrack after the 
Allies initiated their own offensive against the vulnerable German arrackers.403 A 
second assault undertaken between February 28 and March 3 similarly foundered. 
The two sides suffered losses approximating 19,000 men each, while accomplishing 
nothing. The fighting had marked out the beachhead's boundaries, which would 
remain firm until May.404 
Allied commanders breathed a deep sigh of relief when illtra revealed that 
Kesselring's final counterattack would not be repeated. Heavy rain and the expense 
of previous assaults had washed away his desire to do so. Further effort would 
merely waste good troopS.40S Moreover, his Fuhrer required combat troops that 
March to seize Hungarian industrial facilities and the oil fields at Lake Balaton. 
Hider took many of them from the 14Ua Army, rendering it impotent for offensive 
403Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, United States Army in World War 
II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1969), 
394. 
404Kesselring et al., German Version oftke Italian Campaign, 90- 91; Graham 
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purposes.406 Nonetheless, despite bloody Allied reverses at the Rapido River and 
Cassino, German officers later commented that, although they had blunted the 
Allied drive, the southern battle enticed their forces into combat and most certainly 
prevented them from pushing Allied forces at Anzio back into the sea.407 
SUPPLY SITUATION 
German lines of communications depended on the ten to twelve trains 
dispatched southward each day through the Brenner Pass. German logistical officers 
explained after the war that their forces operating in Italy could have functioned on 
as few as four and one-half trains daily. The 450 tons delivered by this small number 
of trains could sustain Kesselring's divisions. Allied air forces did not focus on the 
critical rail passes and never cut German forces off from the minimal logistical 
support necessary for their subsistence.408 
Before the dissolution of Army Group B, its quartermaster handled the 
division of supplies for the two army groups. Rommel's logisticians provisioned 
Lufrwaffo and Marine forces. Deliveries averaged 800-1,200 tons per day, forcing the 
use of trains for temporary storage until Rommel's men established permanent 
406"Sunset No. 555. 9 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, 
Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAil), 23; Irving, Hitler's War, 612. 
407Kesseiring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 81. 
4Os-rransportation Division, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 
Rail Operations Doer the Brenner Pass (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1947), 12, 13. 
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facilities around Bolzano, Merano, Verona, Lake Garda, Mantua, the Isea Lakes, 
Milan, and Laibach. Quartermasters established repair shops north of the Po River 
and east ofTessino, since they expected that most of southern Italy would be 
abandoned. Kesselring's men received urgent shipments by truck. OBS established 
its own supply bases, first depending on supplies originally shipped to support the 
North African campaign. During September 1943, OBS quartermaster troops built 
supply depots at Frosinone and Sulmona. 409 
AGB foresaw Allied operations against rail connections to France and 
Germany and wanted to store supplies for fifteen to twenty days of combat. 
Constant operations and low stocks of supplies in Germany prevented this buildup. 
By fall 1943, supply depots held a two to three day reserve of ammunition and stocks 
of motor fuel good for five to six days travel. A thirty-day store of rations had also 
been amassed. The two army groups accumulated this reserve only because Berlin 
gave the theater a high priority, shipping it stores kept in France to ward off 
invasion.410 
The supply position of German forces rested on a frail framework by the 
spring of 1944. The coastlines of the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian seas lay exposed to 
Allied and partisan attacks. Control of the air rested firmly in Allied hands, making 
409Kesseiring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 18-19. 
410Ibid.; Generalintendant Dr. Richard Plagemann, "Administrative Supply of 
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transport of supplies to the front a dangerous enterprise. The German navy 
struggled to provide minimal logistical support as its ships dashed down the coasts, 
avoiding Allied naval and air forces.411 
OPERATION STRANGLE 
As spring 1944 arrived, Allied commanders decided to break the stalemate 
in Italy by turning loose their air men on the vulnerable German lines of 
communications. Beginning on March 19, 1944, Allied air forces concentrated on 
disrupting German rail transportation. This air campaign, unique in the annals of 
warfare up to that time, sought nothing less than to defeat Army Group C by severing 
its lines of communications. Historians still debate both the effectiveness and 
results of this campaign. Nonetheless, this aerial assault on German 
communications seriously hampered operations for an extended period:H2 
4,000 Allied aircraft took part in STRANGLE, averaging 1,352 sorties daily. 
The Luftwaffe countered them with 525 planes, 200 of which were fighters:U3 This 
weakness in the air forced Lufrwafft commanders to depend on antiaircraft guns to 
neutralize the Allied aerial armada. Allied bombing missions concentrated first on 
railroads and bridges, trying to halt the rail traffic that provided the bulk of the 
411Hoppe, 278. Infanterie-Division, 7. 
412F. M. Sallagar, "Operation "Strangle" (Italy, Spring 1944): A Case Study of 
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4,000-6,000 tons shipped daily to the 1 rJh and 14/h armies. The targets were difficult 
to put out of service, with well-positioned German repair crews working furiously to 
restore damaged lines and bridges. Allied aircraft then switched targets to 
marshaling yards located at key rail centers. 
Although the new targets suffered heavy damage, German communications 
retained a high degree of redundancy, and most trains bound for Italy were 
marshaled at German yards.414 When rail traffic fell off sharply, OBSW used more 
road transport. Trucks could not compensate for the loss of train traffic. They were 
too vulnerable to air attack. Nonetheless, truck shipments, moving slowly at night, 
evaded the swarming Allied fighter-bombers that restricted daylight movement. 
Allied air forces lacked a significant night bomber force capable of making precision 
strikes against the narrow and crowded roads. Moreover, the bad weather that 
turned 'sunny Italy' into a sea of mud that spring, also impeded aerial assaults on 
German communications.41S 
Despite limiting factors, Operation Strangle worked better than earlier 
histories have credited it. Fuel and ammunition supplies diminished to levels that 
worried German commanders. Ammunition stockpiles held steady only because 
414Eduard Mark, "A New Look At Operation STRANGLE" (Office of Air 
Force History, n.d.), 3. 
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stores of Italian munitions, most not readily usable by German units, filled supply 
dumps. Stocks of munitions required for combat did drop sharply. Units entering 
the line as reinforcements brought their own stores, which they quickly used up. 
Fuel supplies also dropped to dangerous levels, rendering troop movements 
problematical. Luftwaffe forces found the situation critical enough to ground 
bomber units when inadequate supplies of aviation fuel forced a choice between air 
defense and bombing missions.416 
Why, then, did the German front not collapse with the beginning of the 
Allied spring offensive? Allied planners, although guided by Ultra intelligence, did 
not understand German logistical requirements. This lack of understanding created 
ideal conditions for the German defenders. The assault rolled forward in a series of 
independent attacks. The poorly-timed offensive allowed German logistics to 
maintain an even flow of supplies, first to the Iff' Anny, and then to the 14th Anny.417 
One factor not heretofore examined in the conduct of STRANGLE is its 
effect on the Italian economy. Although targets nearer the front remained 
STRANGLE's top priority, the constant assaults produced a rippling effect 
throughout the Italian economy. By June 1944, the wave of attacks led to a tsunami-
like impact on transportation in Italy. Heightened Wehnnacht requirements created 
obstructions from Bologna south to Florence. Vital east-west traffic throughout Italy 
416M.A.A.F. ASD, 90; Mark, "New Look," 7-13. 
417lbid., 14-15. 
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screeched to a halt as Kesselring's forces demanded an ever-increasing volume of 
supplies and reinforcements. These requirements, on top of the damage already 
inflicted to the fragile Italian railroads, caused a temporary halt to both east-west 
traffic and essential coal shipments from the Reich, which hindered German efforts 
to return the Italian war economy to full-scale production.418 
ECONOMICS 
Economic historian Dietrich Eichholtz accurately described the new 
German economic policy toward Italy as "on the one hand, the productive 
exploitation of their capacity; on the other, robbing and plundering." Albert Speer's 
right hand man in Italy, former armaments inspector Major General Hans Leyers, 
carried out this policy. Leyers carefully and energetically turned Italian industry 
into a valuable German asset. The new Italian overseer oudined his "task [ ... ] in 
Italy [as] first of all to keep the industries in upper Italy in operation and to harness 
them into the service of German armaments and war production." Taking advantage 
of Speer's sweeping powers to transfer industry threatened by air attack, Leyers 
ordered the movement of major industrial concerns located in Rome to new locations 
in upper Italy. 
Speer reported that "[t]he quick evaluation of Italian capacity for the 
German armaments potential is of absolutely decisive importance." After a cursory 
418General des Transportwesens Italien, "Beitrage zum Kriegstagebuch (fuer 
den Monat Juni 1944)," RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), Band 72 (BAMA: Microfiche),3. 
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survey, another Speer assistant, Amtschef Walter Schieber, transferred machine tools 
and vital production equipment from Alfa Romeo, Fiat, and other major Italian 
producers back to Germany. Between mid-September and the end of October 1943, 
4,800 tons of vital industrial implements moved back to the Reich.419 
The economic potential of Italy included more than robbing it of production 
tools. The Italian chemical industry stood behind only Germany and Great Britain 
among its European counterparts. Although Italy lacked domestic sources of raw 
materials, Italy possessed 7,500 producers employing 130,000 skilled workers. The 
Italian textile industry and its 600,000 workers could produce a wide array of 
urgently-needed fabrics. Aluminum production also numbered among the areas of 
strength for Italian industry. Output from Italian aluminum producers helped 
increase Lufiwaffo production. Speer's operatives rushed factories making optical 
equipment back into production, a boon to the German war effort, given that this 
sector of Italy's economy ranked second only to highly-regarded German producers. 
Strength in aircraft and aircraft engine production and naval construction also lay 
ready for tapping.420 
Nonetheless, a lack of efficient management for the Italian economy plagued 
its German overseers. German officials noted this disarray in February 1944, 
complaining that 
419Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte tier deutschen KriegswirtschaJt (Berlin: 
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There isn't any oversight concerning the extent of production and the capacity 
in the individual Italian branches of industry, especially however in the heavy 
and armaments industries, in the motor vehicle works, the electrical industry, 
as well as in the precision engineering, optical, substitute products, and most of 
all, in the textile industry.421 
The muddle required renewed efforts to harness the potential of the Italian war 
economy to support the Third Reich. 
Speer unified his control of the Italian war economy on March 14, 1944. His 
administrative rule superceded that of Rudolph Toussaint, the new Plenipotentiary 
General for Italy, whose officers and civilian officials had run Italy since the previous 
fal1.422 Despite Speer's newly-won powers, a variety of problems hurt the Italian 
economy throughout the spring of 1944. A prolonged drought reduced the output of 
Italian hydroelectric plants. The shortfall in electricity reverberated throughout the 
Italian economy, being felt most heavily in cement production. Shortages prevented 
the repair of critical plants as engineers diverted supplies for building fortifications. 
Stepped up air attacks on rail installations also hindered the war economy's smooth 
operation, further slowing production.423 
Nonetheless, by May 1944, Leyers could report that Italian industry had 
421W Stb Inland lillI, "Aktenvermerk: Betr.: Berichterstattung durch 
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1944. 1755989-1756001, (NAn), 1755989-90. 
252 
taken meaningful strides, resulting in increased production. Shipbuilders had 
constructed 10 merchant ships. Military vehicles sufficient to outfit nine units had 
been produced during April. Rubber, paper, and motor vehicle output were up and 
producing valuable quantities of useful items. Both raw steel and other metal 
production had risen measurably. Armament factories had achieved 80010 of their 
goals for the month.424 
The German war economy benefitted in other ways as Italians also paid 
direct 'reparations' to their German masters. The province of Turin alone paid 
2,198,651,474.24 lira to the Reich before the war ended:m Moreover, the fertile 
plains of the Po valley became increasingly important as German forces lost control 
of the Soviet breadbasket in the Ukraine. Nonetheless, a lack of fertilizer and 
diverting Italian agricultural laborers to Organisation Todt projects in Italy and for 
labor in the Reich caused production shortfalls.426 
Surprisingly, a German report in February 1944 noted that the 1943 harvest 
sufficed to feed both the Italian civilian population in German-occupied Italy and 
the Wehrmacht forces serving there. Nonetheless, the loss of 80 percent of the Italian 
olive oil supply from southern sources was a bitter blow that reduced the amount of 
424Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis und Ausbeutung," 688-89. 
42SKuby, Verrat aUf Deutsch, 448. The exchange rate had been set at DM 1 = 10 
Lire. 
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fat available for consumption.427 
LABOR AND PRODUCTION 
The German economic exploitation of Italy strengthened support for both 
the partisan movement and direct action by workers against the German occupation 
as Italian resentment of their nation's rape grew.428 German authorities proved as 
inept at controlling Italian workers as Mussolini's regime had been when strikes 
broke out again in December 1943 at the Mirafiori factory in Turin. Laborers in 
Genoa and Milan followed suit. At the height of the strike, nearly 50,000 men and 
women had quit their work places, shutting down much of the Italian war economy. 
Workers struck against low wages, high prices, and the threat of starvation. 
One poignant picket sign carried by workers proclaimed: 
With the exception of the Greeks, who are dying of hunger, no 
people in Europe, is being so completely exploited by the 
Germans as the Italians, not even the conquered countries. 
In comparison: 
Bread: The Germans have 286 g per day, the French 275 g, the 
Norwegians 260 g, the Belgians 224 g, the Croatians 214 g, the 
Italians 150g 
Meat: The Germans have 286 g per week, the Croatians 300 g, the 
Belgians 245 g, the French 180 g, the Norwegians 100 g, the 
Italians 100 g 
421W Stb Inland 11m, T77/Ro1l576 7.II.1944, 1754907. 
428Kuby, Verrat aUf Deutsch, 447; Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bundnis und 
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Sugar: The Germans have 225 g per week, the Belgians 230 g, the 
Norwegians 200 g, the French 125 g, the Croatians 125 g, the 
Italians 125 g 
Fat: The Germans have 206 g per week, the Norwegians 210 g, 
the Croatians 125 g, the French 110 g, the Belgians 105 g, the 
Italians 100 g 
That is the place, which the new German leadership has assigned 
Italy. Therefore you must call: HEIL HITLER !429 
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The new strikes had a more-developed and disturbing political undertone 
than seen in past episodes. Workers had added political complaints to their list of 
grievances. This sparked a swift and harsh German response. Ribbentrop 
authorized deportations and military courts for use against the laborers, allowing the 
execution of strike leaders as alleged communists. 
When the Sicherheitsdienst and German police moved to crush the strikers, 
workers mmed to the partisan movement for assistance. Partisans helped hide 
laborers facing deportation to Germany and protected strikers' families. The Italian 
resistance movement also struck direcdy at the war economy, encouraging workers 
to sabotage production and the shipment of weapons.430 
The broken strike turned workers into parmers of the partisan movement. 
The workers' strength quiedy made the Milan Comminee for N arional Liberation 
(CLN) the commanding voice among the many disparate groups resisting the 
Germans in north Italy. Aroused and organized by partisan leaders, laborers struck 
429Kuby, Verrat auf Deutsch, 448-449. 
430 Ibid., 448-449. 
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hard at those that they held responsible for the deportations and murders of workers, 
killing forty members of the Fascist squads used by German authorities to suppress 
the strike. 431 
The failed strike did not deter plans to renew opposition at a later time. A 
hoped-for mass rising in Rome did not take place when the Allies landed at Anzio. 
Although disappointed, Luigi Longo of the CLN reminded his compatriots that 
previous work stoppages had demonstrated that workers possessed the ability to halt 
or sabotage war production. Communist leaders pressed again for a general strike in 
north Italy to be held in February 1944. Longo strongly felt that German repression 
and atrocities had turned public opinion against the occupiers.432 
Renewed calls for strikes in late February 1944 led to lock-outs the 
following month. Labor leaders saw the new strike as a test of their growing political 
strength. Nonetheless, most Fiat workers reported for their regular shifts. Having 
experienced the German response to the previous round of work stoppages, they took 
seriously threats to arrest and deport them to Germany. Laborers at many other 
factories answered the call and shut down production.433 
Labor and resistance leaders succeeded in stopping city buses and halted 
rail traffic between Turin and Milan. Although shortages of electricity had already 
431 Kuby, Verrat aUf Deutsch, 449-450. 
432Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bundnis und Besatzung, 283-284. 
433Kuby, Verrat aUf Deutsch, 4S 1; Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bundnis und 
BesatzUng, 287, 288. 
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immobilized many industrial plants, German reprisals began at once. SS police and 
Italian Fascist squads arrested and deported workers beginning March 4. Hitler 
ordered the deportation of twenty percent of the strikers. His plans unraveled when 
his ambassador to Mussolini, Rudolf Rahn, pointed out that the reprisals would 
result in the very goal sought by both labor and partisan leaders. War production 
could not continue if so many skilled workers were suddenly snatched away from 
their factories.434 
Despite strenuous efforts to disrupt production, many factories slowly 
returned to operation, even as living conditions further deteriorated. In April 1944, 
German authorities again cut rations. Basic allotments per month declined to 600 
grams of meat, two kilos of rice or pasta, and 300 grams of fat, oil, or cheese.435 
Nonetheless, although workers did not win an amelioration of their living 
conditions, the mass work disruptions of February and March demonstrated to 
Germans the degree of opposition growing among Italians, resistance containing a 
strong anti-Fascist tone that bode ill for the furure.436 
Despite the disruptions, the German exploitation of the Italian economy 
paid large dividends. Speer's plan for using the productive capacity of occupied 
states to manufacture consumer goods found fertile ground in Italy. By March 1944, 
434Kuby, Verrat auf Deutsch, 452; Klinkhammer, Zwischen Biindnis und 
Besarzung, 288, 295, 297. 
435Kuby, Verrat auf Deutsch, 453. 
436Klinkhammer, Zwischen Biindnis und Besatzung, 303. 
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purchases of shoes, cases, and various leather goods, including shopping bags, had 
risen to a level of more than RM 10 million. German agents had acquired more than 
RM 300 million worth of textiles, 30 percent of which had already been transshipped 
to the Reich.437 Later valuations estimated the worth of business done in Italy from 
the conquest until July 31,1944 at RM 1,989,100,000. Of this, arms production 
totaled RM 1,071,000,000, or fIfty-four percent of orders. Consumer goods amounted 
to RM 870,600,000, or forty-four percent of orders placed.438 
Close inspection clearly demonstrates the increasing value of the Italian war 
economy to the overall German war effort. Despite labor unrest, material shortages, 
and partisan attacks, Italian factories contributed substantially to the steadily rising 
industrial output of the Third Reich, even as Allied air attacks rained destruction 
down upon German cities and production sites. As will be seen, the value of this 
contribution did much to sustain the German war effort until the collapse of coal 
deliveries fInally destroyed this vital cog in the vast German war enterprise. 
GERMAN ATROCITIES AND THE ITALIAN HOLOCAUST 
Mussolini had long vacillated between a policy of seeking Jewish goodwill 
and launching attacks on Italian Jews. This awkward scheme worsened after Adolf 
437W. A. Boelcke,Die Deutsche Wirtschaft 1930-1945: Intema des 
Reichswirtschaftsministeriums (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1983), 319; Rieder, "Zwischen 
Biindis und Ausbeurung," 676. 
438Ibid., 693-695. See Chart VI-I for a chart breaking down the orders by 
category and rank. 
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Hitler's accession to power in January 1933. A trial of anti-Fascists opposed to 
Mussolini's regime concluded on March 30, 1934 with the conviction of seventeen 
men, a majority of whom were Jews. Mussolini sharpened the anti-Semitic elements 
of his ideology in late 1934 when the International Fascist Congress at Montreux 
adopted a resolution condemning the Jews, and again in 1938 and 1939, when a 
series oflaws and decrees placed restrictions on the Italian Jewish community 
similar to those already grieving German Jews.439 
Nonetheless, Italian Jews lived a protected existence when compared with 
their European counterparts. The Fascist regime did not seek to destroy the Jewish 
community, which antagonized Nazis engaged in the 'Final Solution.' The saferyof 
Italy's Jews ended with the Italian surrender in September 1943. German officials 
quickly took advantage of their newly-won power in Italy. Herbert Kappler exacted 
a payment of fifty kilograms of gold from Rome's Jewish community that month. 
The city's chief rabbi, Israel Zolli, paid the sum after the Vatican agreed to loan gold 
if needed. Nonetheless, this payment bought small compensation as deportations of 
Roman Jews to Auschwitz began on October 16, 1943. Although 7,000 Roman Jews 
escaped the roundup, only fifteen of 1,007 deportees in the initial group survived the 
439N ora Levin, The Holocaust: The Destruction of European jewry 1933-1945 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968),459-460,462-463; Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: 
The Fate of European jewry, trans. Ina Friedman and Haya Galai (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990),422. 
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death camp.440 
German disappointment at the failure of their first efforts turned into close 
attention to the presence of some 35,000 Jews living in north Italy. A methodical 
drive to destroy this widespread community met with limited success. Once more, 
Italians assisted their friends and neighbors in escaping the clutches of SS and 
Fascist police. Even the transfer to Italy of experienced Nazi operatives, who would 
direct the effort, met with muted results. While mass transports to Auschwitz and 
other extermination camps began in March 1944, best estimates are that fewer than 
10,000 of the Italian Jewish community died there. 44\ 
Italian Jews did not suffer alone. Their compatriots, many of whom worked 
ro save the Jewish community, joined them in large numbers.44! Atrocities against 
Italians began soon upon the heels of the Allied landings in Italy. On September 12, 
1943, a unit of German paratroopers robbed a jewelry store at Matera, fifty miles 
northwest of Taranto. A firefight with the local Carabinieri ensued, during which 
two Germans were killed. German soldiers responded by executing fifteen Italians 
with explosives in the local Militia barracks. Other German troops went ro the local 
440 From Hitler's Doorsteps: The Wartime Intelligence Repons of Allen Dulles, 
1942-1945, ed. Neal H. Petersen (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1996), 187-188; Levin, Holocaust, 465; Owen Chadwick, Britain and 
the Vatican during the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986),288; Yahil, Holocaust, 424-425. 
441Levin, Holocaust, 467. 
442Lamb, War in Italy, 55. 
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power station and ordered the workers to leave the premises. After they had 
complied, German soldiers opened fire on them, killing four.443 Such incidents were 
merely the first in a long series of atrocities that drove Italians firmly into the Allied 
camp. 
The March 1944 bombing of SS policemen in Rome has already been 
mentioned.444 The ensuing massacre of 325 civilians at the Ardeatine caves became 
the most widely known of such incidents. Nonetheless, it certainly fit within the 
wider context of German criminal behavior against Italians. Postwar investigations 
documented the vast scale of German inhumanity in their dealings with Italians. 
The outrages moved Italians to stronger support of the Allied cause, despite the air 
attacks and arduous living conditions that the war forced them to endure.44s 
THE BREAKOUT FROM ANZIO AND CONQUEST OF ROME 
Alexander's multinational force renewed its attempts to breach the Cassino 
line in March 1944. A colossal air bombardment kicked off the assault on March 15. 
443"MA TERA ATROCITIES MAJOR. GRAF VON der SCHULENBERG," 
WO 310/102, WAR OF 1939-1945: REAR HEADQUARTERS BRITISH TROOPS 
AUSTRIA: WAR CRIMES GROUP (SEE): CASE FILES, (PRO),1-2. 
444For the best account, see Lamb, War in Italy, 54-63. 
44SFor just one of many such massacres documented after the war, see: 
"Atrocities by Feldgendarmerie at Palazzo Del Pero Arezzo," WO 310/106, WAR OF 
1939-1945: Rear Headquarters British Troops Austria: War Crimes Group (See): 
Case Files. (PRO), 1. A thorough account of German war crimes between 
September 1943 and May 1944 is to be found in Gerhard Schreiber,Deutsche 
Kriegsverbrechen in Italien: Tater, Opfer, Strafoerfolgung (Munchen: C. H. Beck, 1996), 
128-164. 
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Nonetheless, even though Allied troops advanced under the cover of unstinting 
artillery fire, the attack rapidly bogged down. German paratroops, specially trained 
for urban combat, held fast to the ruined city and surrounding heights, defying every 
effort by New Zealand and Indian troops to dislodge them. Cassino's houses, stoutly 
constructed of quarried stone, provided natural defenses that bombardment 
improved by blocking streets with rubble and craters. Although the attack made 
headway by March 17, German counterattacks pushed exhausted Allied units back. 
When fighting ended on March 20, quiet fell over the landscape as opponents 
assembled their forces for the next round.446 
By early May 1944, German fears of an impending amphibious invasion led 
to the destruction of numerous airfields near possible landing sites and in likely 
areas of exploitation. Engineers demolished eight airbases between Spezia and 
Viterbo, three south of Turin, and four in northeastern Italy. Luftwaffi troops also 
prepared to receive a FW-190 fighter-bomber and a Me-l09 fighter unit to be 
stationed at two airfields near Florence and Pistoia.447 
The supply situation worsened as April closed, owing to air attacks and 
partisan raids that inflicted severe damage on the railroads supporting Kesselring's 
forces. Ultra revealed growing German desperation when "Kesselring on 26 Apr 44 
446Kesselring, "Rapido River Crossing," 1-2; Vietinghoff, "Tla Ch. 6," 
113-115. 
447"Sunset No. 547. 1 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, 
Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSA/CSS, (NAn), 4. 
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"requested urgent reinforcement of railway engineer forces, especially electrical 
engineers," in view of the "continually increasing, systematic destruction of railway 
supply routes by Allied air forces and guerillas."" Seeing as how even this 
reinforcement might prove inadequate, Kesselring further requested that "Italian 
military engineers at present interned in Germany be brought to Italy for purpose." 
The closing of many north-south rail routes left him in a highly exposed and 
dangerous position.448 The Field Marshal also pressed his naval commanders to 
increase sea shipment of supplies to his isolated men.449 
German forces in Italy faced critical shortages of men and material during 
the period immediately preceding the beginning of OPERATION DIADEM. 
During May 1944, Luftwaffo commanders reduced aircraft sorties to thirty each day. 
They conserved their strength in anticipation of a new Allied move in the 
Mediterranean.4so Ground officers also faced serious shortages of manpower as the 
Allied offensive neared. Hitler authorized the use of 'foreign auxiliaries' to free up 
German Landser for combat duty. Even Italians were to be used for such positions in 
the hope that removing them from Italian command might improve their 
448"Sunset No. 548. 2 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, 
Part ll. RG 457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAm, 6-7. 
449"Sunset No. 557. 11 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part ll. RG 457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAll), 28. 
4S0"Sunset No. 556. 10 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAm, 26-27. 
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performance.4S1 The tank return for Kesselring's forces revea1edArmy Group Cs 
weakened state. His armored and mechanized divisions disposed of just 324 tanks 
among its seven Panzer units. The 26th Panzer Division, which had an authorized 
strength of 103 Pzkw IVs and Vs, carried just seventy-eight tanks on its rolls, while 
the 29th Panzergrenadier Division's armored units operated twenty percent under 
strength.4S2 
As May wound on, the renewed Allied drive led Kesselring to transfer the 
90th Panzer grenadier Division from Ostia to support units fighting at Cassino. 
Conditions forced him to commit the division to combat bit-by-bit, diluting its 
effectiveness.4S3 Nonetheless, the tempo of the fighting caused urgent requests for air 
support for the beleaguered defenders. Forty FW-190 fighter-bombers arrived on 
May 13, supported by thirty Me-lOO escorts. Luftwaffo pilots flew 185 sorties a day, 
but the need to conserve strength in anticipation of an amphibious landing kept 
German commanders from turning loose all reserves to assist ground troops 
struggling to hold the line.4S4 
Kesselring surmised that matters could only worsen when observers noted 
4S1nSunset No. 558. 12 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Enrry9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSA/CSS, (NAIl), 3l. 
45211Sunset No. 561. 15 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSA/CSS, (NAm, 38. 
45311Sunset No. 562. 16 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSAlCSS, (NAm, 40. 
454Ibid., 41-42. 
264 
the hurried arrival of new Allied forces in Anzio harbor. The forward movement of 
light artillery units heralded the likelihood of an assault from the beachhead.4ss This 
upsetting news arrived as orders forced the removal of the 16th SS Re'ichsfohreT 
Panzergrenadier Division to Hungary, weakening the German grip on the Anzio 
line.4s6 By late May, the stage had been set for the long-feared disaster confronting 
German forces in Italy. 
CONCLUSION 
Occupied Italy made enormous strides during the spring of 1944 and 
became a valuable economic asset for Nazi Germany. The successful defense of the 
Cassino line and hemming in of the Anzio beachhead provided the military context 
for this achievement. Kesselring's undermanned and ill-equipped divisions 
employed their meager resources to halt the Anglo-American forces' offensive drive. 
This victory permitted German authorities to solidify their grip on the north Italian 
industrial base. 
The record shows that Hans Leyers and the men of the German economic 
apparatus made good use of the opportunity afforded them by this military 
accomplishment. A vast effusion oflabor, production tools, agricultural products, 
raw materials, and finished goods poured forth from Italy to sustain operations there 
4SS"Sunset No. 563. 17 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAIl), 45. 
4S6Sunset No. 555,23. 
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and the war of production in Germany. Even though rising labor unrest and 
partisan operations threatened the gains that had been made, the productive flow did 
not cease. 
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Chapter VI Charts 
Chart VI-I 
Table 3 
Volume of the Roges-Gescbafte 1943{44 according to Types of Goods 
Type ofGoocfs ValueinRM % of Total Goods Made Rank 
A. Armamenu 
Textile Raw Materials 176,534,106 13.6 2 
Machine Tools llS,558,619 8.9 5 
Factories 104,625,000 8.0 6 
Heavy Metal 65,682,827 5.0 7 
Light Metal 64,373,620 4.9 8 
Leather 39,151,479 3.0 10 
Electrical [ndustry 38,308,467 2..9 11 
[ron Alloy 38,195,946 2..9 12 
Chemical 27,787,665 2..1 13 
Orcs 16,662,739 1.3 15 
[ron Working [ndustry 17,479,393 1.3 14 
Mineral Oil 11,714,416 0.9 17 
Rubber 7,915,436 0.6 18 
B. Consumer Goods 
Ready to Wear Clothing 195,674,6 II 15.0 
PicccGoods 154,930,549 11.9 3 
Shoes 124,289,Q91 9.5 4 
Leather Products 15,400,403 1.2 16 
Sewing Machines 6,552,057 0.5 19 
Chart VI-I 
Table 3 
Volume of the Roges-Geschafte 1943/44 according to Types of Goods 
Type of Goods 
c. &potts 
Consumc:r Goods 
Food and Agricuirurc: 
[ndus(rial Goods 
D. Imports 
[ndus(rial Goods 
Food and Agriculrurc: 
Volume Completed 
ValueinRM 
47,932,871 
1,203,084 
1,386,433 
687,608 
467,000 
% of Total Goods Made 
3.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.05 
0.04 
1,302,647,765 = 100"10. 
Source:: Maximi1ianc: Ric:dc:r, "Zwischc:n Biindnis und Ausbc:urung," p. 695. [nformation from BA 121/31, Handaktc:n Dr. 
Mund, Anlage: [I: Zusammc:nstc:llung dc:r U msitzC dc:r Roges in dc:n Jahrc:n 1943/1944 und 1944145 yom 13. 6. 
1950. 
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9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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Chart VI-2 
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Chart VI-3 
Transfers of Goods within Italy and to Germany, November 1943 
1) Sent from Italy to Germany Rail cars tons RM 
a) materials 4908 96503 57,925,044.00 
b) production equipment 813 12368 25,343,000.00 
total I 5721 108871 83,268,044.00 
The corresponding totals from September until 31.10.1943 were: 
I 4394 73168 86,000,000.00 
This results in a change in the number of cars calculated in November of c.: 
I 30% 31% -3% 
2) Sent from southern to northern Italy 
a) materials 1325 25671 1,559,000.00 
b) production equipment 484 2440 1,700,000.00 
total I 1809 28111 3,259,000.00 
3) Loadings in the area of upl!er Italy 
a) materials 141 2717 945,630.00 
4) Sent from Germany to Italy 
Coal I 184625 
other materials 9 141 38,000.00 
Source: RG 242, T77, Roll 576, Frames 1755012-1755015 
Der Generalbeauftragte fUr Italien des Reichsministers 
fUr Riistung und Kriegsproduktion 
Br.B.Nr.:A 418/43 g. 
Mailand. den 9 Dezember 1943. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BREAKTHROUGH TO BOGDOWN: THE FIGHT FROM DIADEM TO THE 
GOTmCLINE 
INTRODUCTION: DIADEM AND DEFEAT 
Allied leaders met again at the end of 1943 to discuss political and military 
strategy. Agreements at Cairo and Teheran that November and December imposed 
limited goals on their forces fighting in Italy. The offensive would continue until 
the Pisa-Rimini line had been reached. Major operations would cease thereafter as 
veteran divisions withdrew for an amphibious landing in southern France.4s7 
Churchill consented to ANVIL (later renamed DRAGOON), an assault on the 
French Riviera, but pressed the case for invading Isma. He wished to keep the 
Italian campaign moving forward with Vienna as its ultimate goal. Despite dangling 
the possibility of Turkish entry into the war on the Allied side, which would open 
the Bosporus Straits to Allied convoys, Churchill made litde headway with Roosevelt 
and Stalin. The modest goals of taking Rome and driving north seemed the only 
4S7Ernest F. Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, United States Army in World War II: 
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1977),6. 
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game in town as the conferences concluded.458 
In Italy, after a series of badly planned and executed offensives at both 
Anzio and Cassino, Allied commanders at last grasped that their limited forces could 
not bull their way through the formidable German defenses barring the roads 
leading to Rome. Alexander's forces secretly massed along the Garigliano River line, 
while deceiving German intelligence into believing that a future thrust would again 
seek to take Monte Cassino and drive on Rome via the Liri Valley. DIADEM, the 
Allied offensive that began on May 11, aimed at capturing Rome and driving north. 
Nonetheless, Allied planners made the U.S. 20d and French Expeditionary corps the 
focal point of the attack. They would push into the Aurunci Mountains and the 
Tyrrhenian Sea coastal plain, while the British 13th Corps feinted against the 
German stronghold at Cassino. 
THE GERMAN SITUATION 
Soon after the Allies launched DIADEM, Field Marshal von Richthofen 
visited with his Fuhrer. Hitler reminded the airman that although danger clouded 
the immediate future, the successful defense of Italy had already paid Germany 
immense benefits. Fears of the previous year that German forces would fall back to 
the northern Apennines had not come to pass. Territorial losses now could not wipe 
458Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader eN ew York: Carroll & Graf, 1991), 
245. 
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out the gains garnered in Italy.4s9 
No informed or objective observer would have spoken so glibly of the 
situation in Italy. Although Hider's strategic wisdom cannot be easily denied, the 
perilous position in which his armies found themselves in late May 1944 seemed to 
predict the loss of all heretofore gained. The German 1 rf' and 14th armies had 
suffered heavy casualties while receiving minimal replacements. Forces earmarked 
for coastal defense lacked the combat power to carry out their assigned tasks, forcing 
OBSW to transfer the Hermann GOring Panzer Division to Livorno. The 2r/' 
Panzergrenadier Division also moved into reserve, rebuilding its depleted units and 
guarding against partisan attacks on the Army Group's lines of communications. 
A pause in combat from mid-March until mid-May allowed smaller 
formations fighting at Anzio to rejoin their parents units. This partial restoration of 
unit cohesion strengthened many divisions that would have otherwise faced the 
Allied offensive without vital reconnaissance and combat elements. Kesselring also 
improved the XIV Panzer Corps's position by shifting some of its defensive frontage 
to other commands. Blind to the exact timing of the imminent offensive, the 
German forces had barely completed changing locations before the Allies struck on 
May 11. This unfortunate coincidence left new troops defending sectors with which 
they were barely acquainted as the first blows fell. Hider's optimism as DIADEM 
began seemed wholly wrong. 
4S~ing, Hitlers War, 628. 
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Construction troops had hastened efforts to construct the Senger Line, a 
switchback position for the Gustav Line. Organisation Todt, Slovakian, Italian, and 
reserve division engineers labored under the watchful eye of supervising officers. 
Allied air attacks hindered the endeavor, causing large numbers of Italians laborers 
to flee for their lives. Despite attempts to create reserves, restore units to their 
parent formations, shift troops west, and improve defensive positions, when the 
assault began, Kesselring simply hoped to defend the existing line, employing his 
reserves to reinforce threatened sectors or to seal breaches and retake lost ground.460 
GROUND FORCES 
The forces Kesselring depended upon to carry out this limited strategic 
vision would be sorely tried by the challenges that lay ahead. His divisions lacked 
both manpower and, in some cases, full complements of basic weapons. For the first 
time, large numbers of Soviet prisoners-of-war were moved into the front line. The 
27sm Infantry Division contained a substantial contingent of Ossetians, one of the 
many minority groups that populated the vast Soviet empire. The Ossetians fought 
well and remained loyal to their division until the end of the war. 
Other groups proved less reliable in defending the Third Reich. Free Indian 
soldiers served in the rjh Company of Infantry Regiment 590. Recruited from prisoners 
taken in North Africa, they refused combat against any save British forces and were 
removed from the line that fall. The 162M Infantry Division had large numbers of 
460Kesselring et al., German Version ofcke Italian Campaign, 119-23. 
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Turkomen and Azerbaijani troops. Unlike their Ossetian counterparts, these 
soldiers fought well only against partisans, with desertions to Allied forces a 
common occurrence. This later prompted Kesselring's Chief of Staff, Siegfried 
Westphal, to bemoan the need to reinforce the unit with German soldiers, who 
shored up its line.461 
The worsening manpower situation also prompted measures to use more 
Italians in non-combat formations and to raise Italian combat divisions from troops 
loyal to the Fascist regime. Italians supported Luftwaffe and Marine units, labored as 
construction workers, and participated in antipartisan operations. The vital role 
played at Anzio by Italian Bersaglieri units, paratroopers of the Nembo and Folgore 
divisions, and the Decima Mas marines led Kesselring to request additional Fascist 
Italian divisions. In late January 1944, Field Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, head of the 
Salo Republic's army, placed half of his 203,500 men at Kesselring's disposal. The 
Monte Rosa and San Marco divisions received allocations totaling 30,000 men. The 
new divisions were to undergo outfitting and training in Germany before returning 
to fight in Italy. Two more divisions would be raised soon after the first two began 
461Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 123; Klaus 
Bertelsmann, "Die Entwicklung der personellen und materiellen Lage der Verbande 
des OB Siidwest vom Sommer 44 bis zur Kapirulation," N422, Bd. 26 (BAMA 
(Microfiche), 17, 18; Hoppe, 278. Infanterie-Division, 11, 12-14,27; "Letter from 
Siegfried Westphal to Basil Liddell Hart, 28 November 1949," Westphal 
Correspondence 9/24/86 (LHCMA), 1. 
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training.462 
The formation of Fascist Italian divisions provided significant aid to the 
Germans. By July 1944,400,000 Italian Fascists had taken up arms for the Germans, 
even though a majority of conscripts did not answer the summons to the colors. 
Graziani commanded 100,000 men fighting with the SS and 80,000 in the four 
combat divisions training in Germany. Field Marshal Kesselring, pleased with the 
progress thus far made, originally intended that the Monte Rosa and San Marco 
divisions would engage in antipartisan operations when they returned. The massive 
drain on manpower during the Allied spring offensive altered his plans.463 
Nonetheless, much of this assistance lay in the future. Kesselring now 
found himself facing the demanding task of holding back the rising tide of Allied 
strength in Italy using the steadily dwindling pool of German manpower and the 
meager assistance of the Wehrmacht's two sister branches. 
LUFTWAFFE AND ITALIAN FASCIST AIR FORCES 
As dreadful as the manpower situation was, the Luftwaffe found itself in far 
worse condition. Few fighters remained to cover German troops, for whom air attack 
was part and parcel of their daily existence. When the Allied offensive opened in 
May, protected by 4,000 Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (M.A.A.F.) aircraft, von 
462Bertelsmann, "Entwicklung der personnellen und materiellen Lage," 16-17; 
Lamb, War in Italy, 94, 95-96. 
463lbid., 100-01. 
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Richthofen pressed his fighter-bombers into ineffectual service as air cover for 
Kesselring's divisions, readily sacrificing them while ground troops complained of 
never seeing a German plane overhead. Reinforcements were but a faint glimmer of 
hope, given fears of an Allied landing in southern France. Worried Luftwaffe leaders 
refused to transfer planes to Italy while Allied forces crushed the German front.464 
The Luftwaffe's situation deteriorated steadily throughout the summer. 
Axis aircraft, outnumbered ten and fifteen to one, totaled just one hundred combat-
capable aircraft, which pretended to contest the armadas of Allied bombers and 
fighters sweeping them from the skies. (See Chart Vll-l.) Allied intelligence 
revealed that the Luftwaffe mounted only 390 sorties between May 14-19, at the very 
time that Allied soldiers penetrated the German line.46S Aviation gasoline shortages 
had developed in January and forced commanders to ground their bombers in July to 
ensure the continued operation of smaller aircraft.466 Moreover, an exodus of bomber 
and fighter wings occurred throughout the spring and summer of 1944. The critical 
situation in Germany forced Luftwaffe commanders to transfer Luftflotte 2 from Italy 
back to Germany where battles with Allied strategic bombers demanded the 
464"Sunset No. 572. 26 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSA/CSS, (NAil), 63; "Sunset No. 576. 30 May 
1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the 
NSAlCSS, (NAil), 71; Lee, German Air Force, 147; Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, 40-4l. 
46S"Sunset No. 568. 22 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSA/CSS, (NAil), 55. 
466M.A.A.F. ASD, 90. 
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Luftwaffe's full attention.467 
The air defense of Italy thereafter rested upon the limited assets of the 
Italian Fascist air force. When Luftflotte 2 handed over command of air operations to 
the 'GAF General in Italy' in mid-September 1944, Allied air intelligence took it as a 
clear signal that increased reliance would be placed upon IFAF units. The creation 
of the new German post in Italy closely followed the model adopted in Finland, 
Hungary, and Rumania.468 The transfer of responsibility to theIFAF did not 
surprise high-ranking Allied air commanders. A November 22, 1943 Ultra intercept 
had warned that the Germans were raising a new IFAF that would defend industrial 
targets in north Italy.469 
Luftwaffe squadrons departing for France left the air defense of the Italian 
theater the sole province of the IFAF during the war's waning months. Combined 
fighter and bomber operations rarely totaled more than 150 daily missions in 
contrast to the 2,000 flown by Allied airmen. Against such odds, GAP and IFAF 
planes did little more than put up a brave show that often passed unnoticed, even by 
their Allied opponents.470 That Allied losses remained as high as they did testified to 
the increasing impotence of the remaining fighter force in Italy. Antiaircraft, a poor 
substitute for air power, inflicted the majority of Allied air losses during and after 
467Franz Kurowski, Kampjfeld Mittelmeer (Herford: Koehlers, 1984), 17-18. 
468Sunset No. 687,214. 
469ULTRA, MAGIC, and the Allies, 19. 
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the summer of 1944.471 
LOGISTICS 
The conclusion of Operation STRANGLE left German forces in a 
precarious supply situation when the Allies launched DIADEM. Heightened 
demands for fuel and ammunition tested German quartermasters, compelling them 
to supply their forces using roads and railways already heavily damaged by Allied 
airmen. OBSW depots located nearest the combat zone held but a single issue of 
munitions, rations, and fuel for combat units. Reserve supply stocks lay south of the 
Po river, but required transport to the front, which presented quartermasters with a 
serious challenge after the Allied offensive began in May. 
German supply officers depended heavily upon the Italian rail net for most 
of the supplies that their forces used. Allied air attacks virtually severed the central 
railway linking Florence and Arezzo, as well as lateral branches nearer the troops, 
rendering them incapable of maintaining a normal flow of supplies to the battlefield. 
Similar strikes interrupted passage of the Brenner line from May 13-15. Marine 
vessels brought forward small amounts of materiel along the two coasts, but the 
aggregate did not meet demand. 
Formidable obstacles also ruled out increasing truck shipments. Civilian 
needs consumed a considerable amount of the 800 tons that trucks could move 
forward each day. German motor pools contained 3,000 different vehicles, each 
471Wilt, "Allied Cooperation," 214. 
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requiring its own spare parts and maintenance. Allied air men struck a crippling 
blow that summer when they demolished the central spare parts depot located near 
Piacenza. Workers salvaged and transferred undamaged parts north of the Alps, but 
this blow, coming soon after losses of like facilities in Paris and Warsaw, hampered 
vehicle repairs. The raid and existing shortages forced the Germans on to the black 
market where they competed with desperate Italian vehicle owners.412 
Makeshift measures ensured that some supplies of fuel and munitions did 
reach German forces. Quartermasters sent gasoline in containers that eased 
distribution and sent valuable tanker cars into dangerous front line areas. Quick-
working supply troops met shipments and hid or distributed them to avoid roving 
Allied fighter-bombers. Planners reduced ration shipments in favor of munitions, 
substituting local grain supplies to feed the troops. Strategically positioned, radio-
equipped officers provided up-to-the-minute information to higher headquarters, 
ensuring that materiel arrived where most needed. At the end of May, transport 
aircraft carried desperately-needed antitank weapons to Perugia and Foligno. 
German divisions had lost seventy-five percent of all such weapons since the 
472"Sunset No. 569. 22 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSA/CSS, (NAm, 59; Kesselring et al., German 
Version of the Italian Campaign, 135; Max Wehrig, "Duties and Operation of the 
Italian Section of the Chief ofWehrmacht Motor Transportation," NARA 
Microfiche Publication MI035, Fiche 0086, Foreign Military Studies, D-Series (RG 
338) D-126 (Washington, D.C., 1947),23-25,31-32,33-34. 
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offensive had begun.473 
The measures taken required large numbers of Italian workers, many of 
whom refused to assist the Germans. When Italian workers abandoned their tasks 
under the unremitting Allied air attacks, Organisation Todt hastily formed a one-time 
truck convoy with 3,000 tons capacity. The epic trip, which began on May 20 and 
continued for three weeks, suffered high casualties from inexperienced drivers, 
desertions, partisan action, and the entrepreneurial spirit of some participants. 
Nonetheless, this mass shipment of fuel and ammunition offered relief during the 
supply crisis.474 
Additional problems developed during the summer. German equipment 
losses necessitated assigning priority to the replacement of tanks and other weapons. 
This reduced the quantity of other shipments as German forces retreated from the 
Gustav Line. Despite the new supply priorities, Berlin still could not provide the 
necessary weapons, forcing the distribution of Italian arms stockpiles to troops. 
Retreating German forces abandoned their old supply points and required the 
establishment of new ones. Quartermaster units scrambled to save supplies near the 
front while moving stores and equipment to new positions in north Italy.47S 
473"Sunset No. 578. 1 June 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, 
Part II. RG 457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAm, 78; Kesselring et al., German 
Version of the Italian Campaign, 136-37, 138. 
474Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 138. 
475 Ibid., 139; Sunset 569, 58. 
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and bases, and heavy Allied air attacks throughout the summer hindered the 
maintenance of secure lines of communications. 
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The retreat provided a single measure of relief as German forces fell back 
upon supply staging poinrs. Stores previously brought forward kept troops 
provisioned during periods when Allied raids wreaked havoc on road and rail 
communications. Time and distance requirements lessened each day during July 
and August as the retreat continued, increasing supply units' efficiency. The steady 
drumbeat of attacks conducted by Allied aircraft against Po river crossings during 
July somewhat offset gains. The destrUction of all road and rail bridges from 
Piacenza to the Po estuary had a calamitous effect on fuel shipments. 
Quartermasters avoided catastrophe only by shifting fuel from Milan to the front, 
establishing ferries that ran each night, and by cleverly using a destroyed bridge near 
Ostiglia to support a fuel pipe line draped across the wrecked strUcrure.476 
THE GUSTAV LINE GIVES 
German troops fought stubbornly to hold the Gustav Line. Nonetheless, 
significant problems undermined their efforts. Kesselring, deprived of information 
from air reconnaissance, succumbed to deceptive Allied maneuvers. The British 
Eighth Army had secredy shifted its strength westward, giving Allied forces for once 
a large numerical advantage over their foes. Moreover, German intelligence 
476Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 144-45. 
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seriously miscalculated total Allied strength in the theater, crediting them with 
holding back divisions sufficient to invade the German rear.47i This dubious 
reckoning caused Kesselring to ready forces to counter a phantom invasion. These 
two factors placed German forces in a precarious strategic situation.478 
On the front lines, German divisions covered abnormally large sectors. The 
27gn Infantry Division, understrength and ill-equipped, rushed south and reinforced 
the front when the offensive began. With only 75 percent of its authorized 
manpower and 25 percent of its transport, the division relieved two of its 
counterparts and defended both thirty kilometers of coastline and thirty kilometers 
of the battle front. The understrength and inexperienced division protected its 
sector, six times that normally assigned to fully-outfitted divisions, with great 
difficulty.479 
Allied moves on May 11 surprised German commanders. They had 
expected the assault to fall once more upon Monte Cassino and the surrounding 
hills. This time the American 2nd and French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) strUck 
simultaneous blows west of the ruined abbey. While the FEC thrust deep into the 
heart of Kesselring's position, he refused to believe that the main Allied thrust 
477"Sunset No. 567. 21 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
1, Part ll. RG 457, Records of the NSAlCSS, (NAil), 53. 
478Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, 40. 
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would not come in the Liri Valley. First reports from the 7lst and 94th infantry 
divisions led him to conclude that they had successfully fended off the attacks, 
alleviating his fears for this sector.480 
Meanwhile, two divisions of green American conscripts penetrated German 
coastal positions while the experienced, professional mountain soldiers of the FEe 
battled for the Auruncan mountains. The German 7Ist Infantry Division belatedly 
discovered the French North African divisions within its lines, forcing German 
reserves onto the offensive. The daily bulletin to Berlin noted that "[t]he 7lst In£ 
Div. has fought like heroes in these battles against an enemy with overwhelming 
superiority (c. 4 div.). According to Army reports, individual units have fought 
superbly until the last round and the last man." 481 Despite German sacrifices, 
Algerian and Moroccan mountaineers beat off the counterattacks, inflicting 
appalling losses on the Germans, who exposed themselves to Allied artillery while 
moving forward.482 
480"Tagesmeldung vom 11.5.1944," RH2 Oberkommando des 
Heeres/Generalstab der Heeres, Band 660, Ob. Siidwest Meldungen vom 1.-15.5.44 
(BAMA: Microfiche), 58; "Morgenmeldung vom 12.5.1944," RH2 Oberkommando 
des Heeres/Generalstab der Heeres, Band 660, Ob. Siidwest Meldungen vom 
1.-15.5.44 (BAMA: Microfiche), 62. 
481"Tagesmeldung vom 13.5.1944," RH2 Oberkommando des Heeresl 
Generalstab der Heeres, Band 660, Ob. Siidwest Meldungen vom 1.-15.5.44 (BAMA: 
Microfiche), 71. 
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Kesselring hastily summoned back to Italy the vacationing commanders of 
the 1 rf' Army and 14'" Panzer Korps, von Vietinghoff and von Senger und Enerlin. 
Nonetheless, the German command did not grasp until May 14 that they were facing 
a concentrated thrust by eleven Allied divisions, not the six that their intelligence 
service believed involved. The picture became bleaker still when Kesselring 
wrongly credited Allied commanders with holding twelve divisions in reserve, and 
shipping was observed at Bari.483 This raised fears that an amphibious landing 
would assault his weak Adriatic flank. 
Misled by the confused intelligence picture, Kesselring slowly inserted his 
weak reserves at key points along the crumbling front line. The 26th Panzer and 29th 
Panzergrenadier divisions moved south after May 15 while Hitler authorized the 
transfer of the 16'" SS Panzer Grenadier Division to north Italy. The SS troops could 
not be used to strengthen the disintegrating Gustav Line. The incomplete picture 
that Hitler had forced him to hold the SS division back as a mobile reserve that 
could respond to an invasion of north Italy:'84 
29th Panzer grenadier Division belatedly entered combat upon arrival. 
General von Mackensen, commanding general of the 14'" Army, had delayed its 
departure despite Kesselring's orders. Its men suffered the misfortUne of defending 
Meldungen vom 1.-15.5.44 (BAMA: Microfiche),68. 
483Sunset 567, 53. 
484Sunset 576, 70; Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier's Record (New York: 
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unprepared positions and incurred heavy losses while defending a line at Terracina 
and along the Lago di Fondi. American infantry and tanks from the 88 th Infantry 
Division fought their way through the hastily established line, forcing German 
Panzergrenadiers to abandon the coastal city. On May 18, the 1st Fallschirmjiiger 
Division quit its tenacious defense of Cassino and the embattled abbey. The swift 
advance had unhinged the German position, forcing the abandonment of hopes to 
reestablish a solid defense south of Rome. Moreover, this catastrophe befell 
Kesselring before Allied troops crowding Anzio beachhead launched the second 
prong of the Allied offensive on May 23.485 
The May 24 entry of American troops into Terracina, a key coastal town on 
the Tyrrhenian Sea anchoring the line near Lago di Fondi, paralleled the moment of 
crisis for the German forces ringing Anzio. Allied forces within the bridgehead 
broke out from positions held since February, causing von Vietinghoff to ask 
permission to pull his 10th Army back from the Hitler Line and defend at 
Valmontone. Hitler rejected the request and a breach developed between the 1 r.f' 
and 14th armies. German divisions retreated back to Rome, with the 14th Army 
suffering near annihilation.486 
485"Sunset No. 566. 20 May 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 
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VietinghofPs right wing did not suffered the same fate. A fortunate decision 
by the American Sth Army's Anglophobic commander, General Mark Clark, to shift 
his advance north toward Rome, rather than send Anzio-based forces east until they 
linked up with his divisions advancing through the Liri Valley, saved the Germans. 
Clark's obsession with entering Rome first gave German forces one more narrow 
escape from certain destruction by encirclement. The slow pace of the Allied 
advance on terrible Italian roads also bought the retreating Germans time to evade 
their Allied pursuers. Nonetheless, the escape at Rome meant that German forces 
could reform a defensive line farther north.487 Given Allied experiences on Sicily, 
Sardinia, and at Salerno, there was no excuse this time in allowing the annihilation 
of the enemy's fighting forces to be subordinated to Clark's personal desire for the 
glory of beating the British to Rome. 
THE THOUSAND YEAR REICH LOSES THE ETER..NAL CITY 
As German troops retreated northward, the loss of Rome rapidly evolved 
into a virtual certainty. Only ambiguity concerning the date remained. Rome was 
the economic and transportation hub of central Italy. When Allied troops neared the 
city, debate broke out in the German camp concerning the disposition of its 
invaluable power stations and bridges spanning the Tiber, which carried gas and 
487Bennett, Behind the Battle, 226-27; Wilhelm Johann Hecht, "I Parachute 
Corps Operations in Italy (22 Jan 1944 - May 1945)," NARA Microfiche Publication 
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water supplies for the city.488 Destroying them would impede the Allied occupation 
of the city and the pursuit of German units withdrawing northward to unfinished 
new positions in the Gothic Line. 
The previous February, Hitler had ordered that Roman installations, 
including the city's historic bridges, not be demolished if Kesselring's men 
evacuated the city. The Fiihrer, who had commanded the destruction of Leningrad 
and a thousand lesser urbs, did not wish to secure his place in history as merely one 
more barbarian whose army had sacked the Eternal City.489 On June 2, Kesselring 
requested permission from Hitler to abandon Rome to the Allies. A favorable reply 
the next day, revealed by Ultra to Allied commanders, led to the city's quick 
occupation by American forces.490 The capture of the first of the three major Axis 
capitals on June 4 represented a political triumph for the Allies, albeit one quickly 
forgotten in the euphoria of the Normandy landing two days later. Nonetheless, 
Rome's occupation hardly justified the cost in blood and materiel expended by 
Allied forces. German forces, as they had on Sicily, Sardinia, and at Salerno, slipped 
away to fight on battlefields more to their liking. 
The old burden of finding bread for Rome's masses attended Mark Clark's 
triumph through the ancient city. Securing adequate supplies to feed Italians had 
488Westphal, Eninnerungen, 259. 
489Irving, Hitters War, 634; Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen 
Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1994), 191-92. 
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long been a problem for the Allies, prompting the Combined Administrative 
Committee to push for active measures that would restore efficiency to Italian 
fishing and agriculture. 491 Providing Rome's citizens with minimal rations 
represented a heavy burden on the already-strained Allied supply network. The 
city's liberators authorized a daily ration of 150 grams of bread, ten grams of olive oil 
and 13.3 grams of canned meat per person. The meager allowance, supplemented by 
soup kitchens that fed 325,000 Romans, held mass starvation at bay. Nonetheless, 
most Italians, including Rome's inhabitants, remained seriously malnourished, and 
death by starvation was not unknown in the British and American zones.492 Italians 
north of the battlefront also did not grow fat on their monthly rations, reduced in 
April 1944 to 600 grams of meat, two kilos of rice or pasta, and 300 grams of fat, oil or 
cheese.493 
THE PURSUIT 
Kesselring suffered a heavy personal blow at the moment that Allied forces 
entered the precincts of Rome. Siegfried Westphal, his able Chief of Staff, fell 
49h'policy with Respect to the Equipping and Maintaining Italian Troops and 
Policy with Respect to Italian Munitions Production," Army Service Forces, Office 
of the Commanding General, Washington, D.C., 12 Nov 43 (George C. Marshall 
Research Library, Lexington, VA), 1-2. 
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seriously ill and escaped a Roman hospital only hours before American troops 
entered the Italian capital.494 General Hans Rottiger replaced Westphal. 
By June 5, a thirty kilometer hole had developed between the 10m and 14th 
armies. German commanders noted a serious decline in morale among their forces 
as they hastily retreated northwards, hoping to escape annihilation. OKWand 
Kesselring lacked any other option than to fling poorly-trained new formations into 
the line. 3m and 15th Panzer grenadier divisions had received orders transferring them 
to France shortly after the Allied landings in Normandy. In August, Hermann 
GOring Panzer grenadier Division also moved out of the theater to Poland, divesting 
Kesselring of three of his seven mobile divisions. 16th SS Panzergrenatiier, 162M 
Infantry, and the 19th and 2r:f' Luftwaffe divisions, moved south ro fill the breach.49S 
But the inexperienced units suffered considerably from having their battalions flung 
inro the fight one at a time, denying them the mass necessary ro halt the advancing 
Allies. The 1 gth Luftwaffe Division, which lacked experienced leadership, fared poorly 
in battle and was broken Up.496 
494Siegfried Westphal, "General Westphal's Replies To Questions From L.H. 
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THE PARTISAN WAR 
The collapse of Italy in September 1943 had birthed the Italian partisan 
movement, which formed the Committee for National Liberation after meetings that 
month in Rome, Genoa, and Turin. The Naples uprising in late September 1943 
gave the Germans a first taste of the many bitter dregs that followed.497 Partisan 
activity surged as Allied forces intensified their pursuit of the retreating Germans. 
From the kickoff of DIADEM, Italian guerrilla units operated freely in the rear of 
German divisions, assisting Allied soldiers and creating serious headaches for 
German commanders.498 Siegfried Westphal nearly became a victim of a partisan 
attack when his evacuation train lay helpless on a rail line blocked by sabotage.499 
German propagandists had long acknowledged their failure to win Italian 
hearts and minds. Italians resisted German propaganda efforts, strongly preferring 
Allied radio as their source of reliable informacion. A Sicherheitsdienst report 
honesdy assessed the weak German position, acknowledging that they did not 
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comprehend the Italian mind set, and could not get Italians to give German 
propaganda a hearing.soo Italian attitudes did not change when the offensive began. 
German intelligence officers on Kesselring's staff acknowledged that the populace in 
central Italy supported the advancing Allies as their compatriots had done in Sicily 
and southern Italy.sol 
The Italian response to this propaganda failure revealed itself after the 
German front collapsed. Italian resistance had strengthened and organized in the 
absence of an effective German effort directed at halting its rise. By the summer of 
1944, more than 100,000 Italians had taken up arms against the routed German 
forces. Nonetheless, partisan numbers alone could not offset German advantages 
that accrued to Kesselring's forces as they retreated in coherent units, equipped with 
heavy weapons. Many Italian partisans responded to Alexander's call to rise up and 
destroy the withdrawing Germans, only to find that the removal of Allied forces 
from Italy to invade southern France took the steam out of the Allied juggernaut. 
Resistance fighters paid a heavy toll when they engaged German forces, not in hir-
and-run attacks, but in toe-to-toe combat with the Wehrmacht's infuriated Landser. 
The summer of 1944 witnessed some of the Italian campaign's most brutal episodes 
as Kesselring looked at the spread of partisan-held areas plastering his daily 
SOO"SD-Berichte zu Inlandsfragen," R58/192/12.-0040/176 (Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz),35-38. 
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situation maps, threatening his isolated, retreating units with ruination.soz 
In April 1944, Kesselring had sought control of anti-partisan operations. 
The growth of guerilla attacks throughout the theater demanded a unified response 
by German and Italian anti-partisan efforts. Although Kesselring intended to 
entrust this effort to an SS official, Heinrich Himmler vigorously protested the 
measure, which would have reduced his influence and control in Italy. Kesselring's 
efforts paid off as OKW decided at the end of the month to assign OBSW 
responsibility for anti-partisan operations in areas twenty kilometers directly behind 
the fighting front and thirty kilometers from the Italian coastline. The fight against 
the partisans elsewhere in Italy fell under the purview of the Supreme SS and Police 
Commander for Italy, General Karl Wo!ff.S03 Wolff disposed of nearly 130,000 men 
assigned to anti-partisan operations. They fought in separate security zones 
commanded by an officer responsible for ensuring that his area remained free of 
activity.S04 
The surge in resistance activity during the German retreat, in part a 
response to General Alexander's appeal, overwhelmed this system. German 
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commanders reported a mournful litany of nightly attacks upon dispatch riders and 
trucks. Widespread assaults against rail lines accompanied unpredictable forays on 
vehicular traffic. German transport officers logged 225 separate bombings of key rail 
lines during the summer weeks. Partisans also established control over large areas of 
the German rear, assuming governmental functions in the liberated regions. The 
Germans conducted major operations to recapture wrecked bridges in partisan-held 
areas before the structures could be rebuilt.sos Senior officers, such as the 2rf' 
Luftwaffe Field Division's unfortunate commander, Major General Crisolli, fell prey 
to partisan ambushes along with lowly privates. The concentration of attacks on the 
critical mountain passes throughout the theater created dark fears that retreating 
units would be cutoff from supplies and left to either the uncertain mercies of the 
hated resistance fighters or the advancing Allies.s06 
On June 17, Kesselring responded to the extreme threat posed by the 
partisans and issued orders demanding that stringent measures be taken against 
their attacks. 
The battle against the bandits is split into passive and active measures, the 
focal point of which lays in the conduct of active measures. Passive measures 
consist ofloca1 protective measures for important structures on railroads and 
roads, as well as vital facilities such as power plants, factories, and so forth .... 
Active measures will be carried out especially where it is necessary to maintain 
SOS"Tagesmeldung vom 18.6.1944," RH2 Oberkommando des 
Heeres/Generalstab der Heeres, Band 662, Ob. Siidwest Tagesmeldungen v. 
1.-30.6.44 (BAMA: Microfiche), 34. 
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Units interpreted his directive as permission to take immediate reprisals against acts 
of resistance, measures including the taking and shooting of hostages, the burning of 
villages, and the shipment of civilians to Germany as forced labor or concentration 
camp inmates.507 
The pursuit conferred one unexpected benefit upon the Germans. The 
507 Haup~ Kriegsschauplarz [talien, 200, 20S. "Der Kampf gegen die Banden 
gliedert sich in den passiven und aktiven Kampf, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der 
aktiven Kampffiihrung liegt. Der passive Kampfbesteht in dem ortlichen Schutz 
wichtiger Kunstbauten an Eisenbahnen und Strafien, sowie lebenswichtiger 
Anlagen, wie Kraftwerke, Fabriken usw .... Der aktive Kampf wird besonders dort 
zu fiihren sein, wo es gilt, den Lebensnerv der Wehrmacht zu erhalten. Die Banden 
sind anzugreifen und zu vemichten .... " 
Allied intelligence officers later found that at least one subordinate unit 
included verbatim portions of Kesselring's antipartisan order in directives to their 
units. Compare this July 1944 operations order from the 1st Fallschirmjiiger Corps 
with Kesselring's original instruction: 
"EXTRACT FROM AFHQ INTELLIGENCE NOTES NO. 72 HQ I Para Corps 
20 July 1944 G Branch No.838/Secret \uSubject\u: Operations against Partisans-
Order No.2. 
3. The fight against partisans involves both active and passive measures, 
with emphasis laid on the former. Passive measures consist oflocal protection of 
important artistic buildings along railways and roads as well as vital installations 
such as power stations, factories, etc. 
Passive measures must in places be curtailed around the vulnerable points, 
e.g. recce patrols maintaining continuous watch over the aproaches [sic]. Active 
measures in areas infested by partisans must be particularly energetic when the main 
arteries of the armed forces are involved. Partisans will be anacked and relentlessly 
destroyed. Intelligence from inside partisan units (inel use of agents) is particularly 
important." 
Source: "War Crimes "Extracts from German Instructions for Operations 
Against Partisans,"" WO 310/150, WAR OF 1939-1945: Rear Headquarters British 
Troops Austria: War Crimes Group (See): Case Files. (PRO),1-2. 
295 
accelerated pace of Allied operations curtailed the flow of Ultra information. The 
heightened pace of the pursuit destroyed the value of most tactical information that 
signals intelligence revealed. Nonetheless, Ultra reports encouraged Allied 
commanders by disclosing the desperate state of the Luftwaffe that summer, a time 
when air operations normally increased in tempo. Between July 27-30, German 
airmen mounted only twenty-seven sorties, in contrast with thousands conducted by 
Allied air forces during the same period.508 
Kesselring visited his commander-in-chief at Berchtesgaden on July 3. 
Hider lectured the Field Marshal, repeating his old order that German troops hold 
every meter of ground. The Italian front commander patiendy described his forces' 
precarious condition, hoping to win permission to fall back upon the partially-
completed north Apennines defensive line. Hider demurred, arguing that it was the 
last line of defense in Italy. If the Allies broke through, north Italy would fall to 
them. Moreover, defeat would create a dangerous threat to the Balkans.509 Once 
again, the economics of war caused Hider to subsume military necessity to wider 
strategic needs. 
Nonetheless, Kesselring pressed his case, reminding his Fuhrer that he could 
ill-afford the loss of two armies after the catastrophes at Stalingrad and in Tunisia. 
508"Sunset No. 646. 6 August 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, 
Box 1, Part ill. RG 457, Records of the NSAlCSS, (NAIl), 28; Wilt, "Allied 
Cooperation," 220-21. 
509Irving, Hitler's War, 652. 
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While assuring Hitler that German soldiers would fight and die in Italy if so 
ordered, Kesselring guaranteed that he could slow and eventually halt the Allied 
advance. Doing so required the flexibility of fighting a mobile defense back to the 
northern Apennines. He reasoned that Hitler actually wanted this result, which 
would allow whatever grand strategy he had mapped out for 1945 to grow to fruition. 
Kesselring returned to Italy, having won the most important battle that he would 
fight that summer.SIO 
The military situation deteriorated as the pursuit continued. German 
divisions, short of transport, took to the roads on foot and made their way north. 
They filled Italy's highways every night, seeking to avoid the swarms of Allied 
fighter-bombers that dogged their steps during daylight hours. Engineers worked 
feverishly at sowing ruin behind the retreating infantry and Panzers, wreaking havoc 
on roads and bridges. 
The delaying tactics worked, as they had against Montgomery's forces in 
September 1943. Allied forces, fearful of ambush or stumbling into a mined stretch 
of road, often lost contact with the retreating Germans. Nonetheless, when the 
Germans made a stand, they suffered severe losses. In early July at Ancona, the 27sP' 
Infantry Division lost an entire assault gun company in a single hour while engaging 
in a sharp fight that decimated the division's infantry.Sll 
SIOKesselring, A Soldier's Record, 249-50. 
SllHoppe, 278. Infanterie-Division, 19-21. 
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Kesselring's army rebuilt while retreating, absorbing reinforcements and 
replacements on the run. The severe losses already taken and the deplorable 
condition of the divisions arriving to firm up the front forced German 
quartermasters to dip into Italian equipment stockpiles. The inferior weapons 
available outfitted units on the front line and in rear areas.S12 
DEFENSE OF THE GOTlHC LINE 
German forces fell back upon their last defensive line in Italy, the partially 
completed Gothic Line. Rommel's engineers had mapped out this position in the 
northern Apennines in 1943, intending it to be the safe haven that German forces 
would fight their way back [0 from southern Italy. Although some work had 
proceeded before Kesselring retreated [0 this line in late summer 1944, he soon 
discovered that it was an unsatisfactory refuge. Combat forces in Italy had not 
participated in fixing its positions, given Hitler's worry that troops retreated too 
hastily when they knew fortified positions awaited them in the rear.513 
The Gothic Line underwent hasty efforts to strengthen its defenses as 
Kesselring's men drew near. Engineers focused on the eastern flank, where fewer 
natural obstacles existed to hinder an attacker. Worries about this weakness led [0 
the construction of a second string of defensive strong points behind the primary 
S12Bertelsmann, "Entwicklung der personnellen und materiellen Lage," 19-20. 
S13AdolfHeckel and Dietrich Beelitz, "Italian Theater (23 Aug-2 Sep 44)," 
NARA Microfiche Publication MI035 Fiche 0259, Foreign Military Studies, 
B-Series (RG 338) B-0268. (1947), 3. 
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security zone.Sl4 
On August 15, a new strategic threat developed to OBSW when Allied 
forces launched OPERATION DRAGOON. The American 6th Corps landed on the 
beaches of southern France, opening the western Alpines as a back door into 
Kesselring's theater. Although Kesselring had long-feared such a landing, he had 
just two divisions of raw recruits to fill the breach. The arrival in late August of the 
first Fascist Italian division, assigned a defensive position between Genoa and La 
Spezia, relieved German defenders there to rush eastwards.sls FortUne smiled 
brightly upon the ever-optimistic Field Marshal as the advancing Franco-American 
forces turned their attention westward, capturing Toulon and Marseilles, and then 
ciri-ving north to meet Eisenhower's forces racing across France. Kesselring's staff 
had accurately forecast just such a scenario and breathed a sigh of relief when it 
unfolded as anticipated.sl6 
The Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff were not the only ones robbing Peter to 
pay Paul that summer. Constant demands on Kesselring's threadbare formations 
nullified whatever advantage had accrued to him from the departUre of veteran 
American and French divisions invading southern France. Losses of mobile forces 
514Heckei and Beelitz, "Italian Theater (23 Aug-2 Sep 44),", 3-4. 
m Ibid., 5-6; Hans Roettiger, "OB Southwest: Effect of Southern France 
Invasion on Italy," NARA Microfiche Publication MI035 Fiche 0321, Foreign 
Military Studies, B-Series (RG 338) B-0330. (1947), 8-10. 
SI6Ibid. 
made defensive plans for the Gothic Line obsolete. Seventeen German divisions 
faced the daunting task of manning over 1000 kilometers of front line and coastal 
defenses originally marked out for twenty-three. Even full-strength, well-armed 
divisions would have been hard pressed to defend twice the frontage normally 
assigned to such units.Sl7 
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Kesselring's divisions were neither up to strength nor fully outfitted. From 
May 11 to July 31, Army Group C had lost 13,104 dead, 41,336 wounded, 41,998 
missing, and suffered 2~8S4 cases of illness. The 119,292 men removed from his 
rolls amounted to nine and one-half full-strength German infantry divisions, 
allocated 12,SOO men on paper. The majority of the divisions reeling back to the 
Gothic Line had combat strengths of between 2,000 and S,OOO men.Sl8 
Nonetheless, the retreat released formations from coastal duties and the 
arrival of four new infantry divisions during September and October enabled 
Kesselring to restore the situation. The Field Marshal became a casualty on October 
23, when his vehicle collided with an artillery piece, severely wounding him. 
Colonel General von Vietinghoff took command of Army Group C. 
Allied forces launched a series of offensives in September and October 
aimed at capturing two mountain passes in the Sth Army sector and releasing British 
forces on the Adriatic coast to take Bologna. The Allied push in November and 
SI7Heckei and Beelirz, "Italian Theater (23 Aug-2 Sep 44)," 6-7. 
sl8Haupr, Kriegsschauplatz Italien, IS3. 
December captured more territory, but halted after the terrain, bad weather, and 
manpower and ammunition shortages, crippled the attackers. German forces had 
again fought their opponents to a stalemate and bought time to exploit Italy. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
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The value of Italy's economic contribution to the Reich rose sharply during 
the summer of 1944. Speer directed Hitler's attention to Italy's indispensable role in 
the war economy in late June 1944. "Advised the Fiihrer once more on the 
importance of Italian armament- and war production for the total production and 
informed him, that about 15% of the German armaments volume will drop off if Italy 
produces no more for us. The Fiihrer emphasizes that the importance is clear to 
him." During a speech the next month, Speer reminded his audience that German 
war production depended upon the Italian and western European economies for 
twenty-five to thirty percent of output. Moreover, purchases of essential goods from 
Italy between April 17-10 October 1944 had climbed to RM 299,000,000. Despite 
aerial bombardment, labor unrest, and raw material shortages, Italy played an 
invaluable role in replacing production lost in the east and west throughout 1944.519 
Speer increased turnout even as the German empire shrank around him. 
The boost resulted from measures improving the efficiency of the war economy that 
redirected production from consumer to military output. Manufacture of consumer 
519Deutschlands Riistung, 385, 397; Rfmki, Economics of the Second World War, 
341. 
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goods remained high until late 1943. German arms manufacturers then employed 
only S.2 million workers, while consumer producers held on to 6 million employees, 
many still working at home. Speer's earlier mentioned plan to shift consumer goods 
production to plants in the occupied nations took hold in 1944. Much of the 
miraculous rise in German arms production that year can be attributed to this 
transfer of manufactures. Moreover, Speer's dispersal of production, many times to 
hardened underground facilities, bore fruit. Nonetheless, Speer failed to mobilize 
German women to replace industrial workers sent to war.520 
What did this mean to Italian production? First, Speer's use of occupied 
producers to turnout consumer items freed up German manufacturers, who then 
shifted their expertise and labor to arms manufacturing. Every square meter of 
Italian cloth, every item of optical apparatus, every ounce of chemicals made in Italy 
directly contributed to the stunning rise in German arms production that year. 
Moreover, skilled Italian labor, toiling in both Italy and Germany, provided Speer 
with sorely-needed workers. The highly proficient Italian laborers proved 
irreplaceable, given the failure to mobilize unskilled German female workers. Speer 
testified to this at Nuremberg when he noted that: 
In 1944 7 times as many weapons were manufactured as in 1942, SVZ times as 
many armored vehicles, and 6 times as much ammunition. The number of 
workers in these branches increased only by 30 percent. This success was not 
brought about through a greater exploitation oflabor but rather through the 
abolition of obsolete methods of production and through an improved system 
520Ehrman, Grand Strategy, 6-7. 
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of controlling the production of armament.S2I 
That Italy played a vital role in this achievement is undeniable. 
Some German forces began using Italian equipment during this time and 
received replacement parts from Italian manufactures. (See Chart VII-2 for detailed 
information.) Between October 1943 and October 1944, Italian producers delivered 
more than 95,000 submachine guns, 41,000 rifles, 42,000 carbines, and 6,000 machine 
guns. Italian antiaircraft, antitank, mortar, and artillery pieces sustained the 
German defense of Italy. Moreover, thousands of Italian bicycles, motorcycles, 
automobiles, trucks, and tractors kept German forces moving. A few improved 
assault guns and tanks from Italian factories also reached the fighting forces.s22 
Nonetheless, serious problems impeded Speer's campaign for greater 
efficiency in Italian production. By September 1944, developing shortages of key 
raw materials loomed on the horizon. The loss of chromium from the Balkans and 
Turkey meant that Germany and Italy would soon be unable to produce the special 
types of steel essential to modem warfare. Without such metals, all war production 
would halt in early January 1946.523 
S21IMT, XVI:448. 
S22Andrea Curami, "Miti e rea1rit dell'industria bellica della RSI," Rivista di 
Storia contemporanea XXII, no. 2-3 (Aprile-Luglio 1993): 325-37. 
5230ron J. Hale, "Speer. 8 Aug 45," Government Service, War Department, 
Historical (Schuster) Commission Interrogation of Former German Officials, 
University of Virginia Special Collections (Charlottesville, Va.: Alderman Library), 
2. 
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The shrinking coal supply also hindered the maintenance of production 
levels throughout the Reich that summer. In Italy, which required 900,000 tons of 
German coal monthly for industry and agriculture, demands for transportation space 
to maintain Kesselring's embattled armies slowed coal shipments and with it, Italian 
factories. By September 1944, the destructive force of Allied air power in the 
Balkans had reduced coal stocks that powered transportation to a twelve-day supply. 
During October, Ultra revealed that 30 to 35 percent of all industrial concerns in 
western Germany had ceased operation owing to the destruction of key 
transportation nodes, particularly the rail marshaling centers vital to moving coal, 
which fueled the entire war economy. The end was not far off for Hider's Thousand 
Year Reich.s24 
Even as the Reich neared collapse, food made its way from Italy to Germany. 
Despite the transportation crisis, Italy supplied large amounts of foodstuffs to 
Germany between August and December 1944. Hider's officials dispatched 5,800 
carloads of Italian victuals to the Reich during this period. Italian rice, wheat, and 
fruits replaced losses from Russian, Polish, and Romanian farms during the Reich's 
s24Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis und Ausbeutung," 690-91; General des 
Transportwesens Italien, "Beitrage zum Kriegstagebuch (fuer den Monat Juni 
1944)," RH19 X (Heeresgruppe C), Band 72 (BAMA: Microfiche), 3; "Sunset No. 
692. 21 September 1944," SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 1, Part ill. RG 
457, Records of the NSNCSS, (NAIl), 232; "Sunset No. 726. 25 October 1944," 
SRS-1869. NND 947022, Entry 9026, Box 2, Part IV. RG 457, Records of the 
NSNCSS, (NAIl), 97. 
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waning days.S2S 
Air attacks on north Italy hindered industrial efficiency during the summer 
and fall of 1944. Targeting of manufacturing plants declined as raids focused on 
transportation during OPERATION STRANGLE. The strikes began with renewed 
force late that summer. A raid during August destroyed the Ferrara rubber works, 
which threatened to shut down twenty-two other factories dependent upon its 
output. Leyers requested 1,100 rons of rubber from Germany lest he lose Italian 
capacity ro manufacture 22,000 tires monthly.s26 
The destructive attacks continued throughout the winter of 1944-1945, but 
with the addition of air raids on ammunition and arms plants, directly supporting 
Kesselring's forces in Italy. Steel manufacturing and rolling plants also moved 
higher up the list of targeted facilities. Air raids further reduced output because 
Italy lacked a modem warning system that could determine the raiders' intended 
target. This antiquated warning system caused widespread work sroppages at major 
industrial concerns until early 1945, when most plants had already been idled owing 
ro a lack of coal and transportation for finished goods. The dispersal of 
manufacturing facilities worsened transport problems and angered Italian 
industrialists, who feared the loss of machine rools and other equipment.s27 
S2SKlinkhammer, Zwischen Biindnis und Besatzung, 116; Heckel and Beelirz, 
"Italian Theater (23 Aug-2 Sep 44)," 1. 
s26Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis und Ausbeutung," 689. 
S27Leyers, "Italian War Production," 17-19,23-26,27-32. 
305 
Problems plaguing transportation to and from the Reich caused a radical 
realignment of Italian production priorities. Speer at last accepted Kesselring's 
notion that Italian production would best serve the Wehrmacht forces fighting in 
Italy. It took the disastrous transport situation to tum that plan into reality. The 
northward withdrawal of fighting forces to positions near Bologna made the plan 
even more efficient than it would have been earlier, when German forces were 
fighting south of Rome. Given the effects of Allied air raids on transportation routes 
that fall, the plan became an imperative if German forces were to continue operations 
in Italy.528 
The new measures gave Italian industrialists a measure of self-
administration. They acquired the right to tum steel and other basic materials into 
finished goods, increasing the number of workers needed. Keeping more Italian 
workers at their jobs became important to bosses who worked hard to minimize labor 
unrest.529 Industrialists' efforts preserved their skilled labor force and kept it in 
place for postwar production. 
Nonetheless, Italy served its German masters until the end of the war. Its 
fields and factories first filled gaps in German production and later sustained the 
operations of German troops in Italy when they otherwise would have collapsed 
because of their isolation from the Reich. The Allied failure to take the Po Valley 
528Leyers, "Italian War Production," 5; Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis und 
Ausbeutung," 691-92. 
529Leyers, "Italian War Production," 6-7. 
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meant not only that they had to keep troops deployed on the French Alps and 
northern Apennines during the winter of 1944-45, it also meant that Germany could 
use Italian resources to continue fighting. 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict in Iraly from May until December 1944 claimed thousands of 
lives and saw the American Fifth and British Eighth armies finally break the 
months' long stalemate ar Cassino and Anzio. The caprure of Rome, the first capital 
city of a major Axis power to fall to the Allies, presaged rhe fall of Berlin and 
surrender of Tokyo. Rome's capirulation gave the weary Allied forces a much-
needed, if somewhat short-lived, reason to celebrate. The pursuit took the Anglo-
American armies 250 miles up rhe Italian peninsula, affixing additional laurels to 
their rolls for the liberation of Florence, Pis a, Ravenna, and a host oflesser, if 
nonetheless equally grateful, Italian cities and villages. 
But for all the exhilaration of the advance, what had been won? Churchill's 
bold vision of a triumphant drive on Vienna rurned anew into a fading chimera of 
dashed hopes. The agonies of the Gustav Line blurred into the torments of the Gothic 
Line. There was always one more muddy hellhole lying ahead, one more river, one 
more elusive phantom called final victory, which was always over just one more 
Italian hill. 
Despite all the misery, bloodshed, and plain hard work, the Allies gained 
little wisdom from rheir experiences. The Allied advances added hungry mouths 
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needing sustenance. The German escape outside Rome meant that Kesselring's 
battered Kampfgruppen had bought themselves the time to restore themselves into 
foot-weary, battered divisions. These much-reduced forces defeated the Allied push 
for Bologna and a real breakthrough into the Po Valley, as sunny Italy once more put 
on its winter guise of mud. One of the Italian campaign's great what-iPs remains 
what might have happened had Alexander kept the divisions "DRAGOON"-ed off to 
southern France. Might not this enhanced army have pulled off the invasion of 
southern France in reverse, crossing the Alps to pursue German forces into France 
and the waiting arms of Eisenhowers divisions at Lyon or Colmar? 
The situation in Italy as 1944 ended was fundamentally unchanged from the 
way that 1943 had closed. German forces occupied a strong defensive position 
astride the mountainous north. The Po Valley beckoned to the Allies, but stayed in 
German hands. Another Italian harvest, the labor of Italian workers, the output of 
Italian factories, fed the German war machine during its most desperate days. Italy 
could not tip the tide for Germany, but it could feed Germans and ensure that 
Kesselring's forces could stay in the field through the final winter of the war. 
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Chapter VII Charts 
Chart VII-I 
The Luftwaffe in Italy: July 1944 - April 1945 
Arm of 20. 7. 20. 8. 20.9. 20. 10. 20. 11. 20. 12 10. 1. 45 9. 4. 45 
Service 
Shon-range 15/9 34/21 23/20 27/18 22/5 25/13 29/23 24/14 
recon 
Long-range 22/12 27/12 25/17 17/10 22/17 17/13 16/13 14/12 
recon 3/2 
Ar234 
Fighters 60/47 38/30 - - - - - -
(IraL F.) (58/29) (74/61) ( -) (34/22) (28/18) (60/44) (67/31) (66/50) 
Ground - - - 14(7 12/9 - - -
attack 
aircraft 
Night 48/26 33/17 32/23 35/25 26i15 26121 23/14 38/35 
fighters 
Bombers - 62/14- - - - - - -
(IraLB. (41/13) (23/6) ( -) (14/-) (141-) (24119) (13/11) (l3n) 
AndT.) 
Total 145/94 194/94 80/60 93/60 82/46 68/47 68/50 79/63 
(99/42) (96/61) ( -) (48/22) (42/18) (84163) (80/42) (79/51) 
Transports 36/36 
First number: Aircraft on hand; second number: combat ready aircraft. In parentheses: Italian 
units. 
Source: Karl Gnndelach, Die deulscne Luftwaffe im MiItebMer 1940-1945 Band 2, 830. 
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CHARTVII-2 
ITALIAN SMALL ARMS, ARTILLERY, AND MUNITIONS PRODUCTION 
1 OCTOBER 43-10 OCTOBER 44 
Weapon Number Weapon Number 
produced produced 
Berettasub~chlne~ 95,234 65/64 naval A.A. cannon 25 
7.65 mm pistols 53,725 75/18 field howitzers 74 
91/41 rifles 41,850 75/18 assault gun howitzers 55 
91 a carbines 18,994 75/34 assault gun& field 290 
artillery cannon 
91 b carbines 23,217 8 hnm mortars 1,150 
Breda 30 light machine-guns 1,733 90/50 naval A.A. cannon 23 
Breda 37 ~chlne-~ 1,300 90/53 field A.A. cannon 198 
Breda 38 ~chlne-~ for 2,875 100/47 torpedo-boats cannon 20 
armor 
12.7mm ~chine-guns for 1,699 100/47 submarine cannon 10 
aircraft 
Breda 31 ~chlne-guns 204 105/25 assault gun cannon 88 
20mm cannons for armor 184 120/50 naval cannons 4 
20mm naval AA. cannons 226 135/45 naval cannons 26 
20mm field AA. cannons 2,639 149/19 field howitzers 13 
Breda 37/54 cannons 139 149/40 field cannons 10 
47/32 antitank cannons 101 210/22 howitzers 22 
47mm cannons for armor 188 
Source: Curami 1993: 326. From photocopy of «[Jer Generalbeauftragte for ltalien des 
Reichsminister for Riistung una Kriegsproduluion (illegible) Ausstellung der oom OKH-Wa A ltaiien in 
der Zeit fXm 2.10.43 - 31.10.44 beschaffien allen, Gertit8 una Munition. (10 Dec 44.) 
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CHARTVII-3 
CHANGES IN OBSWFROM SUMMER 1944 UNTIL MAY 1945 
DEPARTURES FROM ITALY 
Hermann Goring Panzer Division Left in July 44 for Eastern Front (Warsaw) 
3M panzergrenadier Division Left in August 44 for OB West (France) 
15th panzergrenadier Division Left in September 44 for OB West (France) 
44th Infantry Division (Hoch-n. Left in November 44 for OB Siidost 
Deutschmeister) 
188th Reserve Division Left in December 44 
71Sth Infantry Division (motorized) Left in December 44 for OB SUdost 
71" Infantry Division Left in December 44 
710th Infantry Division Left in January 45 for Eastern Front 
356th Infantry Division Left in January 45 for Eastern Front 
16th SS Panzergrenadier Division Left in March 45 for OB Siidost 
"Reichsfiihrer SS" 
237th Infantry Division Left in March 45 
ADDITIONS 
16th SS Panzergrenadier Division June 44 
19th Luftwaffe Field Division June 44 
20th Luftwaffe Field Division June 44 
34th Infantry Division July 44 
114th Jager Division Summer 44 from OB Sudost 
3M Italian Division "San Marco" Summer 44, new division from Grafenwohr 
4th Italian Division "Monte Rosa" Summer 44, new division from Grafenwohr 
42ad Jager Division August 44 
232ad Infantry Division (immobile) September 44, new division raised from fortress troops 
98th Infantry Division September 44 
148th Reserve Infantry Division October 44, remnants of division escaped from France 
157th Reserve Mountain Division Early fall 44, remnants of division escaped from France 
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237th Infantry Division (immobile) Sept. 44, new division raised from fortresS troops 
1 It Italian Division "Italia" Fall 44, new division from Grafenwohr (understrength) 
2ad Italian Division "Linorio" Fall 44, new division from Grafenwohr (understrength) 
Replacement Division "SchIesien" Fall 44 
Replacement Division "Ost Prenssen" Fall 44 
NEW FORMATIONS RAISED IN ITALY 
Italo-German Corps Staff"Lombardia" 
155th Field Training Division Jan. 4S from portions of 20m Laftwatfe Field Division 
Machinegun Battalions 1 & 2 Late Fall 44 from Army Panzer Antiaircraft 400 unit 
92M Infantry Division June 44 [0 reinforce 362M Infantry Division 
19th Luftwaffe Field Division To reinforce 20m Luftwaffe Field Division 
94th Infantry Division To reinforce 305m Infantry Division 
20th Luftwaffe Field Division To form 155m Field Training Division & reinforce another 
division 
RENAMING OF UNITS 
LXXXVII Army Corps Became Army Liguria under Marshal Graziani 
Commander Adriatic Coastal Area LXXIII Army Corps 
157th Reserve Mountain Division 8th Mountain Division 
148th Reserve Infantry Division 148th Infantry Division 
278m Infantry Division Designated a Volksgrenadier Division 
305th Infantry Division Designated a Volksgrenadier Division 
334m Infantry Division Designated a Volksgrenadier Division 
Sources: Klaus Benelsmann, "Die Entwicklung der persone1len und materiellen Lage der Verbiinde des 
OB Stidwest vom Sommer 44 bis zur Kapitulation." N422, Bd. 26, Nachlafi Hans Rottiger. (BAMA: 
Microfiche), 24-25; Adolf Heckel and Dietrich Beelitz, "Italian Theater (23 Aug-2 Sep 44)." NARA 
Microfiche Publication M1035 Fiche 0259, Foreign Military Studies, B-Series (RG 338) B-0268, (1947), 
11-12.; John Ellis, World War/I: A Statistical Survey: TIre Essential Facts and Ftgures for all Comhatanls, 
(New York: Facts on File, 1993) 164-165. 
CHAPTER 8 
FINALE 
'What are the conelusions? The people say: the Germans are stripping Northern Italy, 
and won't even leave us our eyes to cry witb.'S30 
Marshal Graziani,Ianuary 1945 
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German forces eked out a narrow victory by turning their Allied opponents 
away from the gates of Bologna. Nonetheless, the successful defense of the northern 
Apennines could not undo the fatal damage that the Allies inflicted upon Germany 
at home. The loss of battles elsewhere presaged the German collapse in Italy in April 
and May 1945, no matter how hard German troops fought to stave defeat off or how 
much Italian laborers produced. 
WINTER BATTLES 
With the terrible summer rout and bitter fall fighting behind them, 
Kesselring took stock of his army. By the smallest of margins, his formations had 
fended off the Allied bid to breach Bologna's defenses. Had that battle continued a 
single day, further combat would have compelled his retreat. Despite a sense of 
pride in his troops, Kesselring knew how badly they were hurt. Most divisions 
carried fewer than 3,000 men on their rolls. With this bare minimum of manpower, 
S~eakin, Brutal Friendship, 746. 
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the Field Marshal expected each one to cover a sector stretching more than thirty 
kilometers. Few reserves backed up his exhausted and over-extended units. The 
skeletal formations rotated men in and out of the line as a trickle of men and 
equipment strengthened German divisions.531 
Kesselring, keenly aware that his troops had given their all, requested 
permission for his forces to fall back behind the Po River, while the bad weather of 
the winter months offered cover from the ubiquitous Allied air forces. Hitler, with 
Russian forces firmly established on German soil, would brook no further retreats.532 
He demanded that Kesselring's men stand and fight in the northernmost 
Apennines. Hitler's insistence on a static defense ensured that when the Allied 
spring offensive began, the immobilized remnants of Kesselring's army would not 
escape Allied armored and mechanized infantry divisions penetrating the flat 
country of the Po Valley. 
The winter halt in Italy did not mean a cessation of all fighting. Although 
British and American commanders lacked the strength necessary to hammer their 
way through the mud and German defenses, they applied constant pressure along 
the front, conducting what their opponents labeled 'snail offensives.' The incessant 
assaults on German positions prevented the defenders from rebuilding their 
531Ehrman, Grand Strategy, 37-40; Heckel and Beelirz, "Italian Theater The 
Fighting in the Bologna Adriatic Coast Sector," 1-2. 
532/bid 3 
., . 
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strength.S33 Instead, the fighting in Italy degenerated into World War One-style 
trench warfare. German infantry dug-in and depended on their few remaining 
mobile units to cauterize penetrations of the line.S34 
DISINTEGRATION: THE ITALIAN WAR ECONOMY COLLAPSES 
RAILROADS AND EMPTY COAL CARS 
The havoc wreaked by the Allied air offensive against transportation targets 
in Germany radiated throughout Hitler's shrinking empire. Aerial assaults in Italy 
hampered transport of men and materiel. During December 1944, the Allied air 
campaign against the Italian rail net and Po River bridges created 400 major breaks 
in the system. So widespread was the harm, that fifty breaches remained un repaired 
on January 1,1945. Between November 1944 and April 1945, Allied raiders dropped 
15,000 tons of bombs on the Brenner line alone. The damage interrupted movement 
on the Brenner route to Bologna until February. Although repairs restored a low 
level of service during February and March, Allied air attacks again severed the 
railway in Apri1..S3S 
S33Heckei and Beelitz, "Italian Theater The Fighting in the Bologna Adriatic 
Coast Sector," 16-17. 
S34Forster, "The Dynamics ofVolksgemeinschaft," 3:211. 
S3S M.A.A.F. ASD, 1 06; Walther Hubatsch, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos 
tier Wehrmacht (WehrmachtjUhrungsstab) 1940-45. Band IV: 1. Januar 1944 - 22. Mai 
1945. Zweiter Halbband, ed. Helmuth Greiner and Percy Ernst Schramm (Frankfurt 
am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1961), 1390; Transportation Division The United 
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Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, the Russians opened a massive winter 
offensive on January 9 and overran the rest of German-occupied Poland. Zhukov's 
armies penetrated Germany, seizing the Upper Silesian coal fields. The American 
conquest of the Saar during March further aggravated the situation. The loss of the 
two areas proved catastrophic, leaving the Ruhr basin as the last source of coal for 
empty German bins. Speer worked hard to see that remaining coal stockpiles got 
through. Hider's ever-busy Armaments Minister won the enmity of the last few 
bureaucrats who still possessed the energy to defend their shrinking personal 
fiefdoms by taking over railroad operations as he saw fit. Despite Speer's 
extraordinary measures, the end was in sight. He projected that little more could be 
produced other than that for which materials were already in the pipeline. S36 
The deteriorating situation in the Reich meant that coal and raw material 
shipments from Germany to Italy would soon cease. OBSW responded to its 
impending isolation by expanding efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. Logisticians 
worked to replace 50,000 tons oflogistical support shipments dispatched monthly 
from Germany. Efforts to further mobilize Italian industry faltered when the cutoff 
of German coal exports took place. On January 21,1945, Kesselring received news 
States Strategic Bombing Survey, Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 1, 13-14; USAAF, ULTRA and the llzstory 
of the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force, 194. 
S36Die TagelJUchervonJoseph Goebbels, Teil IT: Diktate 1941-1945. Band IS: 
Januar-ApriI194S, ed. Elke Frolich and Maximilian Gschaid (Miinchen: K. G. Saur, 
1995),240; Hubatsch, Ktb OKW IV(2), 1321-22; IMT, XVI:490-91; Deakin, Brutal 
Friendship, 747; Mierzejewski, Collapse of the German War Economy, 155-61. 
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that coal shipments would soon be halted.S37 
While Allied air attacks never stopped all rail traffic between Italy and 
Germany, the experience of the Trento line between November 1944 and April 1945 
is representative of the system's general demise. (See Chart VIll-l.) That traffic did 
not falloff more sharply stemmed from the herculean labors of railroad men and the 
local population. 11,500 workers stood ready to restore breaks along the Brenner 
line, and officials did not hesitate to enlist nearby residents when the situation 
demanded it. 
German engineers dug deep into their bag of tricks, building bridges with 
removable spans, camouflaging rebuilt structures with painted-on bomb craters, and 
using an adjacent line to decoy attackers. Other officials oversaw the network by 
telephone, rapidly shifting traffic from damaged [0 undamaged routes. 350-480 
antiaircraft guns defended the line, 70 percent of which were manned by Italian 
crews. They and the 2nd Group of the Fascist Italian Air Force protected the route, 
taking a heavy toll of the Allied medium bombers assigned the drudge work of 
sundering the thin ribbon of steel.538 
S37Hubatsch, Ktb OKW!V(2), 1391. 
53srhe United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Rail Operations Over the 
Brenner Pass, 7-10; Richard Baumgarmer, "Organization of the Po River Crossings (1 
Jan - 30 Mar 1945)," NARA Microfiche Publication M1035, Fiche 0136, Foreign 
Military Studies, D-Series (RG 338) D-207 (Washington, D.C., 1947),12-13; 
USAAF, ULTRA and the History of the United States Strategic Air Force, 181. 
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Chart VIII-I 
Number of Trains transiting the Trento Line 
November 1944-April1945 
Passenger Freight Work Total 
Nov 44 344 24% 790 56% 296 20% 1430 
Dec 44 482 31% 609 42% 357 27% 1448 
Jan 45 367 27% 750 56% 232 17% 1349 
Feb 45 292 31% 471 51% 169 18% 932 
Mar 45 234 31% 358 46% 173 23% 765 
Apr 45 200 41% 158 33% 120 26% 478 
Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Transportation Division, 
Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1947), 11. 
Nonetheless, impromptu repairs could not substitute for a working rail 
system. German engineers' heroic measures could only go so far in heading off 
collapse. Traffic on the Trento line fell 66.6 percent from November 1944 to April 
1945. A postwar survey revealed the scale of the destruction that German rail 
officials confronted. Rail cars clogged a two and one-half mile stretch of track 
between Gardano and Bolzano. More than 6,000 pieces of rail stock languished in 
and around Bolzano. The cars, some empty and some full, could not enter Italy nor 
return to the Reich. A small number of shipments slipped through, using jury-
rigged railroads, but trains bearing the Wehrmacht's logistical life-blood languished 
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on tracks leading nowhere, while German forces bled to death in Italy.s39 
The failure of the rail system and continuing Allied air attacks on Italian 
industry seriously undermined the willingness of Italian labor to work for Germany. 
Wage and hunger strikes occurred frequently in the waning days of the war. 
Stockpiles of hoarded raw materials vanished, either having been used in Italian 
factories or returned to Germany.S40 One A WP official reported that air raids had 
severely curtailed output, halting production at many plants.541 Although Mussolini 
nationalized the remaining important Italian industry in March, his desperate 
playact merely made the collapse crystal clear.S42 
SWITZERLAND SLAMS THE DOOR SHUT 
In the fall of 1944, Albert Speer ordered production dispersed in Italy, 
hoping to avoid the worst consequences of Allied air attacks. Fighting had driven 
the front line far north of Rome, requiring the dismantling of plants in endangered 
areas. Transportation, as seen above, became the worst bottleneck in Speer's 
production scheme, slowing shipments of machine tools north to new sites in Italy 
and Germany. What he could not have foreseen before launching this undertaking 
S3~he United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Rail Operations Over the 
Brenner Pass, 13-14. 
s-ww ehrig, "Duties and Operation of the Italian Section of the Chief of 
Wehrmacht Motor Transportation," 6. 
541The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Rail Operations Over the 
Brenner Pass, 12. 
S42TagebiichervonJoseph Goebbels, 499; Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 747-50. 
319 
was the convergence of Allied air attacks and Swiss intransigence concerning rail 
shipments across that nation. 
In March 1944, the Swiss government accepted Allied demands that 
German transit rights for fuel, requisitioned goods, and items with potential military 
use be reduced. The curtailment limited trade to prewar levels.543 Allied pressure 
for additional abatements of German transit rights continued that July when U.S. 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, pushed for a further cut in German-Swiss rail traffic 
and commerce. A month later, he demanded a complete halt to such intercourse. 
Hull ruled out a food blockade of Switzerland after the Allies captured France in 
July and August. Nonetheless, he recommended to his British counterparts that the 
Swiss be threatened with air raids on rail routes leading into the country, a move that 
would have choked off the Swiss supply of food and other necessities. British 
diplomats pointed out to Hull Switzerland's role in protecting Anglo-American 
airmen downed over Germany. This function had assumed increased importance as 
German civilians took out their anger on British and American fliers who fell into 
their hands. 
Swiss officials partially placated the Americans in October, when Bern 
denied Germany access to the Simplon tunnel and discontinued shipments of 
S43Richard Ochsner, "Transit von Truppen, Einzelpersonen, Kriegsmaterial, 
und zivilen Gebrauchsgiitern zugunsten einer Kriegspartei durch das neutrale 
Land," in Schwedische und Schweizerische Neutralitiit im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Rudolf 
L. Bindschedler, Hans RudolfKurz, Wilhelm Carlgren and Sten Carlsson (Basel: 
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1985),223; Schwarz, Eye of the Hurricane, 65-66. 
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ammunition and explosives to the Reich. Nonetheless, German trains rolled through 
the Swiss Alps, taking the St. Gotthard Pass, a route off limits to Allied fighter-
bombers. Swiss cooperation with Hider infuriated the American government, which 
knew that German trains carried food requisitioned from Italy by its Nazi overseers. 
American representatives stepped up pressure on the Swiss again in November, this 
time halting Swiss ground and rail movements through liberated France. The 
handwriting was on the wall, and even the most obdurate Swiss could see it. Allied 
threats forced Switzerland to choose between its relationship with the crumbling 
Reich or its future dealings with Western powers.544 
The Swiss slowly gave ground that winter, reducing transit shipments of 
German iron during November and December. Similar cuts followed in cargos of 
foodstuffs. Swiss representatives excused their actions to German officials on the 
grounds that Germany had not supplied exports dictated by earlier agreements. In 
fact, the Swiss no longer worried about German retaliation, given the new state of 
affairs in central Europe.545 
The Bundesrat halted coal shipments on February 9, 1945. German coal 
shipments to Italy could not transit Switzerland so long as coal deliveries to the 
544Helmreich, "The Diplomacy of Apology," 26-28; Ochsner, "Transit von 
Truppen," 225; Tom Bower, Nazi Gold (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),69-70; 
William Slany, U.S. and Allied Effons to ReCO'Oer and Restore Gold and Other Assets 
Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II: Forward and Executive Summary to 
the Preliminary Study <www.state.gov>, 7 May 1997. 
54SOchsner, "Transit von Truppen," 226. 
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Swiss were in arrears. Since Germany could not make up the deficit owed to 
Switzerland, this policy change ended coal transfers to Italy. Throughout March, 
the Swiss government applied the same principle to commercial transactions with 
Germany, terminating the movement of iron, scrap metals, and food. Switzerland 
also ended transfers of electricity to Germany. New agreements with the Western 
powers incrementally replaced Switzerland's lost commerce with Germany and let 
the Republic haul supplies of food and raw materials through France. Nonetheless, 
the Swiss purchased looted gold and traded secretly with Nazi Germany until the 
war ended.s46 
A major reassessment of the Swiss role in the Second World War is under 
way. Those assigned this task would do well to consider the important part that the 
Italian campaign played in Switzerland's actions. Because Allied armies remained 
south of Rome until June 1944, Nazi Germany kept Switzerland isolated from other 
democratic states. Switzerland's isolation, its desire to profit from the war, Swiss 
racism, and significant sympathy for Germany in government and commercial 
circles, predisposed the Swiss leadership to assist Nazi Germany during the war's 
last eighteen months. Switzerland manufactured arms and explosives for Germany, 
supplied electricity to fuel German homes and factories, built locomotives and 
machine tools, and greased the German war machine with hard currency, urgently 
S46Ochsner, "Transit von Truppen,", 227-28; Bower, Nazi Gold, 79-80; Slany, 
U.S. and Allied Efforts to ReCO'Der and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by 
Germany During World War IL 
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needed to purchase raw materials from Spain and Portugal. 
Could the Allies have prevented this? Swiss-German cooperation survived 
the war, with Switzerland refusing to acknowledge that it had German assets and 
denying Holocaust survivors access to funds given safe haven in its banks.547 
Nonetheless, Swiss assistance to Germany shrank substantially only after Allied 
troops arrived on the Franco-Swiss border. When American and British leaders 
threatened blockades and severe consequences after the war, Switzerland reduced 
German transit traffic across the Republic and slowly cut commercial ties with the 
disintegrating Reich. Had Allied forces made a determine effort to breakthrough to 
north Italy in late 1943 or early 1944, Swiss authorities might have reduced their 
entanglements with Germany that much earlier, which would have assisted the 
Allied cause. 
TOTAL WAR, TOTAL DEFEAT 
On March 11, 1945, Kesselring departed Italy to command the Western 
Front. He nominated as his replacement von Vietinghoff, who had been transferred 
from Italy to Army Group Courland on the Russian Front. Vietinghoff visited Berlin 
in mid-March and left convinced that Hitler had lost touch with reality. The Fuhrer 
offered nothing but transparent fabrications to buck-up the visiting commander. 
S47For two recent studies on Swiss complicity in assisting German efforts to 
turn looted gold into hard currency, see: Tom Bower, Nazi Gold, New York: 
HarperCollins, 1997, and Adam LeBor. Hitters Secret Bankers: The Myth of Swiss 
Neutrality during the Holocaust, Secaucus, N.J.: Birch Lane Press, 1997. 
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Vietinghoff returned to Italy and willingly assisted on-going negotiations with Allied 
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representatives in Switzerland, which resulted in the surrender of German forces in 
Italy a few days before the comprehensive Reims setdement in May 1945.548 
548 Albert Kesselring, liThe Territorial Authority And Responsibilities of the 
Commander in Chief South-West in Upper-Italy," NARA Microfiche Publication 
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Vietinghoff's staff pondered possible Allied strategies for the spring of 1945. 
British and American forces could drive northward while simultaneously landing on 
the Adriatic and Ligurian coasts, trapping German and Italian units in pockets along 
the main battle front, in Istria, and in the western Alps. The landing would have 
prevented a retreat to the Po River and annihilated German forces in Italy. 
Vietinghoff's dismal reconnaissance capability revealed that the Allies had not built 
up their amphibious forces to the level that this operation required. Nonetheless, 
German estimates held that a landing on either flank a posed a serious threat. Units 
were deployed for a quick response to the endangered coastal sectors, playing into 
the hands of Allied deception measures one last time.S49 
Vietinghoff had sixteen divisions in the battle line before the Allied spring 
offensive began. He could expect little naval support, and the Luftwaffe and Italian 
Fascist Air Force could only put up a dozen planes against thousands of Allied craft. 
Ultra served the Allies one last time by revealing the deterioration of German forces. 
German divisions were still woefully short of men and equipment. Allied air attacks 
on Italian factories had halted ammunition production in February 1945, decreasing 
ammunition supplies held by combat forces to a two-day allotment. German vehicles 
M1035, Fiche 0057, Foreign Military Studies, C-Series (RG338), C-064A (1949), i; 
Hubatsch, Ktb OKW W(2), 1390; C.M.H.Q. Historical Section, "Special 
Interrogation Report. Colonel-General Heinrich von Vietinghoff gen. Scheel. 
Commander Tenth Army Commander-in-Chief, Army Group "C,"" 9/24/146 
(LHCMA, 24 Oct 46), 7-8. 
S49Kesselring and et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 175-78; 
Hubatsch, Ktb OKW W(2), 1392; ULTRA, MAGIC, and the Allies, 50-52. 
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had fuel sufficient to move just eighty kilometers. Moreover, Allied commanders 
knew that Hider was demanding that his troops fight in place.sso 
Despite the inevitability of the offensive, the British 8th Army attack on 
Apri19 took von Vietinghoffby surprise.SS1 Without aerial reconnaissance, he could 
not keep an eye on what was taking place behind the immediate front. A second 
strike by American forces so confused German commanders that they miscalculated 
the location of the main blow.ss2 
The ferocity of the Allied air assault that accompanied the offensive 
surprised the Germans. Roving fighter-bombers struck German positions on the 
Senio River with fragmentation bombs, which sent casualty counts soaring in front 
line units. Command and control centers, supply lines, and river crossings, received 
close attention. Air power for once lived up to its claim that it could decisively 
influence the outcome of a campaign when aircraft struck at ferries and bridges 
carrying fleeing German units to the north bank of the Po River. Unit cohesion 
broke down as the German formations retreated, seeking escape from the Allied 
SSOKesselring et aI., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 184-87; Hans 
Rottiger, "Geschichte der Waffenstreckung der deutsch-italienischen Truppen in 
Italien," N 422, Bd. 2 (BAMA Freiburg, Germany), 4-5; Klaus Bertelsmann, "Die 
Entwicklung der personellen und materiellen Lage der Verbande des OB Siidwest 
vom Sommer 44 bis zur Kapirulation," N422, Bd. 26 (BAMA Freiburg, Germany 
(Microfiche)), 21; Leyers, "Italian War Production," 19; ULTRA, MAGIC, and the 
Allies, 49, 52; Bennett, Behind the Battle, 234-35. 
sSlHistorical Section, "Vietinghoff9/24/146," 7. 
SS2Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope, 298. 
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divisions nipping at their heels. The flat and open Po Valley offered little cover from 
marauding Allied fighters and bombers. It was also ideal terrain for Allied armor. 
German morale plummeted as defeat and disintegration overtook German units 
fleeing to the Po. 14th Army abandoned its equipment in the rout. 1rJi' Army escaped 
with half of its weapons and vehicles.ss3 
Allied forces in western Germany renewed offensive operations in March, 
crossing the Rhine River at Remagen on March 7, breaching the last defensible 
position on that front. Montgomery's 21st Army Group made a set-piece crossing of 
the Rhine at Wesel on March 24, two days after Patton's American 3rd Army snuck 
over at Oppenheim, south of Mainz. Allied forces raced through Germany, with the 
remnants of twenty-six German divisions offering sporadic resistance. The 
encirclement of the Ruhr on 1 April 1945 isolated the last important concentration 
of German troops in the west. American spearheads reached the Elbe River in 
eastern Germany on April 24, where they linked up with their Russian counterparts 
the next day. 
Russian forces, immobilized by their winter advance to the Oder River, just 
thirty miles east of Berlin, spent several months recouping their strength. Three 
Soviet fronts, each equivalent to an Allied army group, fought an intense set of 
battles to seize bridgeheads across the Oder from April 15-18, 1945. When the 
SS3M.A.A.F. ASD, 106; Baumgartner, "Organization of the Po River 
Crossings," 18; Bertelsmann, "Entwicklung der personnellen und materiellen Lage," 
21; Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope, 299-301. 
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assault by Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front encountered stiff resistance on the Seelow 
Heights, which guarded the direct route [0 Berlin, Stalin altered plans and set loose 
the troops of Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front, who raced to Berlin from the 
south. 
Troops from the two Russian fronts linked up near Potsdam on April 25, 
isolating Berlin. Zhukov's and Konev's forces continued their contest in Berlin's 
city streets, with their forces often fratricidally shelling each other as the last pocket 
of German resistance slowly shrank. On April 29, Hider, with the noise of battle 
ringing in his ears, appointed Grand Admiral Karl Donitz as his successor and then 
married his mistress Eva Braun, only to commit suicide that same day. 
Allied troops drew up to the Po River west of Mantua between April 22-24. 
The eLN called for a general insurrection against the Germans on April 25. 
Resistance units liberated Milan and harassed German troops fleeing for the 
doubtful safety of the Alps. Verona fell to the U.S. 88th Infantry Division on April 
26, and the Colored 92Dd Infantry Division freed Genoa the next day. 
Resistance uprisings against the defeated Germans in the great cities of 
north Italy complicated the situation. OKWauthorized the suppression of the 
insurrection by the 'most brutal means,' a phrase that haunted Field Marshal Jodi at 
Nuremberg.ss4 German units were too busy fleeing to worry about such orders, 
issued from Hitler's bunker in Berlin. Partisans asserted their authority in areas not 
SS4""JODL Order of28-4-45: "Use most brutal methods to suppress rising in 
Italy,"" AL 413 (IWM), 1. 
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yet reached by Allied forces, capturing and executing Mussolini and his mistress, 
Clara Petacci, on April 28.sSS 
Neither JodI nor Hitler knew of negotiations between SS General Karl 
Wolff and Allied representatives in Switzerland, which culminated in a 'secret 
surrender' of German forces in Italy. Agents of the two warring sides had conducted 
lengthy and dangerous exchanges since March 1945. The German capitulation in 
Italy preceded the yielding of all Nazi forces by only six days. Nonetheless, the 
process of arriving at terms exercised a profound influence on the development of 
postwar relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. 
Stalin, who had conducted his own secret negotiations with Hitler during 
the war, worried that a German surrender in Italy was a precursor to the Western 
Allies arriving at a separate peace with the Nazi dictator. German forces could then 
have focused on holding off Stalin's armies, preventing deeper Soviet inroads into 
Germany. Moreover, Stalin feared that a German surrender in Italy would weaken 
the position of pro-Moscow resistance groups in north Italy. If the Germans 
unexpectedly capitulated and cooperated with advancing Allied forces, British and 
American forces could establish an unassailable position and dominate postwar 
Italian affairs.SS6 
SSSCaIvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, Total War, 409-10. 
sS~he standard account of the complex negotiations preceding the German 
surrender in Italy is: Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise: The 
Secret Surrender (New York: Basic Books, 1979.) For German-Russian peace talks, 
see Weinberg, A World at Arms, 609-611. 
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CONCLUSION 
On May 3,1945, Field Marshal Kesselring requested that Hitler's successor, 
Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, approve the surrender of German forces in Italy, signed 
on May 2. Donitz, hoping to limit Russian advances in the east, assented, 
concluding the long German campaign in Italy.557 
Germany lost the Second World War, and with it, the Italian campaign. 
Nonetheless, the battle for Italy was not a sideshow to the main event. Italian assets 
sustained the German war machine during the last eighteen months of conflict. 
Moreover, Allied leaders underestimated Italy's importance and blundered by 
focusing on invading France. Germany profited from their blunder, protracting the 
war. 
Chart VIII-3 
Oberbefehlshaber Sad and Sadwest Losses during Italian Campaign 
ARMY Dead Wounded Missing Total Losses 
Total Officers Total Officers Total Officers Total Officers 
Liguria 76 5 204 13 70 2 350 20 
14m 17,145 544 59,195 1,332 45,734 644 121,074 2,520 
10m 20,550 1,074 106,174 375 161,736 4,672 296,460 8,821 
Special 1,034 42 2,998 81 669 8 4,731 131 
Total 3~805 1,665 168,571 1,801 20~O9 5,326 422,615 11,492 
557Doenitz, Memoirs, 248. 
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Source: Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, W(2): 1514. 
The campaign in Italy from Cape Pessaro to the Brenner Pass lasted 570 
days. Allied troops suffered 312,000 casualties while conquering Italy. Their 
German opponents lost 422,615 men. (See Chart VllI-3.) War's cold accounting 
discloses that German losses exceeded Allied by more than 110,000 men. This figure 
may deceive observers and lead them falsely to conclude that the Allies inflicted 
greater injuries on the Germans than Allied forces received. German losses included 
208,209 officers and men tallied as missing. Among this group, a ratio of one 
casualty for each prisoner taken held steady during the war. Moreover, many 
Germans surrendered at the war's end, inflating German casualty counts. By this 
reckoning, German battIe losses roughly equaled those that the Allies suffered. 
Germans taken prisoner in Italy could have been captured in France, Poland, or 
defending the Reich.sS8 
The Allies did not enter Sicily to engage in attritional warfare. Churchill 
and Roosevelt wanted to defeat Italy and overthrow Mussolini's regime. They 
partially achieved their aims when the Italian king and Grand Fascist Council 
removed Mussolini from power in July 1943. TheDuce later returned to office, 
albeit as a German puppet, and maintained the fiction of a separate Italian state, 
competing with Badoglio's unpopular government for torn Italian loyalties. 
Other political goals eluded the Allies. Italy's surrender did not entice 
SS8Hubatsch, Ktb OKW IV(2), 1514; Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, 544-45. 
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Germany's smaller allies to quit the war. Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary fought 
alongside Nazi forces in Russia and the Balkans until Soviet military power 
conquered them. The threat of force is a poor substitute for actual military might. 
This lesson remains as applicable to Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s, as it 
was to Eastern Europe in the 1940s. 
Allied leaders also wanted to coax the neutral states of southern Europe into 
the war or edge them toward a more favorable stance toward the Allied cause. The 
Allied campaign in Italy did not catapult Turkey into the war. Constantinople 
remained on the sidelines, shipping chrome and war materials to Germany until the 
tide turned in February 1945. Spain mirrored Turkish attitudes. Franco assisted his 
Italian and German mentors, for which he suffered international isolation after the 
war. Nonetheless, Franco cooperated up to a point with Hitler until May 1944, 
supplying tungsten, a key ingredient in manufacturing steel for Panzers and antitank 
weapons. 
The plodding Allied advance in Italy did not convince the Swiss to cutoff 
trade with Hitler. Isolated from the Western democracies after France fell in 1940, 
the Swiss compromised their principles and learned to live and let-live with Hitler's 
Germany. Having witnessed the brutal expansion of their Teutonic neighbor, the 
Swiss did not arrange to become the next German target for conquest and 
exploitation. Germany appeared the certain victor of the great European civil war in 
1940. The Swiss government decided to deal with reality, unable to foresee how 
Allied fortunes would rebound by 1943. 
In each case, the feebleness of the Allied effort in Italy did not win new 
converts or friends for the Anglo-American cause. European neutrals understood 
Hitler's record of redeeming disadvantageous situations and turning them into 
amazing victories. 
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Churchill spoke eloquently of taking a poke at the Axis '50ft underbelly.' He 
mournfully corrected himself later in the Italian campaign, declaring that the Allies 
had struck at Hitler's 'tough old gut' in Italy. Handicapped by American reluctance 
to postpone the main event in Normandy, Churchill never overcame his partner's 
suspicion that the United Kingdom wanted Italy as a part of its master plan to 
preserve the British Empire. The lonely fight in North Africa against the Italians 
and Rommel's Afrika-Korps kept Britain in the war long enough for American entry 
to seal the promise of final victory. American political and military leaders could not 
grasp how the Mediterranean served Britain, linking Middle Eastern oil fields and 
Indian resources to that embattled isle. Logic, not just love of empire, drove 
Churchill to fight in the Mediterranean, where the British military had established 
bases at Gibraltar, Malta, and in Egypt. 
What began as a squabble between friends became an impasse between 
allies. Americans wanted to minimize their commitments to this British-dominated 
theater. Marshall's reticence kept force levels low and ensured that Allied troops 
never mastered their opponents. Churchill could not accept this state of affairs. He 
pushed for bold action, which left Allied forces hanging onto a precarious 
bridgehead at Anzio throughout the winter of 1943-44. American insistence that 
DRAGOON proceed stripped Alexander of veteran divisions necessary to take 
Bologna and the Po Valley in late 1944. Only the Germans benefitted from this 
standoff between partners. 
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Germany struck gold in Italy. The recovery of hoarded materials relieved 
shortages curtailing German production and fed machines in Italian factories. A WP 
officials transferred several hundred thousand tons of modern German, Swiss, and 
American machinery and raw materials back to the Reich. Germany did almost RM 
2,000,000,000 worth of business with Italian concerns, providing needed relief for 
German manufacturers. Moreover, Speer dipped deeply into the Italian labor pool, 
filling openings created by German men conscripted into the Wehrmacht. The slave 
labor of 600,000 Italian military internees filled many gaps in the German war 
economy. Although Italian production required imports of German coal, 
hydroelectric power from Italy augmented German and Swiss output. 
The farms and orchards of the Po Valley filled many railway cars with 
agricultural produce for the return trip to Germany. In 1944, Italian rice, wheat, 
fruits, and vegetables filled German bellies, replacing commodities lost when 
Russian forces retook Ukraine, Romania, and Poland. That Italian workers and their 
families lived on reduced rations worried their German overseers not one whit so 
long as Hitler could feed his army and German civilians. 
Control of Italy kept open the passage to the Balkans. German forces 
depended upon Romanian oil and Yugoslavian ores, which fueled and equipped their 
formations. Allied forces fighting from bases in north Italy could have dominated 
rails lines criss-crossing the region, eliminating the necessity of conducting a 
protracted and costly air offensive against the Romanian oil center at Ploesti. 
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During OPERATION STRANGLE, Allied airmen immobilized much of the Italian 
rail system located close to American and British air bases. Had this offensive been 
launched from north Italian airfields against routes traversing the Balkans, the effect 
on the German war economy might have been decisive. Hitler argued with his 
commanders that he could not lose the Balkans and continue the war. Allied airmen 
might have proven him correct in 1944. 
Hitler's command of Italy also dealt him a strong hand during economic 
negotiations with Switzerland. The Swiss lived in isolation from the outside world 
for four years. Moreover, their traditional neutrality left them without allies to 
counterbalance Hitler's threats of invasion. While the Swiss had confidence in their 
military forces, their government had no illusions concerning German military 
capabilities after France fell in 1940. Churchill recognized this and accepted that the 
Swiss had to trade with Hitler to survive. 
Switzerland also could not cutoff German rail transit rights, guaranteed by 
international treaty. Halting Nazi movements through the Swiss tunnels would have 
removed the one fear holding Hitler back from taking on the prickly Swiss. Released 
from the need to protect the German right of passage, he could have blockaded or 
invaded Switzerland. After the Allies landed in Sicily, German forces depended on 
the tunnels too much to risk their destruction. Hitler might rail against Bern, but he 
would not risk losing Italy to assuage his anger. 
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American and British demands that Switzerland 'play ball' with the Allies 
came too late to be effective. By the time Switzerland regained its confidence, Allied 
forces had reached the Franco-Swiss border, making the outcome in Italy a matter of 
lesser importance than it had been a year before. If Allied forces had pushed the 
Germans out of Italy in 1943, American demands on the Swiss would have carried 
real force and might have deprived Hitler of Italian and Swiss economic help. 
A fundamentally flawed grand strategy lay behind Allied decisions in the 
Mediterranean. American military commanders saw the theater as a drag on limited 
resources. Nothing justified intensifying efforts to capture Italy. The direct route to 
victory lay across the traditional battlefields of France, Belgium, and the Reich. 
Because of this relentless focus on taking the war to Hitler and Germany, American 
leaders never analyzed what they might have gained from capturing Mussolini's 
Italy. 
Mter Mussolini's fall, Germans revised their attitudes toward Italy until a 
single premise dominated policy. Italy was a prize worth winning and defending. It 
offered economic, geographic, military, and political assets worth the costs of a 
military campaign. Having assessed what Italy offered the Reich, German officials 
viewed Italy in this light from the earliest days of the takeover until the final 
shipment of goods crossed the Alps in 1945. 
Italy fit well into Albert Speer's scheme for exploiting the occupied nations. 
He turned the Mussolini's rump state into a profitable German colony. Using Italy 
as a source of consumer goods, Speer released German manufacturing capacity for 
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arms production. Mter Allied bombers hammered German railroad marshaling 
yards in the fall of 1944, he revised operations and shifted Italian industrial output to 
support Kesselring's forces.s59 
German commanders understood that economic factors outweighed military 
necessities. SS General Karl Wolff described the tenor of the September 1944 
German rout during a March 1945 discussion with Allen Dulles, noting that despite 
the dangers of defending Italy, economic requirements outweighed abandoning it for 
a secure line in the Alps. 
The food supplies available in North Italy were considerable, Italian industry 
had some value, a great deal was then being taken out of North Italy, and 
advanced air bases in the Italian plain would be a serious danger to Germany. 
These in effect were the arguments they used at the time, and Hitler swung 
over and subsequently had been opposed to evacuation for the same reasons 
that impelled him to hold on in Norway and other such areas.560 
Hitler, Wolff submitted, could not surrender Italy because its value outweighed the 
cOSt of its defense. 
German Ambassador to the Salo Republic, Rudolf Rahn, noted Italy's 
lasting value to Germany while battling with officials fighting to annex large sections 
of north Italy to Germany. He argued in a December 1944 telegram that 
[t]he Italian contribution to the war has reached a level in economics, 
employment oflabor, and in many areas, including the military, that demands 
a certain recognition by the German side, and forces us to refrain from putting 
unavoidable hardships or [our] wounded attitudes upon the Italians. The most 
559Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis und Ausbeutung," 627,676,691-92,696. 
560Allen W. Dulles and Gero von Gaevernitz, "The First German Surrender," 
Item 2454, Misc 159 (IWM, 1945), 16. 
difficult problem of the German-Italian relationship is the nature of the 
existence of the Operational Zones Alpenvorland and the Adriatic Coastal 
Area.561 
So important was Italy's economic contribution to the Reich, said Rahn, that 
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Germany must hold off transferring Italian territory to the German state, lest Italian 
sensibilities be offended. 
Military commanders lived under the long shadow of this 'gospel of 
exploitation' until the war concluded. In early 1945, von Vietinghoff and his staff 
accepted orders to defend Italy along the northern Apennines because the Italian 
industrial and agricultural heardand was one of the few economic assets still 
available to the Reich. 
The Army Group Southwest was directed to defend the existing positions and 
to prevent the Allied [sic] from pushing into the Po Valley. This decision of 
the German High Command undoubtedly originated from the necessity of 
keeping the rich agricultural resources of the Po Valley and of the industry of 
the Turino-Milan area which were decisive factors for the continuation of 
warfare.562 
Vietinghoff informed his interrogators after the war that Germany saw the struggle 
for Italy as a contest for Italy's resource base.563 His observations, reflected in WolfPs 
and Rahn's comments, show that German military and diplomatic representatives 
understood that Italy was a prize wonh winning and defending. 
561Rahn to Sonnleimer, "Telegramm Nr. 3448 vom 19.12.44," Akz. 2462/59, 
(IFZ),1. 
562Kesselring et al., German Version of the Italian Campaign, 185. 
563Historical Section, IVietinghoff9/24/146," 7-8. 
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If Germany reaped the benefits, Italy paid the price. The war left the 
Italians short of everything, except tears. They paid the cost of both German 
exploitation and Allied misunderstanding of the stakes in their beleaguered nation. 
Industrial output fell 75 percent from 1939 to 1945. Twenty percent of the industrial 
base was ruined, and that which remained needed extensive repair. Per capita 
income collapsed, falling to half that Italians earned in 1939. Many Italians suffered 
from serious malnutrition, their caloric intake having dropped 25 percent from 
prewar levels.s64 Italians working for the Germans suffered similar heavy losses. 
Nearly 40,000 of 600,000 military internees died while enduring forced labor under 
the harshest of conditions.56S 
Political instability dampened hopes of making a quick recovery from the 
ordeal of war. Ivanoe Bonomi, chairman of the Rome Committee of National 
Liberation, replaced Marshal Badoglio as prime minister after Rome's capture in 
June 1944. Bonomi governed until June 1945, when resistance leaders insisted upon 
the removal of Fascists still serving in the Italian government. Resistance leader 
Ferruccio Parri then took power, adopting socialist policies oudined during the fight 
against Germany. 
Parrl's efforts fizzled after conservatives and businessmen united to counter 
the occupation of factories by resistance fighters and their supporters. Allied 
S64 Allen and Stevenson, An Introduction to the Italian Economy, 8. 
S6SPetersen, "Deutschland und Italien," 116-18. 
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commanders had the final say, supporting Italian moderates, who understood that 
American assistance would not be offered to Italy so long as Communists and 
Socialists held power in Italy. Disappointment reigned among a majority of Italians 
in north Italy. The long fight against the Germans had both radicalized Italian 
workers and raised hopes that the end of the war would usher in a period of social 
reform. Workers and their families did not forget the Communists' leading role in 
the war against Hitler and Mussolini. Many laborers, disappointed by the failed 
social revolution anticipated in the heady days ofliberation, did not move back 
toward the political center until the 'economic miracle' of the 1960s took hold in 
Italy.566 
On May 16, 1945, the last day that the war diarist of the Oberkommando tier 
Wehrmacht made an entry, he noted that the Allies had "placed 200,000 German 
Prisoners of War at the disposal of the Italians for the work of reconstruction." The 
remnants of the German army that had won its 'last victory' in Italy played an 
important role in rebuilding the Italian economy. Italian military internees, who 
were returning home after twenty-one months of slave labor in the Reich, must have 
enjoyed the bittersweet irony of this final twist of fate.567 
566Spencer M. Di Scala, Italy: From Revolution to Republic (Boulder, Co.: 
Westview Press, 1995),272-273. 
567Hubatsch, Ktb OKW W(2), 1498. 
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